h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

Mal. I like your class' intuitions. Do they know about these internet resources and forums? We have had discussions with people from 14 to even-more-ancient-than-me on this thread. There is a lot of philosophical talent here, although I suspect I'm the only philosophy graduate. Own up any others.

Hi Heathen .

You are, of course, correct. Prof.Hutton is a historian, not an archaeologist - see even druids make mistakes . I have read some of what the others you mentioned have written in this area. Mr. Beresford-Ellis though is not my favourite. He sometimes tinges his scholarship with particular prejudices, but that deabte is not relevant here.

Please note that when I use this emoticon , I may be being ironic or sarcastic or otherwise not entirely sincere, ? Thus I am well aware that our northern ancestors were not 'paragons of virtue'.

"I don't wish to be in any way rude, but I find that, generally, pagans who are concerned about the activities of the Catholic Church are often ex-Catholics who still bear resentment against it. I don't support it as an institution; I just find it irrelevant to my concerns."

Bingo! I am an ex-Catholic but I bear no personal resentment against it. I was not abused or repressed especially. Indeed my Catholic upbringing and the scholarship it invoked have been foundation stones in my life. Have we established that I am not a 'damaged christian' yet?

Right, back to the point. The Roman Catholic church has carried out a deliberate and political campaign in every country where it has influence (most of Sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Europe, Latin America and the Philipines). This campaign has used disinformation and political pressure to deny the population access to safe and legal sexual advice and care.

It has propagated the myth that the latex from which condoms are made is porous and will allow viruses such as HiV to transmit freely through it. This has come from the very highest levels of the Church and is disseminated at every opportunity. It has opposed every attempt to set up sex education in countries it influences(other than abstinence and then monogamous married relationships) on the grounds this may lead to giving women choice about their own bodies (i.e. abortions).

It threatens anyone who gives sex guidance that includes abortions, or who gives out condoms with excommunication under Canon 1938 (I could be wrong on the exact number. Where's Alji when you need him?). Politicians in these mostly poor countries are often not willing to oppose the strongly presented beliefs of their local Bishops or Cardinals. The Church supports those politicians who take a hard line on abortion and contraception (including protestants such as George Bush, and many Islamic leaders!).

As there are close to one billion catholics in the world, and possibly half a billion other people living in countries dominated by Catholicism, this is a deadly serious game.

For the sake of Catholic doctrine up to 25% of the world's people are being put at unnecessary risk. This is sacrifice on a grand scale.

As a human and a druid I am appalled that such a wrong could be perpetrated in the 21st century. If AIDS does wipe out half of the young people in these countries what will be the effect upon us?

Perhaps it is what we deserve....

Blessings,
Matholwch /|\.

I've been playing with my new toy Math, a Fuji Finepix S5000 digital camera.

Alji

MockCalypso - mind if I call you that?

So you think if nearly all of your philosophy class shares an opinion that means it's a fact that most people do?

> Yup, at least from my calculations

Would you like to share these calculations?

Can you or the members of your philosophy class explain why they feel that two identical people can't both be the same person - i.e. in respect of which 'person' attributes are these two physically identical people differentiable?

> Surely the term "an exact atomic replica" is misleading?

Not in this context - which is a thought experiment where the machine creates an exact duplicate by definition. Whether this is technically possible, even in principle (it clearly isn't), is irrelevant. However, as long as there is no discernable difference between original and copy, i.e. the replica is identical in all significant respects (including memories and mental state) at the moment of duplication, I think some relaxation of the definition is acceptable.

> See if you can figure out just where I was leading, for me.

I have no idea.

"To the extent that philosophical positions both confuse us and close doors to further inquiry, they are likely to be wrong..." Edward O. Wilson.

This amused me...

Hi Alji

That's . You are just so excellent at finding the right quote or fact, when you're not around to ask we miss you.

Blessings,
Matholwch /|\

'Jordan. We have a problem!

''

You're right. What I should have said was 'there are two instances of one 'me' in the room. That was a pretty confused statement.

And why is there only one 'me'? Because all the properties are identical, and whatever the state of the 'me' is, it is identical in both.

'Seems like a contradiction in terms there.'

Yes. I also shouldn't have said there were two people. I meant, somehow, to say that there were two identical bodies in the room.

'If you hurt one, will the other suffer? If you kill one, will the other one die? So which one do you have to hurt for me to suffer?'

Analogy time!

A brilliant quantum physicist, after years of working with zany quantum-type stuff, obviously goes quite mad. One in particular decides to let the future of her relationship be dictated by quantum indeterminacy.

