h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

MaW,

Ah but according to dictionaries, the 'mind' is also an 'abstract concept' as well!

You rightly point out that a 'mind' seems to have a 'reality' over and above our abstract conceptualisation of it (ie we have concrete conscious experiences) , but this was the very point I was making and it makes a case for something very profound indeed.

Lets talk computer science and AI for a minute ok? According to AI, a mind is a 'process' corresponding to the operations of the human brain and a sufficiently complicated computer program could perfectly simulate a 'mind' But now ask yourself what a computer program is? The technical answer is that it's an 'algorithim' But what is an algorithm? Guess what... its pure maths! In other words, according to modern computer science, maths and mind are the same thing!

If then, we are prepared to call a 'mind' a 'real thing' it seems that we should be prepared to call other abstract concepts like 'mathematical things' 'real' as well!

You know, the view that all 'abstract concepts' have no 'reality' and are just models we use to describe the world is a very common view but its wrong. The view among many scientists is that 'the map is not the territory' and abstract models are just 'devices' being used to calculate things. A lot of the time that is indeed the case - for instance many abstract things postulated in science in the past have turned out to be nonsense (xyroth gave an example a while back - phlogiston I think)

But it is true that all abstract concepts are just 'human inventions'? My argument suggests that it's not true and that in some cases at least, abstract concepts are 'real'

My example of the human mind is great example. You KNOW your own mind is indeed a 'real concrete thing'! ('I think therefore I am')

But look at your mind from the point of view of someone else - to another person you are just a collection of atoms interacting according to physical laws - your brain is a collection of nerve cells firing electrical signals.

Lets imagine two aliens from outer space have just come across humans for the first time and are trying to make 'abstract models' to explain their behaviour.

Both aliens hit on the idea of an 'abstract thing' they call a 'mind' They describe this thing entirely through mathematics (remember this is perfectly valid: according to computer science a mind is describale as pure maths)

But now they start having a philosophical argument: the first alien doubts his 'abstract mathematical mind' is real - he would argue that humans don't really have minds and that his maths is just a calculational device used to understand human behaviour. He states that 'the map is not the territory'

Alien 2 disagrees - he believes that his abstract mathematical concept 'mind' is also 'real' and he states that human beings really must have minds and that they are conscious.

Who is right? Well, of course alien 2 is right. 'I think therefore I am'

Sometimes the map really IS the territory!


Until next time...

Nope, that doesn't wash. I've done an admittedly basic AI module, and nothing in it led me to believe that it's possible to model the human mind with a computer - even a sufficiently complex one. Yes, it's possible to produce something that behaves almost identically, but I don't think true self-awareness is possible, and that is what makes the mind different.

Anyway, if the mind can be described entirely in terms of maths, that doesn't mean it in itself is an abstract concept. Why not? Because atomic iteraction can also be modelled using maths (or rather, physics, which is applied mathematics). Does this then mean that atoms are also an abstract concept?

I tried real hard to refrain from posting to this thread, but there are a couple of points that seem to require a little more elucidation. Please note that these comments are based on the initial posted summary of Mr. Langan's 'Cognition Theoretic Model of the Universe' I have not read Mr. Langan's work, so if my criticism is imprecise, incomplete or poorly aimed, I apologise in advance

Mr. Langan's 'proof' that reality is self-creating and self-describing is either specious, or simply ambiguous semantics dressed up as a pseudo-philosophy! It is not only tautological, ( reality is reality ), it also manages to be a non-sequitur, (reality is reality - non-existence is non-existence - therefore reality created itself), which is a neat trick, but is far from original. Wanna-be philosophers have been propounding tautological 'proofs' and non-sequiturs before the Greeks invented philosophy. Re-defining certain words in terms of obscure definitions, ( 'creation' means 'the mechanism through which the properties of the Universe are determined' ), is either verbose obfuscation, ( if you can't dazzle them with brilliance, baffle them with bulls**t), or an attempt to legitimize this argument with a pseudo-scientific veneer. And statements about time being included in the self-creation of reality is simply more tautology. Space/time is included in all of existence - well, duh.

