h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

A bit of a weighty topic, you may think but with a practical edge, Do you think we can exercise choice to behave in a certain way or does the history of things that have gone before make the choices we make inevitable, in other words do we have free will or do we live in a deterministic Universe ?

This has been a long-standing point of contention amongst many thinkers down the ages, having already addressed the Ulitmate Answer to the Ultimate Question of Life, The Universe and Everything, this goes out to all the friendly folks at h2g2, for their thoughts and comments.

So if you have a view stick it in and get the debate going!!!

Clive

I think (not proved, researched or even possibly right) is that everyone has free will to do what they want. The choices they make are their own - even if forced to make them.

The theory that history repeats itself and so must be preordained I think is wrong. The only reason why history repeats itself is the fact that some people tend to have similar characteristics and so they interract with the world in a similar way, causing similar events to occur.

Again this may be wrong, I am open to postive discussions on the subject, but not anyone criticising my opinions because they don't match their own. (Can you tell someone has already done this to my opinions? )

SallyM

Stepping back from the question for a minute, and not trying to be offensive, I was wondering what theories exist about *why* the answer actually matters.?
(Ignoring the case where the concept of determinism is misused by someone to absolve themselves of moral responsibility for their actions)

Anyway, on with one argument:

Ignoring Heisenberg, if there was some set of physical measurements of subatomic particles, and/or other physical quantities that would enable an *external* observer to predict the entire future of the universe, they'd have to be in a much larger separate universe than ours in order to contain all the information, and the required computing machinery.
Given the complexity of people and the world, even if everything is predetermined, accurate prediction of the future is impossible for us. People's own thoughts and actions will always carry some component of reaction to events and other people in their surroundings, and therefore are also not entirely predictable by them.

Add to that the fact that human thought isn't based on crisp logic or complete information, and the fact that our awareness of our own thought processes is itself limited, even if everything is predetermined, it is entirely understandable, even predictable, that people believe in free will.

Even if it is a fallacy, free will does seem like a generally harmless one.
Even if determinism is strictly correct in some abstract sense, it's correct in a way that isn't of any practical value to human beings. It doesn't tell us what's going to happen, merely that if a suitably divine being could understand the entire universe, it would be able to see the future.
(Determinism supporters please don't be offended - I just couldn't stop myself writing that)

Like SallyM and Potholer, I am all for free will, but seeing as no-one has yet proposed an alternative view and just so that we are not all agreeing with each other, how about this :

' Although Newton and others did believe in a mechanistic Universe whereby, Heisenberg, Schrodinger and that damn dissappearing cat of his, nothwithstanding, would you accept that it is also the case, that our free will operates within the actual world, rather than upon it. And that that world operates under determinism ? So a 'free act' is one that is not coerced or an unavoidable consequence of what has gone before.

To clear things up a little, so that everyone is disscussing the same thing I propose this definition of what Determinism implies:

" All events and states of affairs are fully determined by by sufficient antecedent conditions. Everything that happens is fully determined by what has gone before. " - this would be a truly mechanisitc picture of how the might Universe operate.

Further, I suggest that there are three types of argument that could be presented here:

1. Libertarian Incompatablist: ' Someone who affirms Free Will but denies universal Determinism. ( In this debate I'll be favouring this approach esp. Sartre . )

2 The second is Determinism, but it has two distinct branches:

i Hard Determinist: ' Someone who affirms Universal Determinism but denies that people have free will.'

ii Soft Determinism: ' Someone who believes that Freedom IS POSSIBLE is a deterministic Universe ( of which the above argument is an example )

Do you agree with these catagories ?
Do you think one of these catagories describes the world better than the others?

If so, join in the discussion, we need some Determinists to champion their cause, We are all alone in here without you!

Clive

Aha! Found it at last. I accept Clive's definitions. My position is that of a hard determinist. I concur with the geneticist Steve Jones that the universe is deterministic but that we should conduct ourselves as if we had free will. I have some sympathy with Potholer's question 'does it matter?'.
I would amend slightly the definition of 'a free act' to 'one that is not an unavoidable consequence of some other event or set of events upon which the individual can have no influence'. This is because the relationship between the past and the future is almost certainly a human cognition rather than a fact

Fairy Snuff, accepted terms now look thus:

Determinism: " All events and states of affairs are determined by sufficient antecedant conditions. Everything that happens is fully determined as unavoidable consequences of the event(s), upon which the individual can exert no influence and is bound to follow. "

Hope that appeases everone ? Good. Onwards.....