So, she sets up her equipment: a device to release a single photon into a dark box, and a semi-silvered mirror guarding a photon detector, such that there is a 50/50 chance that the photon will register with the detector. (Bear with my inaccurate terminology.) If it registers, she will ask her partner to marry her. If it doesn't, she will slap her partner with a wet haddock and hide their car.

Now, there are two possible, and very different futures for our physicist. She presses the switch to release the photon into the box and awaits her future...

The question is, which is 'me' (with respect to the physicist)?

There are two different possible 'me's, but only one exists at the moment she releases the photon.

I'm not saying that the universe splits into two universes or that she is half-married, half-lawsuit. I'm saying that there are two equiprobable states that she can end up in, and asking which is actually called 'me'.

Now, let's say that the universe does split. In one, the partner sues for the lost car and fish-battering (he-he), in the other she marries her partner. Curious to see what would have happened if the experiment had turned out otherwise, the happily married woman makes a device to open a way into the other universe and finds herself. Now, which would she call me?

The fact is, at the instant the photon hits, there is only one 'me'. Once the universe splits, there are two instances of her, one in each universe, fundamentally unchanged but with different potential futures - ergo, both are the same person, essentially unchanged by the event. Neither is the 'original' or the 'copy.' However, at the instant she observes the photon and starts to register the result, there are two 'me's.

If one goes to jail, the other is not affected. If one buys a new house, the other is still behind bars. They are no longer the same person.

Let's look at the situation after duplication again.

The original and the copy are the same person. They are both 'me'. Until, that is, they start to diverge in a significant way. At this point, you split. There are two different people from then on. The original and the copy are no longer indistinguishable. Both call themselves 'me,' and mean something different by it. They share a common history, but their present and immediate past experiences are different.

The critical time frame is that between duplication and the development of differentiable impulses. If one is destroyed within this time, it shouldn't be considered murder, it is simply reducing the number of instances of your 'me' to one. You do not suddenly become 'me' just because one is destroyed because me was the same person.

It's getting long, but I'll reiterate: there is one 'me' in the room until the point at which different sensory inputs causes divergence.

- Jordan

Doh!

'The fact is, /just before/ the photon hits /(or doesn't hit) the detector/...'

- Jordan

'I'm not the physician here, but isn't it impossible to have exactly the same qualitys of an atom, or the atoms'll follow the QUIP (Quantum Inseperability Principle) and *become* the same atom, in different places, doing the same thing in different space.'

If that's so, and follows in our thought experiment, then it would seem that my position is strengthened.

'Yup, my class said that between a choice of a ship that has 50% chance of you surviving the journey, and a matter transportation/copier that worked 100% of the time - they'd always choose the ship.'

Like Higgs, I wish your class would explain their trepidations. They sound pretty unreasonable to me! What if the transporter/duplicator had already been tested by someone (or a group of testers) and it were demonstrated that the people at the end point were indistinguishable, physically, psychologically and subjectively, from their original selves?

Telling us that your class are disagreeing with the statement isn't especially helpful, other than to tell us that your class either take a philosophical position different to mine and Higgs', or instinctively dislike the idea of being transported.

If you could, can you ask some of them to forward their objections?

- Jordan

Jordan. I'm convinced that I am necessarily sui generis. So there can't be two instances of me, even though they be instantaneously identical. The one that is me after the instant is the one that was actually me-now before the duplication. Not the one who has the false memory of being me-now. The difference is that one has a genuine past and the other a false past (because he was really built atom-by-atom by a machine). Hower brilliant a forgery is, it is still a forgery. That is so even if it is logically indistinguishable from the genuine article.

Toxx
Perhap the problem is that you are thinking in terms of two.

With quantum superposition one would be in two(or more) places simulataneously. What happens to one happens to the other 'part' of one. The superposition would entail the character and characteristics of the one in all.

Higgs
Wishful thinking. Yes it is ...but (and I sense you aint gonna to like this ) what we wishfully want we create and not just in the fantasy areas of the mind. Because I believe that all matter is consciousness at the sub sub atomic level and that *will* affects matter at this level (not pretended will ) therefore what we think we create in the mind we create in reality. In this way the thing we call God , (which we are), creates God (which we are)

I disagree. You are basically defining yourself as something which cannot be duplicated, and therefore deducing that the copy is not you. This is a perfect example of begging the question. This person is, literally, you. Although he was not physically born, has not ever actually eaten food or tasted salt, he has memories of eating and drinking and love and pain exactly the same as your own in quality and quantity. Locke would, I believe, agree with me that this person is literally you at exactly the instant of duplication. Once either the copied you or the original you develops independently, each of you is your own person, now distinct from each other, but not before.

You have presented no logical reason that this person cannot be you, other than saying it is so by definition. As I said earlier, the classical definition of a person no longer stands in our thought experiment.