His second 'proof' regarding 'mind like' properties of 'reality' is also specious. Basically it seems to say because I can read a book, the book has a mind. The 'proof' assumes 'things' exist, then states that they can only exist as 'thoughts', and that only 'minds' can have 'thoughts'. Again, this is tautolgical, ( 'real' things 'exist'), contradictory, (if 'things' existed only 'as' thoughts, they could not 'have' thoughts, because the 'thoughts' of 'thoughts' would in turn be entities unto themselves), and is a non sequitur, ('things' exist solely as 'thoughts' - only 'minds' 'think' - therefore every 'thing' 'thinks', or has a 'mind')

The final 'proof', that 'reality has holistic properties', is a further restatement of the initial tautology. Namely, all of reality is all of reality.

Tautological and contradictory 'proofs' and non-sequiturs are not generally considered proof except by those who wish to believe whatever notion they are supposed to prove.

Despite the argument's stated objective of proving a single, unified and holistic universe which is god, the entire so-called 'argument' appears to be based on a 'special', narrow interpretation of the Cartesian premise of dualism, which is to say the separate existence of both 'physical' and 'non-physical' things, aspects, parts, etc. But if the premise of dualism is accepted as a 'fact', then the concept of a single, unified reality as proposed by Mr. Langan is not possible: The argument becomes self-contradictory, because 'physical realilty' is by Cartesian definition, ( and at risk of belabouring the obvious ), separate, and independant from 'non-physical reality'.

On the other hand, if the premise of dualism is not accepted as fact, again the argument fails, because things such as 'minds' then have only a single, 'physical', (or for the sake of argument, 'non-physical'), characteristic, which they share with all other 'aspects' of reality, ( either physical or non-physical, but not both ), and we are left with the rather evident and simplistic statement that reality is reality, physical or not, however we perceive it. Admittedly, this is inarguable, insofar as the existence of non-physical reality can be neither proved nor disproved. But whichever way you look at it, this really gets us no further than we were at the beginning, and is certainly not proof of anything in particular.

One thing more: Rene Descartes' well known statement, 'Cogito ergo sum' - 'I think, therefore I am', is often regarded as some kind of inarguable fact of existence, when it is actually nothing more than a philosophical premise, however 'obvious' or 'sensible' it might seem. Descartes was searching for a foundation for his philosophy, and his belief in the Cartesian notion of dualism was unequivocal:

'From that I knew that I was a substance, the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this "me," that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter, and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is.'

The theory that at some point in human evolution an elementary consciousness began, developed into a simple mind, later evolved into a more complex mind capable of thinking, eventually using language to communicate and organise thinking, is viewed by some to be just as valid a concept as Descartes' philosophy. 'We are, and then we think, as a consequence of the physical structures and operations of being' - is just as acceptable an idea to some who do not wish to accept the notion of dualism, ie a non-physical 'mind' residing in a physical 'body'

I would respectfully suggest to Mr. Langan and the proponents of his 'Cognition Theoretic Model of the Universe', that they take some time to carefully consider each and every element in the argument, most importantly the initial one. I also recommend they examine and explain each and every special definition used in the argument. When a 'global' word such as 'creation' or 'mind' or 'thought' or 'abstract' or 'reality' or 'god' is used, every effort should be made to clearly define the contextual meaning, and every effort should be made subsequently to restrict the meaning to it's special definition. A degree of skeptical rigour helps avoid fuzzy thinking, and fallacious reasoning.

I would also suggest that many of the counter arguments in this thread are not only valid, they are far better reasoned and elucidated than those of Mr. Langan, and he could do worse than to emulate their authors

Ok, MaW,

Well I have a certain sympathy with you when you say you believe that a computer can't ever make a mind. But that's not really the point, the point of the argument is that according to the modern scientific world-view there is SOME physical device which when put together correctly should result in an 'artificial intelligence' And that being the case any such device would be running some kind of 'program' (I leave open the question as to whether this program is actually an 'algorithm' or something else) and this 'program' is in fact 'mathematical' This is the 'standard line' according to computer science.