Clive

Clarifying,
Temporarily ingoring any true randomness emerging from quantum mechanics, I'd say that the universe is theoretically deterministic to a hypothetical external observer, but from a practical (internal) viewpoint, it is bound to appear as partly random as a result of inevitable partial ignorance. That effective randomness will affect human behaviour, making human behaviour partially unpredictable.

The script *may* in some sense have already been written, but no-one has ever seen it, nor is there a chance that anyone will ever see it in the future. Neither can we predict what's going to happen next, and hence what our response may be, so in that sense, it's academic.

In summary, if there isn't any true randomness as a result of subatomic processes, the universe is fully deterministic in theory, but won't appear as such in practice to any residents.
If there is true randomness deep down, there isn't even theoretical determinism.

I suppose you could say that either free will really exists, or an illusion of free will exists as an emergent property of a sufficiently complex deterministic universe. The question then becomes :

'In a universe as complex as ours, can we discriminate between *real* free will, and a naturally generated *illusion* of free will?'

*Phew!, huff!...huff!* I'm running between two similtanious conversations here.
Academic, the question may appear, but if we live in a Universe ( or a society or a family - this doesn't just have to be about science )
where what we do is not under our volition or even our understanding ( to quote a memorable phrase: " as much as a tea bag is aware of the history of The East India company." ) then doesn't that cheapen the lives we lead and the decisions we make ? Moral decisions aren't any more because being good or being bad is not a choice we make but the inevitable outcome of what has gone before.

And it's not necessarily theoretical or hypothetical either. I was hoping to focus on the real nitty-gritty of experience. When you stand in the Supermarket looking at the milk cabinet, do you think:
'Which should I choose ? Full Cream, Semi-skimmed or Skimmed ?
or
Do you believe that this choice is a fallacy, no matter what type of milk you buy it will follow from all the antecedant, determinate conditions, such as a desire to lose weight or that the receipe for which this milk is for specifies full-fat. When it comes down to it, you will only choose what inevitably follows from the facts of existance that surround your life.

To empahsise my point, I really have to go and do some urgent shopping now, it's not far from where I live I will take me about 20mins to walk there and back. I will in fact be buying milk today. Anyone care to place bets ( no money )on which kind I'll decide to get today ?

I tell you when I get back.

As a hint, my last bottle was Full Cream. ( Tea taste better that way. )

Clive.

By the way, before I go. Potholer, if you accept that the universe is essentially determinate but that for any 'residents' of this place, not knowing the it would appear to be random, and that thought of randomness would lead to apparently free will. Does that make you a Soft Determinist ?

See you in 20Mins.

Clive

My money is on full cream.
One cannot separate philosophy from science unless one takes the dualist approach that the mind (or soul) is separate from the physical universe (or universes). As this proposition is not disprovable one can make no progress, so it seems reasonable to work on the premise that mind is an emergent phenomenon of the physical universe. Following Potholer's reasoning we must then conclude that if the physical universe is deterministic, so is 'mind'.
I am quite comfortable with the theory of illusory free will. It has been suggested that depression is a condition in which one loses the capacity to ignore reality.. or perhaps the illusion of free will?

I want to say full cream, but he could be sneaky and put a side bet on semi-skimmed. I say be one with the cream and who cares about the calories

SallyM

Clive, I wouldn't say I'm a soft determinist. You may, but I feel that labels are often where the trouble starts - I fear that accepting the title might lead people to assume I was subscribing to a suitcase full of ideas, some of which I may be ignorant of, or disagree with.

I do understand your comments regarding choice of milk, but I wouldn't see that as entirely a question of determinism.

For instance, I've had similar experiences when hungry at bedtime - I go to the kitchen, stand in front of the opened refrigerator, scanning the contents for something suitable. I get the definite feeling that my conscious high level mind really isn't bothered about eating - it just wants to go to sleep, but after a few mental attempts to leave, it's obvious that my body and my subconscious mind are determined to stay exactly where they are until I do eat something. (Though it's debatable what I mean by 'I' in that context)

I could describe the experience as 'I decided to eat something', but that would be perhaps an extreme illustration of the common occurrence of the conscious mind pretending responsibility for much of the decision-making actually performed by the subconscious.

Though it may well not be true, many (most?) people assume that their conscious mind is in direct control of their thoughts and actions, rather than being more of a back-seat driver as would seem to actually be the case much of the time. That's not to say that consciousness isn't useful even in that context - it's quite possible for the subconscious to learn a great deal as a result of either obeying or ignoring a back-seat driver, and for the conscious mind to learn better ways of directing the actions of the subconscious.

