h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

Hi, Noggin. <... the dedicated application may be quicker.>

The question was whether the computer was more versatile, not whether it was quicker - so that's a classic case of moving the goalposts.

Another one is <... but taking your point to its logical conclusion would imply that while humans can be logical/illogical they can't be rational/irrational.>

I don't deny that humans *can* be rational. Since I don't really know what it means, that would be foolish. I do, however, suggest that for the most part we *aren't* rational using the vague criteria and observations that I've encountered. For example, illogicality entails irrationality, I take it. We are seldom logical although we can be. We are, most of us, inconsistent which is illogical and therefore, presumably, irrational.

toxx

toxx

Thank you, Matholwch, I know you had debated with him. Thanks also, Toxxin, azahar, StrontiumDog...

Thank you, Noggin, Fathom...

Thank you, ltp, Vixen... and anyone I haven't mentioned - it means a lot...

Yes, it is a shift of the goalposts.

Although when time is of the essence, and you need to get it right first time, the application may enhance future versatility

But obviously the original analogy is just that - an analogy, and shouldn't be taken too literally; it's an illustration of a point, and aspects of a *real* computer that are extraneous to that point are not really relevant. In real life the applications are more like prewritten modules for specific purposes, and housekeeping functions of various sorts.

Outside of certain overt cognitive processes even logicality/illogicality is quite hard to pin down, without knowing something about the often implicit goals that underlie a specific behaviour.

Noggin

....mosey....

Hi Noggin. Yep, I take your point. I dislike analogies and detest metaphors in philosophical conversation. I even cringe when politicians talk about 'shoulder to shoulder' and 'the heart of Europe' etc.

Considering what you have just said, are you associating logic/rationality with effectiveness in achieving goals? I'm not saying that this would be completely wrong - but I doubt that it's entirely correct either!

toxx

Hmmm. People do sometimes talk about the rationality of means (which would fit that description) and the rationality of ends (which I think is where this conversation started, and which wouldn't).

Noggin

Noggin. I hadn't heard of 'the rationality of ends' before. I don't see that there can be any such thing. I have quoted this bit of Hume more than once on this thread - but it bears repeating here. "Reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions".

OK, there's a metaphor in there, but it is totally transparent.

toxx

Which isn't that far from the point that I started from - that logic requires premises from which to work. And that the Passions constitute at least an important part of those premises when it comes to people.

Noggin

I am quite interested in attempting to achieve a lofty goal as opposed to actually achieving a lesser one.

Firstly I should start by saying that by "lofty" and "lesser" I am talking about the quantitative scale of the achievements. Not a qualitative judgement.

The greatness therefore could refer to Newton's work on the Principia, or Stalin's efforts in "finding Russia with the wooden plough and leaving it with the atomic reactor", or to anyone who has through skill and effort subordinated a sizeable aspect of their world to their will.

Two things strike me at the moment. First, it seems that in addition to skill and effort, those who make a deep impact must also have a lot of luck. Secondly, as I think through some historical figures, it seems to me than in many cases they ended up very bitter and unhappy, and most times their achievements had side-effects that eventually spiralled and grew into changes that they were fundamentally opposed to.

What historical figure has done more damage than Jesus of Nazarath, who had a few hundred supporters in his lifetime and who preached tolerance and compassion?

The normal course of events is to start off seeking power in order to change the world, and to end up seeking to change the world in order to retain power.

Noggin

Noggin. I agreed with your original point. However, you seemed to slide into saying that the passions could be described as 'rational'. That was where I came in.

I know it is now fashionable to talk about 'emotional intelligence'. I think that is something different from the passions and possibly part of ordinary, good-old-fashioned intelligence.

toxx

Bounce.



Mohammed?

Part of the problem is perhaps that these things don't come in "watertight compartments"? And that some of the human passions are "rational" (loose usage alert) in the sense of being *coherent* within a wider context of culture, biology, evolution etc.

Noggin

Noggin. Stuff that exists 'out there' has to be coherent in the sense that it coexists. You just won't combine ice and a very high temperature. I don't think that can be described as 'rational' though. Surely rationality has to do with thinking and particularly conscious thinking. Keep in mind the subhuman levels of the brain to which we have no conscious access, except that they make us feel good about some experiences and bad about others. They make us eat, have sex etc. There's nothing rational about those things.

toxx

Well given the premise::You just won't combine ice and a very high temperature.::Fridges useing that particuler point.

in fact a fridge needs a "higher tempeture" to work efficently.

subhuman levels of the brain to which we have no conscious access::
I think it is a result of not needing conscious access,that most of us are not aware, a lot can be got at through memorys ,ie when remembering grannies sweet shop ,smells can be recalled, or recalling that night of passion.....that makes me want sex again..

ltp. You are waffling. The point of fridges is that you keep the ice and the higher temperature separate. You don't combine them!

toxx

Perhaps I should have said "We can build a coherent model of" or somesuch. But maybe its congruence with the universals I was waffling about earlier that gives us the illusion of rationality.

Noggin