According to modern computer scientists a 'perfect simulation' of a mind IS a mind! That is, the running of the program simulating a mind would produce a real actual conscious 'artificial intelligence' This is the 'standard line' according to computer science. And this is the big difference from, for instance, a mathematical simulation of say atoms. Since the simulation of a mind produces a REAL mind, then we have to say 'mathematical concepts' are real concrete 'things' as well!

If, on the other hand, you try to dispute this by arguing that a computer simulation of a mind would not produce a 'real' mind, then, you are saying in effect that 'minds' are separate entities from mere matter (ie we have 'spirits') and then you have actually already conceded that a form of thesism is correct!

Hey there Taliesin!

Bear in mind that my original post on the CTMU is a hugely simplified form of Langan's actual argument. You should see his articles - they are really complicated and obscure! I'd like for some people at h2g2 to have a read of his stuff and see what you can make of it. If you've got an e-mail address for me I'll send you the URL's of the articles.

I've actually dealt with some of your points in posting 8 earlier in the thread (please read 8 again) but I'll try to clarify things again based on what I know.

Firstly, the CTMU is supposed to support the theory of monism, so Langan would strongly deny that he is dualist. By 'Real' Langan is definitely referring to everything that exists. This does not cause the argument to fall apart since Langan is propounding a single monic entity capable of manifesting itself as anything, whether we call it physical or non-physical. Although Descartes was using 'I think therefore I am' to support a dualistic theory, Langan is NOT using it in that way.

Now again: 'Reality consists of all and only that which is Real'

This statement is basically the underlying postulate of the three axioms of CTMU, and as you quite rightly point out, it's indeed a tautology. But does this make it useless? Not according to Langan! He fully realizes that it's tautological and he spends quite a bit of time trying to argue that , contrary to popular belief, tautologies CAN produce useful information. The mere fact that the underlay premises are tautological does not result in non-sequitur's so long as the lines of reasoning which follow from the premise are valid.

As regards the second part of the proof, it doesn't simply assume that 'things only exist as thoughts' - this is in fact roughly a conclusion which follows from a set of premises. I say 'roughly' because Langan does not actually end up defining everything as 'thoughts' per se - he ends up defining everything as a single monic 'mind-like' substance he calls 'info-cognition' which is more fundamental than thought itself. So the idea that info-cognition' can go on to have thoughts of its own is not actually contradictory.

Until next time....

*delurks*

Hey, Playboy Reporter, I'd like to read the Langan articles. Why not post the URLs here in a Guide Entry or at your personal space?

*undelurks*

Another quote comes to mind:

'There's nothing you can't prove if your outlook is only sufficiently limited.'

Don't recall the source

Enjoy

*waves to Tal from the other coast of Canada*

Whenever I see a thread misquoting Descartes' infamous line, I sigh heavily and refuse to engage in the argument.

As Tal points out, anything can be proved if your 'outlook is only sufficiently limited'. And not understanding the full context of Descartes remark, perhaps never realising that "I think therefore I am" is quoted out context (from a more complex arguement), is what I would call 'limiting'.

I have pointed this out before. Everyone ignores me. It's hard to fight three centuries of disinformation (based on a cutesy misquote of a bad transaltion) but my struggle goes on. I will fight them in the sandlots, on the internet and in cafes everywhere until Descartes is freed from the Limbo of glibness.
What he said was:
"I think, therefore I am. Therefore I think, I am lonely."

peace
~jwf~ (stop thinking,it only gives ya headaches and makes ya lonely)

Yes, I do believe that we have spirits. How does that relate to theism? All theism is, is a belief in a deity. It has nothing to do with souls/spirits/whatever.

hey john, rather than tilting at windmills every time it comes up in a thread, why not write a review of the problem. it might even get into the edited guide.