If most sane people can happily live with the illusion of conscious control where it doesn't really exist, it seems quite a minor problem to ignore the academic possibilities of true determinism in a world where we're guaranteed to be ignorant of the overwhelming majority of facts required for any accurate prediction.

I apologise. I wasn't trying to label you personally into a particular set of beliefs or doctrines, I was just interested if that was the poistion you favoured most. Once again, my apologies for not being back on time - I got roped into letting a friend search the net on my computer for information about an essay he's got to write. Also I can't stay long again either, I too have got an esay to write for Monday and I have to attend a meeting at 7.00pm.

Right, that preamble out of the way, I got Semi-skimmed. Just to try to demonstarte that I can choose my own actions separate from the facts that may surround them, ( that I personally prefer Full-Cream, always have. )
O.k, so maybe the milk wasn't the best example I could have thought up but I would like, in the spirit of good-natured debate, to take issue with Percy von Wurzel and Potholer.
This may be where I demonstrate my credentials as a fan of the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre.
Percy first, according to Sartre, those people who deny that they have the radical freedom to choose their own natures as conscious agents are fleeing in to what Sartre termed ' Bad Faith '. The inevitability of choice is a source of anguish to them, they want to reject the responsibilty that this entails ( universalisation of the judgement - what is right in these circumstances for me, becomes right for others when they are in the same circumstances because I choose it to be this way ) and so fall into Bad Faith. The anguish that is felt by those that don't flee into Bad Faith sounds remarkably similar to the people who 'lost the ability to ignore reality' and feel depressed/anguished. ( and I'm not trying to say that people who suffer from clinical depression are only in the symptoms of realising their own freedom - that is a medical condition ) That you find the concept of illusory free will ' quite comfortable to live with' is a further
example of the what Sartre believed to be true.

Oh dear i'm late for my meeting. Potholer, I apologise, I'll be back again later

Clive

It's OK, there's no need for apologies - I just shy away from some kinds of label.

The milk example wasn't particularly bad, it just happened to prompt my memory of the fridge example, where I viewed things from a different perspective. If we are talking about decision making, I thought the conscious/subconscious question might be worth introducing.

Regarding what you said on Sartre, I can sort of see the point about universalisation, but only if people don't realise that there's no such thing as 'the same circumstances' in practice. Also, why would someone assume that just because they do X rather than Y, that means everyone else will subsequently do the same - surely most (all)determinists would accept that individuals are still different.

If someone did believe in universalisation, which would seem to me to be a rather rare faith in a sane person, wouldn't they try to find out what someone else has already done in the 'same' circumstances.? If they did, they could copy the other person, and shirk responsibility.
If they *didn't* care what anyone else had done previously, then presumably it's a no-brainer to realise that no-one's likely to subsequently care what *they* choose. Surely therefore, universalisation is inherently inconsistent, unless it can be shown to have operated throughout history.

I guess I'm missing something here, but what?

For instance, I've had similar experiences when hungry at bedtime - I go to the kitchen,
stand in front of the opened refrigerator, scanning the contents for something suitable. I
get the definite feeling that my conscious high level mind really isn't bothered about eating
- it just wants to go to sleep, but after a few mental attempts to leave, it's obvious that my
body and my subconscious mind are determined to stay exactly where they are until I do
eat something. (Though it's debatable what I mean by 'I' in that context)

I could describe the experience as 'I decided to eat something', but that would be perhaps
an extreme illustration of the common occurrence of the conscious mind pretending
responsibility for much of the decision-making actually performed by the subconscious.
Though it may well not be true, many (most?) people assume that their conscious mind isin direct control of their thoughts and actions, rather than being more of a back-seat driver
as would seem to actually be the case much of the time. That's not to say that
consciousness isn't useful even in that context - it's quite possible for the subconscious to
learn a great deal as a result of either obeying or ignoring a back-seat driver, and for the
conscious mind to learn better ways of directing the actions of the subconscious.

If most sane people can happily live with the illusion of conscious control where it doesn't
really exist, it seems quite a minor problem to ignore the academic possibilities of true
determinism in a world where we're guaranteed to be ignorant of the overwhelming
majority of facts required for any accurate prediction.


O.k I'm back. Sorry if that ending was a little rushed but I was five minutes late for my meeting. Why can't choosing which milk to buy be the subject of determinism ? Surely if all of experience is determined, that includes buying milk, and if one cannot except that they are pre-destined to buy Full Cream over Semi-skimmed, why subscribe to determinism at all ?

