h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

What I was saying is that, with our current electoral system, having multiple printouts of your vote would not be a bad idea. As for the idea of such drastic measures re: Secretaries of State, Lt. Governors, etc. (those in charge of elections). Whatever works!

Well, I still don't see that having multiple printouts would have any advantage over a single lodged print. But hey, if you wanna kill twice as many trees as you need to, then it's fine by me.

I would suggest, however, that allowing the voter to remove the second copy from the polling booth would not serve any purpose, other than to give them a souvenir of the fact that they voted. It would render the second copy useless.

A second copy would be relevant if the electronic copy and the paper back-up 'disappeared' from the voter records entirely.

Thank You Witty.

I just think the more backup, the better. Particularly given this last election. But honestly, the receipt is for the voter, and really doesn't HAVE to exist. But there should be a printout that is placed in a sealed ballot box for verification.

At the very least.

The MIT/Cal-Tech study that analyzed the 2000 election concluded that hand counting ballots was the most accurate method.

So don't fall for the false assumption that "machines are inherently more accurate than humans", at least for vote counting they are not.

I agree with Hypatia. I think if you want to have an electronic machine which prints out the ballot and counts it, fine. But also count the paper ballot, have the voter be able to verify her/his paper ballot, and make the hand tally of the paper ballots be the default result.

With something so important as a vote in a representative democracy, what could possibly be the harm of having a fail-safe plan for counting ballots? I'd rather see money and time invested in a solid process upfront rather than spending millions on recounts.

The copy would also be relevant to exit polling.

<< A second copy would be relevant if the electronic copy and the paper back-up 'disappeared' from the voter records entirely. >> & << With something so important as a vote in a representative democracy, what could possibly be the harm of having a fail-safe plan for counting ballots? >>

A problem where the electronic and paper copies are not secure enough is not fixed with the solution you provide (i.e. printing a second copy), so it's more of a "false-safe" than a "fail-safe" plan. If it's possible to lose/steal/burn/eat/whatever the initial copy, then it's safe to say that a second copy might be in just as much danger. Fix the security problem and the need for a second print is gone. (BTW, what you are describing/suggesting is known as a "workaround". i.e. "don't fix the problem, instead provide an alternative way to do what you want to do".)

<< But there should be a printout that is placed in a sealed ballot box for verification. >>

I absolutely, totally and utterly agree.

<< So don't fall for the false assumption that "machines are inherently more accurate than humans" >>

It's not a false assumption, it is a fact. A properly programmed computer *will* count more accurately (and more quickly) than a human.

<< The MIT/Cal-Tech study that analyzed the 2000 election concluded that hand counting ballots was the most accurate method. >>

The problem, therefore, is that the computers have not been programmed correctly, but don't blame a machine for the mistakes of a (human) programmer. Programs can very easily be tested and bugs fixed but, from the articles/reports I've read about the machines used in the USA, I've come to the conclusion that the testing procedures for these machines are woefully inadequate. All functions, procedures and areas of the program should be tested, but weren't, and some areas which were tested do not appear to have been tested thoroughly enough. Designing and running test programs is part of my day-to-day job, so I know of what I speak. And if I had to guess, I'd suggest that the reason the testing is woeful is because they weren't thinking about and designing the test procedures at the same time as they wrote the program code. Testing appears to have been an afterthought and not, as it should be, included in the design phase of any program. Excuse the computer programmers rant there......

<< But also count the paper ballot, have the voter be able to verify her/his paper ballot, and make the hand tally of the paper ballots be the default result. >>

I agree, and certainly while the electronic counting is evolving, the paper ballots should be the default with the electronic count verifying the tally. But in the long term it would probably get to the point where the electronic count is the default and a hand count would serve, if needed, to verify the electronic tally.

<< The copy would also be relevant to exit polling. >>

Exit polling is a side issue that is not vital, relevant or even vaguely important to the actual outcome of an election. As such (and IMHO), providing a copy to assist in this process is unimportant and unnecessary.