I'm a little confused here

Can you actually have a philosophical proof?

Or

Should it be, Philosophical theory ?



~jwf~ that quote "I think therefore I am, therefore I think I am lonely"--- can you explain that a little bit... I tried and pondered but I just couldn't get it

Some thoughts as they came to me head

I understand that god is only a variable (in this case) that represents the "Mind"

I recall that Einstein said that time does not exist (I do not imply that just cuz Einstein said so "time does not extist")

I'm trying to recall what the explanation was but I spent quite a long time reading through the posts you guys wrote which were quite long, but very informative. And now its 1:29 AM here

Mind is fuzzy

Playboy Reporter... I just want to thank you for giving your point of view
and also thank everybody else because maybe this is what the Life, the Universe and Everything is all about

Synapsing, you know what I mean

Ah but Sancho, what can a quixotic man do but tilt?

My point is that perhaps someone who can actually read Latin should go to the source of the Descartes quote and lay it out here once and for all, in Latin, and, with his best shot at a fresh translation, as if he'd never seen the words before. (ie: Without prejudice.)

Bescause Descartes was a Frenchman, working in a foreign country (Belgium!) as a military engineer, he was a stranger in a strange land. An educated Frenchman, he was not rich and could not afford to stay at home and play at 'hot air balloons' or some such folly. He had to earn his keep like a commoner.
A naturally brilliant maths genius, he ended up designing forts and artillery ranges for a peasant army of Belgian beerdrinkers, who would have despised him; for being intelligent, for being French and for having to 'work' for a living like a peasant while carrying himself like an educated gent. The officers and aristocrats would have shunned him too. He would have had no friends. And he says as much.
I have always interpreted his opening statement to mean something like "Because I have a brain, I am able to make a living, therefore I can 'exist'; but because I 'make' my living, and I make my living with my brain, I am lonely (working with brainless soldiers and snobby officers in a foreign country)."
His pre-amble to the treatise-on-reason is meant only to suggest the mood and circumstance (setting) in which he spent so much time contemplating the Universe, Life et al, and was never intended in itself to be a statement of philosophy, much less a conclusion of those cosmic considerations.
Once you put the scene in its proper historical and social context, you realise he had a lot of lonely time on his hands to let his mind wander. And that's what he was saying, in that opening sentence or two ..or three.
In a literary context, such an opening remark is quite typical, not unlike other opening lines like "Call me Ishmael..." or "I've just come down from the Isle of Skye" or "Being of sound mind and body..." or "We the people.." It is a standard literary form. It is meant only to identify the speaker and his situation, to put what follows in human context. It would be rude (bad form) to not first-introduce-yourself-and-your-social-and-academic-position.
And it's just plain bad story-telling to give away the ending in the first line! No writer of his time would start with the conclusion! Think about it.
But ..like many great opening lines, that is all most people can remember, and most only remember the first three words "Cogito ergo sum". There is much more to it than that.
But hey, don't take my word for it. `
peace
jwf (hoarse befour des cartes)

jwf!!!

That was awesome

very enlightening...... I agree, we definiteley have to find some one who reads latin, I'm sure if we call upon our fellow Researchers. One of them is bound to read latin



to sum it up ""

Okee Dokee...

A couple of areas where Playboy Reporter's paraphrasing of Chris Langan's argument seems to need some clarification:

First: In the "proof" that reality is self-creating and self-describing, you rely on the idea that since nothing is the absence of constraints there must be the potential for something to exist.
Not true: Nothing is not just the absence of constraints, it is also, by definition, the absence of any potential. Nothing is just nothing. So this proof seems to fall over at the first hurdle.

