h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

That's what I meant by the environment rewarding rationality. Sorry if I expressed it badly.

Pattern-chaser

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Yes it is. I even explained why. I'm not doing it again.



...thus retaining most of the problems with 'objectivity', wouldn't you say? No, I suppose you wouldn't. Never mind.



"Reconciliation with subjectivity" is a problem? Do we have problems reconciling black with white?

Pattern-chaser

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Please, can we not get side tracked into a debate about semantics just yet?

Have we deduced the existence of reality (we can save the argument over whether its objective or not for later) from the existence of rationality?

Can we also infer the consistency of the one from the consistency of the other?

"

Yes it is. I even explained why. I'm not doing it again."

Well, no you didn't. You made an analogy. Then you said objectivity carries connotatons of certainty. Indeed it does. And my definition of objectivity also asserts certainty; but not in all cases. There's a world of difference between an 'objectivity' that is uncertain about everything and an 'objectivity' that is undefined in certain fields.

"

...thus retaining most of the problems with 'objectivity', wouldn't you say? No, I suppose you wouldn't. Never mind."

I didn't say any of them were sensible. But it does allow us an understanding of objectivity that is both practically useful and philosophically satisfying. It also meets what many would consider to be the most important aspect of objectivity; it is the 'truth' (such as it is). In this case even our final authority does not have all the answers. Now there's a FFFF thought if ever there was one.

Of course, there is still the issue that trying to find this objectivity is very difficult. We still have room for 'near-objectivity' in this context, but it occurs at a different level.

"

"Reconciliation with subjectivity" is a problem? Do we have problems reconciling black with white?"

Look at this way:

Under previous thought, we have objectivity which is certain about everything, and subjectivity which is dependent on the mind holding it. We think of some things as only being sensible from a subjective viewpoint; but then we also allow subjectivity to warp what might otherwise be objective perceptions. Why this asymmetric arrangement? Why does subjectivity extend farther than objectivity?

And even our most subjective perceptions often seem to have some grounding in objective facts (I like the song because it has a good guitar riff). If objectivity is blind to 'subjective' topics why is that the case?

What I'm proposing is that both subjective and objective viewpoints cover everything; it's just that objectivity does not precisely define every case; in many cases it allows a number of interpretations which subjectivity can exert itself. These cases can be physical or abstract.

There's your reconciliation. Instead of a whole quantum difference in both what they are and what they encompass we have a framework that allows both.

"Have we deduced the existence of reality (we can save the argument over whether its objective or not for later) from the existence of rationality?"

I don't know about deducing it from rationality; we can only deduce that the environment that promoted it had underlying rationality.

PC has implied previously that 'objective' and 'real' are interchangeable; and that anything that isn't in kock-on-wood existence can't be objective. If we take that view then we need to prove one or the other.

Basically there are two alternatives:

a) I am the only real thing and everything I percieve is not. In which case Descartes carries us to hell in a handbasket.

b) There are a number of autonomous minds with which we each interact. In this case we have some agreement over 'objectivity' that seems not be be dependent on our perceptions.

But what is reality? Is the emotion I feel when I hit my thumb with the hammer any less real than the hammer itself? I say not. There may not have been a monster under the bed but it was real enough to scare you when you were little.

I call something 'real' if it can impinge on other 'real' things. Circular I know but it means that emotions, subjective perceptions and everything else wind up in one huge category.

Some would say that things like emotions aren't 'real', but they affect what we do and thus affect the physical world. Reality is that which we percieve.

In which case we can prove the existence of reality by simple virtue of the fact that we experience sensation.

Given the 'semantic' difficulties with objective perception, and our lack of it, I think we *must* deduce the existence of reality from the existence of reality. This is a difficulty which stems directly from our use of objectivity, and objective standards, when it is not a useful or accessible thing for us.

Pattern-chaser

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I hope I didn't imply the former: anything objective is - *must be*, surely? - real, but the converse is not necessarily the case. From this (if you accept it) it follows that "anything that isn't in knock-on-wood existence [I.e. real] can't be objective".

Pattern-chaser

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I guess what I wondering, Queex, is:-

- I can establish that I can reason, perhaps say through my ability to conceptualise mathematics
- I can then reason that this ability to reason is a product of my existence and my ancestors evolution in a rational environment
- then is it not reasonable to infer that that particular environment will follow the same rational "rules" of mathematics, otherwise my evolved ability to reason would have seen my ancestors dead in their tracks

Sorry- thought I saw a contrapositive in there at some point. My bad.

"I guess what I wondering, Queex, is:-

- I can establish that I can reason, perhaps say through my ability to conceptualise mathematics
- I can then reason that this ability to reason is a product of my existence and my ancestors evolution in a rational environment
- then is it not reasonable to infer that that particular environment will follow the same rational "rules" of mathematics, otherwise my evolved ability to reason would have seen my ancestors dead in their tracks"

Oh yeah, baby. Exactly. I'd go one further, though:

- As the environment is also a product of the wider universe, is it not also reasonable to infer that these 'rules' are also followed by the universe at large, otherwise we would expect there to be many 'rules' present across the world.

P-c:

Yes, I got my train, two minutes longer and I would have missed it though.

"What I'm saying is that near-objectivity (if we can call it that) is a practical and useful concept. And to describe it, all we need is the *concept* of objectivity, of something that is true independent of the conceptions or perceptions of humans. Surely we can easily *conceive* of such a thing?"