I was nevertheless very interested that Potholer mentioned sub-consciousness. One of the other things that Sartre rejected was Freud's notion of a separate, unconscious,part of the brain that exerts an influence over the other, conscious, part. He didn't accept that, partly because he had his own idea about what it meant to be a conscious being, but mostly because it removed from us the responsibility to consciously make decisions and to take responsibility for the decisions we take. What does this mean for our debate?

Well, to quote Sartre directly: " We identify our reality by the ends which we pursue not hypothetical causes from the past." My
buying milk or your late-night snacking are all part of conscious living, but we live in a world of facts, things in many cases just are, and we have no control, no choice in the matter. Such as the time or place that we were born or that, in your example there is a physical and biological process through which we feel hunger. It is how we choose respond to those facts where our conscious choice is so important because if what I choose is already determined, then I have no free will, I am downgraded to the status of another thing I am just mere ' facticity ' ( what Sartre referred to as the collection of all these facts ). It is through this that we define ourselves, define our own nature.
This idea of a back-seat driver consciousness, seems to me a remarkably hands-free existence.
I had hitherto believed for determinists it is not about making a prediction about how you should behave, if you could know everything in the Universe - which you can't - but instead believeing that that choice is already determined.
There is no ' illusion of conscious control'. On the contrary, conscious control is all we have. To deny that is to deny the singular thing that makes us unique as conscious agents, in denying it we are lead right back into the jaws of Bad Faith.

Clive

Just to explain, the above post refers to your earlier posting. I'll get busy and pull out my lecture notes on Sartre and check why universalisation seemed such a reasonable idea at the time but does now seem a little incoherent, I agree.

Clive

No wait....it's appeared below this one..

Arrrghhhh! it's all gone wrong! Ignore the top few paragraphs of my last reply, they are yours. I copied and posted them onto my message so that I could read them and write a reasonable relpy at the same time instead of having to keep leaping back and forth with those ludicrous back and forward buttons.

My responce starts: " O.k I'm back. "

Clive

Maybe this is the ghost of Jean-Paul tormenting me for doing a fluff job on Universalisation ?

Such errors are inevitable aren't they?
Back to the skimmed milk. This does not begin to demonstrate free will. It is perfectly rational to argue that under the particular set of circumstances, ie. that you were involved in a debate about determinism and that your nature and nurture have influenced the way you behave in those circumstances, that you were bound to choose semi-skimmed. The fact that I guessed wrongly is equally explicable by determinism.
Whether our actions are conscious for 1% or 100% of the time seems to me to be irrelevant to the debate. We may consciously make a choice, but that choice is still predetermined if consciousness is a function of a deterministic physical universe. Having said this, I agree with Sally that one should use one's illusory free will to take the cream.

No, not inevitable, they just happen because as free and conscious agents of choice we are of course liable to make errors; to choose badly. Better than not choosing at all ! ( nice try though ! )

Back to the milk: I always maintained that it was probably a bad example, that did not properly represent the point I was trying to make. Not that I am yet ready to concede any ground on this but it does seem that unfortunately that so long as you and I both accept different explanations/hold different beliefs etc about what it means to choose something, we will always seem to reach different conclusions about that which we disagree ( in the best natured way, of course ). That I think choosing one type of mik
is a free choice I make or that you believe that that and other choices are always pre-determined, even your wrong guess or my mistake with the message posting, means that we are always opposed.

It was my hope in starting this debate to try to resolve both of these kinds of blocks to understanding. However, that said, as an example of this I don't really accept that " if consciousness is a function of a deterministic universe" ' consciously choosing is irrelevant '. ( to paraphrase ). I don't accept that consciousness is a function if a deterministic universe, rather it is a special quality of our being that rescues us from the monotinous world of mere objects but ultimately curses us to know the possibility of error. ( ' oh that we were truly deterministic, we might cry. But we are not. we are conscious agents of free choice and all the rag-bag of problems that that entails. )

Is there any ground of common agreement we can find, without yet reaching the rather lack-lustre view of freedom of Soft Determinism ?

( And just to mainstay any libelous issues, I want to re-itterate that I was not earlier labeling Potholer a Soft Determinist, nor by implication, that potholer is lack-lustre. Sorry if my poor grasp of the English language - which you rightly may have expected me to have fully grasped by now having lived in England my entire life! - meant that this was the impression that was given, it was not intended and I apologise to potholer if he/she found it offensive. )

Clive