Second: In the "proof" that all aspects of reality have mind-like properties, you rely on the idea that for reality to be self consistent, the general properities of reality must be replicated on all scales "to some extent". Leaving aside the unanswered question of "what extent?" for now- this general notion seems to confuse consitency with replication. For something to be self-consistent, all that is required is that it does not contradict itself. A car engine is perfectly consistent as long as it behaves like a car engine, and doesn't do something strange, like gradually shut itself down while simultaneously starting up. So anything can be self consistent, while being composed of anything at all- any sort of different things can make up one self-consistent thing. There is no need for a car engine to have its general properties replicated on all scales in order for it to be self-consistent. In fact, this replication would probably make it inconsistent. Say the general property of an engine is to drive the car. Then, according to the argument above, for the engine to be self- consistent this general property would have to be replicated on a smaller scale in the engine. But if the radiator drove the car what would the point of the rest of the engine be?

Third: You say that reality cannot just be the sum of its parts because all objects exist in space and time, and if reality were the sum of its parts, we would be unable to explain space and time.

This assumes, without explanation, that if something is unexplainable, it must therefore not be the case.

It also confuses "objects" with "parts", and suggests that the only "parts" in reality are objects, like tables and chairs. But why can't space and time be parts of something just as much as anything else? You have not explained this- and so reality might well be the sum of its parts. In fact, given the definitions of part, sum and whole- it is difficult to comprehensively imagine how the whole of reality could be anything other that the sum of its parts.

Good critique! OK, Let's try to take a crack at dealing with the points:

1. The only way that 'Nothing' can be understood as a coherent concept is to imagine taking what exists over some region of reality and trying to strip everything that one possibly can from that region, so that whatever remains we define as 'Nothing' Doing this results a region where of ever lessening contraints and the at the limit which is 'Nothing' there are no contraints at all. Thus 'Nothing' cannot be an absense of 'Potential' as such, the concept of 'potential' not being a 'thing' any way.

2. In order for 'reality' as such to be self-consistant, the 'set of laws' that govern reality must be self-consistant. If these laws were not in fact 'consistant' then there would be no reality at all, because in an in-consistant system one can prove anything.

What does it mean to say that the set of laws governing reality are self-consistant? in essense it means that with the appropriate formulation these laws can be expressed as 'Absolutes' - ie at the deepest level there exist laws which are the same at all places and times.

Suppose you tried to argue that different laws governed different regions of space-time ie there are no absolute laws. Then at a deeper level you would still have to explain which laws govern which spaces/times. If there is no explanation there are no real laws and thus reality is inconsistant. If there is an explanation (which as I just mentioned, there has to be) then a deeper formulation is possible incorporating the rule which explains the different space/time regions - but this deeper explanation is itself then a part of the laws governing reality and it will be absolute!

Given that the laws govcerning reality are the same at all times and places then this requires that reality has a whole has fractal (self-replicating properties). The self-replication required is as follows:

(1) The general laws governing reality must be accessible at all times and places

(2) Objects existing at all times and places must be able to 'access' these laws.

Back soon...

Right, relying to point 3:

There do seem to be global properties of reality which are inexplicable as 'parts'. In Einstein's General Theory of Reality it has been mathematically proven that space-time consists of certain holistic properties - take the concept of 'gravitational energy' for instance - it has been proven that this 'energy' cannot be localized to any specific region of space or time - a definition of gravitational energy at any given point requires specification of the entire space-time continuum.

The fact that reality as a whole is self-consistant (as explained in point 2) seems to reuqire holistic fractal properties. (namely that the global laws of reality somehow are 'transmitted' to be individual point in reality, and that each 'part' of reality can 'access' each laws and change their states according.)

As was explained though, the underlying global laws of reality themselves don't change however, and define a monic, holistic feature. According to the latest theories, these underlying features of reality are the fabric of space-time itself.

Until next time...

"In Einstein's General Theory of Reality it has been mathematically proven that space-time consists of certain holistic properties - take the concept of 'gravitational energy' for instance - it has been proven that this 'energy' cannot be localized to any specific region of space or time - a definition of gravitational energy at any given point requires specification of the entire space-time continuum."

Could you explain how, please? It has been my impression that scientific theories can't prove things about reality except insofar as they are confirmed by observations, which can only be done to a certain level of precision, so I'm confused.