- Jordan

Moth:

> and I sense you aint gonna to like this

I will only dislike it if you don't appear to have any reason for believing it - i.e. you can't explain it in terms I can understand (even if I don't agree with your reason(s).

> Because I believe that all matter is consciousness at the sub sub
> atomic level and that *will* affects matter at this level

Is this consciousness qualitatively different from our own?
Is this a shared consciousness, or is each particle individually conscious?
Is will a manifestation of consciousness? If so, can this sub sub atomic consciousness of matter affect itself and/or other matter?
To what extent can will affect matter?
Where does the energy will uses to affect matter come from?
To create matter requires a lot of energy - where do we get this from?
Why can't I deliberately will the creation of another bottle of wine, if I what I think I create in my mind I actually create in reality?
... enough for now

Jordan. We are doing conceptual analysis here, so the way I define what I am is crucial. I am saying that we are all unique. If you agree with that then my conclusion follows. If you don't, kindly explain.

Locke's criterion is memory, but we know the some people think that they recall being Napoleon. It doesn't mean that they are or were! Some people forget who they are; but that doesn't mean that they cease to be who they are. Babies probably have no concept of who they are that is not common to most babies. That doesn't mean that they have no individuality. So there's a lot wrong with Lockes' criterion. It is both too little and too much.

toxxin:

(As az requested. And might I say, chocolate is an ingenious idea for breakfast. Muchos gratias! )

'Jordan. We are doing conceptual analysis here, so the way I define what I am is crucial. I am saying that we are all unique. If you agree with that then my conclusion follows. If you don't, kindly explain.'

I disagree because, in our experiment, we have created a device which can create exactly identical people. In this context, uniqueness is not even a possibility for our subjects. If I duplicate you, there will be an exact copy of you which is indistinguishable except from spatial location. Unless you're willing to concede that either (a) location is a fundamental attribute of what defines a person regardless of whether this affects them or not - so, if you're only a micrometre away from where you should be standing, you would not be yourself, which seems quite silly - or that (b) there is something that cannot be transported, i.e. a soul - something of a cop-out - then your argument cannot hold in the context Higgs and yourself have set up.

All this and I haven't had to resort to weird quantum effects, with which many potential transporters would be riddled... I consider the above an adequate refutation of your position on uniqueness, unless you can tell me where it is flawed.

While I'm on the topic of ancient philosophers who would agree with me, would Kant concur? (Noggin, you seem to be Kant reincarnated, so perhaps you can tell us. ) I'm reasonably sure a logical positivist would agree, though.

- Jordan

Higgs

"Is this consciousness qualitatively different from our own?"
No, but unbounded.
"Is this a shared consciousness, or is each particle individually conscious?
Both - like quantum superposition everything is shared and simultaneoulsy individual

Is will a manifestation of consciousness?
Yes
If so, can this sub sub atomic consciousness of matter affect itself and/or other matter?
Yes, because it is what everything is comprised of at the sub sub level. If consciousness is the foundation of all matter it does have affect on itself and other matter. It is 'us' and also originates 'us.'

To what extent can will affect matter?
It is the creator of all matter and the laws of cause and effect that matter is established within.

Where does the energy will uses to affect matter come from?
Will is the energy. A force.
To create matter requires a lot of energy - where do we get this from?
This is the same question, no?
Why can't I deliberately will the creation of another bottle of wine,
if I what I think I create in my mind I actually create in reality?
Because you (ego) don't really believe you can
I explain as best I can, but it is a rabbit hole .
Now do you understand the metaphor I have used in the last sentence, which sounds peculiar but when thought about has some meaning and if you understand it, why do you understand it?

The problem is that the duplicate *is* a causal product of the original, albeit in a somewhat unusual fashion. And as I pointed out earlier all the atoms that compose me get replaced eventually, so being-composed-of-the-same-atoms can't be the deciding factor. So the question is "How should I respond to the duplicate?" If the original is destroyed by the process, there's no problem. Captain Kirk is still Captain Kirk, sui generis, as toxx would say. If the original is not destroyed my response is for the moment, open.

Noggin

To be honest Jordan, I'm not at all sure what Kant would say. (Possibly, "Star Trek? Never watch it." )I feel sure, though, that the introduction of a noumenal as well as a phenomenal self into the discussion would be an excellent exemplar of Anderson's Theorem.

Personally I'm taking more of a Wittgenstein approach to this one.

Noggin

It seems obvious that, given duplicator technology is possible, 'sui generis' is no longer a deciding factor for what constitutes a person. The word 'individual' becomes meaningless until the two diverge noticably.

If the original is not destroyed, obviously the two will diverge and become different people, once more 'sui generis'. I consider this the only logical possibility.

- Jordan