I think there must be a way of defining and using your "near-objectivity" concept without reference to the pure form of objectivity - "something that is true independent of the conceptions or perceptions of humans". I think it's important to do so because I don't believe in the latter. I can conceive of such a thing, but I think that's a product of my own irrationality. I think objectivity in the pure form is logically incoherent.

As an example, suppose I want to make a statement like "Alice is taller than Bob". To say this, I have to have a conception of length. Length is defined by comparison. Comparison is a human behaviour, not something inherent in the universe (I could say something like "the universe doesn't compare, it just is"). So, although our intuition screams out for all its worth that the statement "Alice is taller than Bob" refers or corresponds to an objective truth, it is wrong. It refers to a human activity, comparison. I'm not saying that we might be wrong, or that if we actually tried to compare Alice and Bob we might make a mistake, but that even in principle you cannot separate the statement about the relative heights of Alice and Bob from the activity of comparison.

Actually, this is another interesting example because of changing theories of length in physics. 150 years ago the statement "Alice is taller than Bob" would have been interpreted as not depending on where Alice and Bob are in the universe or their relative velocities. Now that we have the theories of special and general relativity, and the phenomenon of length contraction (where a fast moving object appears, and actually is, shorter than a slow moving one), to make a statement like "Alice is taller than Bob" you'd have to specify that Alice and Bob are in the same "inertial frame" (roughly speaking, their relative velocity is zero), and probably some other assumptions.

I think the position I'm converging on is something like this: the meaning and truth of statements are emergent properties of the system of human argument and discussion. Something like truth, or something like objectivity, emerges because (a) we cannot control what the universe does or what other people do, only what we do, (b) other people have different ideas from us, (c) in order to get on with life we have to be able to co-operate with others. Truth or objectivity consist in agreement between people with differing ideas. If everyone agrees on something, that is a very good standard of objectivity but clearly isn't enough. The most objective statement is one that is agreed upon by two people with as different viewpoints as possible.

What I haven't thought about yet is exactly what it means for two viewpoints to be as different as possible, but I think this way of stating it might get round some problems. For example, suppose that 1000 Christians agreed with the proposition "Killing others is wrong". That would confer less objectivity on the proposition than finding, say, 50 Christians, 50 Satanists and 50 Atheists to agree with the proposition, even though the former case is numerically stronger than the latter.

Hi - another good post. I agree with most of it, so this isn't going to be a long criticism!



That may or may not be so , but the ability to conceive of what it means is enough. The best I can do in the way of a primary definition for near-objectivity is this:

Near-objectivity. n. Something whose truth depends minimally on human conceptions or perceptions; something accepted by those of widely differing views for this reason.

Any good? Any improvements to offer?

Pattern-chaser

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Restating this a little:

1 - I exist and can establish that I can reason through my ability to conceptualise such things as mathematics

2 - I can further deduce that my ability to reason is a product of my existence in a rational environment

3 - I can then infer that my particular environment must follow the same rules as my rationality, otherwise rationality wouldn't work

4 - Then since the local environment is also a product of the wider universe, I can infer that these 'rules' (mathematics) are also followed by the universe at large, only the boundary conditions may vary


So even accepting that I can only perceive the universe subjectively, the inner workings or my mind (my rationality) can only be a reflection of the rules of reality, otherwise I would not or could not exist.


5 - Then I have to accept that truth (and beauty?) is an emergent property of my perception of the universe

6 - It would seem logical then to accept that a "universal" truth is one that is shared with other rational entities


Is this a well worn philosophical approach?

P.S. a better term would be good; 'near-objectivity' is far too much of a mouthful, and too long to type. The best I can do is "p-true" for "practically true". I'd love to hear something that trips off the tongue more easily....

Yes, I think it *is* important to find another term, and distance ourselves from the baggage of certainty and incapability of error that the original term cannot be separated from.

[To attempt to dilute the meaning of "objective" gives us oxymorons like 'partial pregnancy' or 'military intelligence', and doesn't work for me. You can't be 'partly certain', and what use is 'nearly absolute truth'?]

Pattern-chaser

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How?



"The same rules"? Surely the environment is what it is, and your rules mimic its behaviour closely enough to be useful?

Pattern-chaser

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Taking both questions together.

Reality is and I exist within reality.
I am a product of reality.
I am rational.
To produce a rational mind, reality must also be rational.
The rules governing rationality and reality must be the same.

Consider the alternative. A mind that does not follow the same rules as reality is irrational. This sounds perfectly reasonable to me.

* head spinning, can't keep up with backlog *

I understand that this is not a strictly-objective claim, so OK.



Unsure exactly what this means, but I see no problem with it.







ASSERTION ALERT!! ASSERTION ALERT!! ASSERTION ALERT!! ASSERTION ALERT!! ASSERTION ALERT!! ASSERTION ALERT!! ...



Why?



I don't see that this follows from the reasoning above.

Pattern-chaser

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Madent.


No. Because to paraphrase Dogster, rationality is an emergent property of human discussion and argument - and a very hard won one, at that. However, given that successfully dealing with reality is at least one of the tests of rationality it does seem likely that reality is rule governed and consistent (although not necessarily tractably so, as someone said.)

As to reality itself. Well, either
1) our perceptions are generally veridical - in which case there is a reality.
Or 2) They're not. In which case there's nothing more to be said.

is indeed a well trod philosophical path.

I may not be able to "prove" that reality exists, but I challenge anyone to prove that it doesn't. Innocent until proven guilty, say I.

Noggin

Either way seems to be fairly inachievable.