Evil Roy, you do make some valid points and you are making some of us, me for certain, think more. Thank you for that!

It would certainly help if the companies that are making the machines were not "bought" by the reptilians, repugnants, whatever you want to call them. Until we have machines that are made by neutral parties, any election results are going to be suspect.

Perhaps what we need, aside from better programming. Is UN run elections. I believe some Demos even called for Shrub to call in UN elections officials, I do not believe that happened. I am not a big supporter of the UN myself but, perhaps they are what we need for fair elections. We impose the use of the UN on other countries' elections, why not our own?

And in return, you're making me think..... Stop That!!!

The point about biased companies building the machines is valid. My first thought was that finding a neutral company would probably be very difficult.

But what strikes me is that this is a process which is of vital importance to every voter, no matter which party they are affiliated with. Doesn't that make it sound like exactly the sort of thing that a government department should take care of? I'm not sure which gov dept in the USA is responsible for election counting/results (in Australia it is the Electoral Commission), but maybe they are the people who should take control of the process. Maybe not to the point of actually building the machines or writing the software, but certainly from the perspective of designing the specs for the software (and testing procedures) and then actually testing the software provided by whichever company wins the tender to create it.

I'm not a fan of the UN myself, and I think that if the electoral process is as transparent as possible, there wouldn't be the need to involve a third party to oversee it.

That last sentence..."if the electoral process is as transparent as possible, there wouldn't be the need to involve a third party to oversee it." The operative word there being IF. It isn't transparent, and thus, we need oversight.

There were UN election monitors at polling places in Florida and other states (had a couple in LA, for instance) but they were kept away from the actual voting sites, and were told that if they interfered in ANY way, there would be hell to pay.

Good point. What I meant to say was that "if you change the electoral process so that it is as transparent as possible". I was meaning to use a "future if".

Certainly if the current system needs monitoring then I suppose the UN would be as good a mob as any to do it. But without the authority to enter any of the voting sites they'd be pretty much a lame duck.

Kind of like how the election observers will be observing the Iraqi polls... from Jordan?

Sham observers for what is in reality a sham election?

I was too tired to argue the point last night, but I want to say, do not underestimate exit polls. They have turned out to be the only reliable way of determining voter intent besides the actual votes themselves, which are now tainted.

My hunch is that in the next election you will see much more priority given to exit polling, which is why a paper receipt would be so useful.

Sorry Evil Roy, but what I said was that for vote counting, machines are not as accurate as hand counting. That's a fact. The assumption about machines being inherently more accurate is therefore false. Blame it on the programmers, or corrupt companies, but at the end of the day, hand counting is more accurate than machines.

Any machine/computer can fall prey to the old saw "garbage in, garbage out", especially, as everyone else has mentioned, when the companies building and selling the vote counting machines in the U.S. are openly partisan. It would be nice to imagine a government agency charged with accurately counting ballots and overseeing the touch-screen voting machine production process but every government agency in America is affected by politics. If one party or the other controls the executive and legislative branches they can change the direction and goals of the agency or tie its hands during the monitoring process by passing numerous laws that water down its power. Like other regulatory agencies, for instance the FDA or the FCC, it would be pecked to death by ducks with dull bills.

Hence the need for an outside 3rd party.

<< do not underestimate exit polls. They have turned out to be the only reliable way of determining voter intent besides the actual votes themselves, which are now tainted. >>

Lil, I think that you are overestimating the exit polls. As far as I am aware, the past 3 exit polls in the USA have failed to accurately predict the election outcome. Yet you still consider them to be not only reliable but *more* reliable than the votes themselves?

IMHO, the only way to accurately determine voter intent is to count the votes.

<< for vote counting, machines are not as accurate as hand counting >>

Change that to read "for vote counting, the software currently in use is not as accurate as hand counting" and I agree. But while it may be true today, it will more than likely be false in the not too distant future.