I'm not even disagreeing with you, I would just like to see the details, because I need to take things in bite-sized pieces.

I see that clay-toy is still making the same mistakes that he used to make when he called himself playboy reporter, and not bothering to make sure he understands something before he starts talking about it.

fractals are not like von-neumann machines, replicating themselves throughout space and time.

fractals are where some mathematical system (usually spatial, but not always) has a non-intiger number of dimensions, and thus properties show up almost (but not quite) identically upon a number of different scales.

He also bases some of his previous comments upon the idea that the rules must be communicated through space to tell the local bits how to act.

this is blatently rubbish.

einstien proved that except for very specific circumstances (the einstein podolski rosen paradox) action at a distance was neither necessary, or desirable.

all of the rules of gravitation work by using a finite state machine model of action, with the general rules as given by newton being an emergent propert of local application of general rules.

These rules do not need to be communicated, as most of them are themselves emergent forms of lower level rules which define the structure of space-time and of quantum physics, and as such are built into the foundations of reality.

I do wish he would learn to read stuff which he agrees with, and then go away and check if it makes sense, rather than just swollowing it whole and regurgitating it without understanding it.

perhaps he should look up the creationist "josh the genius", and they could have a good time together talking about how all these science people have got everything wrong, and only they have got it all correct.

I see that clay-toy is still making the same mistakes that he used to make when he called himself playboy reporter, and not bothering to make sure he understands something before he starts talking about it.

fractals are not like von-neumann machines, replicating themselves throughout space and time.

fractals are where some mathematical system (usually spatial, but not always) has a non-intiger number of dimensions, and thus properties show up almost (but not quite) identically upon a number of different scales.

He also bases some of his previous comments upon the idea that the rules must be communicated through space to tell the local bits how to act.

this is blatently rubbish.

einstien proved that except for very specific circumstances (the einstein podolski rosen paradox) action at a distance was neither necessary, or desirable.

all of the rules of gravitation work by using a finite state machine model of action, with the general rules as given by newton being an emergent propert of local application of general rules.

These rules do not need to be communicated, as most of them are themselves emergent forms of lower level rules which define the structure of space-time and of quantum physics, and as such are built into the foundations of reality.

I do wish he would learn to read stuff which he agrees with, and then go away and check if it makes sense, rather than just swollowing it whole and regurgitating it without understanding it.

perhaps he should look up the creationist "josh the genius", and they could have a good time together talking about how all these science people have got everything wrong, and only they have got it all correct.

Quote from xyroth: 'not bothering to make sure he understands something before he starts talking about it'. Well, lets see if we can apply this to xyroth.

First xyroth states that 'fractal's are not like von-neumann machines, replicating themselves throughout space and time' Well of course I agree with him. Where did I ever say fractals were like that?

If xyroth had bothered to read my earlier post he would have seen I was simply making an analogy - and it's a perfectly valid analogy which has been used by many science writers. I was making an analogy in postulating that the universe has fractal properties in the sense that certain of its large scale abstract properties are indeed replicated throughout space and time (in this case I was talking about the laws of nature - a wholly abstract concept).

xyroth again: 'He also bases some of his previous comments upon the idea that the rules must be communicated through space to tell the local bits how to act. This is blatantly rubbish...' Once again I agree. But I never said that 'rules must be communicated through space' at all!

What I actually did say (and I was speaking very loosely) was this: 'global laws of reality are somehow 'transmitted' to each local point within reality' This is not 'action at a distance' - I did NOT mention transmission through space - and is fully consistant with qantum non-locality as revealed by the EPR effect.

xyroth: 'These rules do not need to be communicated, as most of them are themselves emergent forms of lower level rules'

That's the supposition that I was questioning. There appear to be 'high level' features of reality that cannot, in fact, be explained as emergent forms of lower level rules. General examples: the consistancy of reality, the completeness of reality, and the comprehensiveness of reality. Specific examples: Mach's Principle, the 'space-time concept' (relativity), quantum non-locality.

More soon...