h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

Bx4,

I see what you mean, the Ramsay quotes don't exactly fly off the page.

I heard a podacast by Hugh Mellor in which he put the idea of 'success semantics', which I mentioned in #1225. Also he gives the milk example, and makes the point that Ramsey's idea of truth stands in contrast to 'meaning first' theories, since for Ramsey the contents of a belief are the success criteria for actions based on them, rather than propositions for which to apprehend their truth conditions is to apprehend their meaning. this has the advantage of dealing with animals having beliefs but not language, and us having implicit beliefs.

So I think you are right and I was wrong, this is consistent with Dummett's formulation, though not, I think, equivalent to it.

the podcast series is 'philosophy bites' which is free and had Mellor on Ramsey and Dummett on Frege relatively recently, so you might like to download those.

When I used 'Ramsey's Ladder' I did so in a Blackburnian sense; if you are right and Blackburn's use is not warranted by what Ramsey actually says, then that doesn't affect my argument.

ttfn

Hi Bx4,

Whilst I await your latest on @p, I thought I'd return to:

"However, 'The standard view on the direction of causation is that it reduces to the direction of time: causes occur prior to their effect.' (The Metaphysics of Causation' SEP). So the standard view cannot apply in a B-universe since time has no direction** in it."

But even in the B-series, we can have binary relations such that E1 can be prior to E2. So why can't causes be prior to effects in this sense?

Hi Bx4,

I notice your steely resolve has slipped a little recently as you've been chatting in The Bull.

By the way have you read any John Gray? I've just read 'Straw Dogs', which was interesting.

ttfn

hi psi

Sadly response to @p growed like topsy and work in splitting it up delayed by Stornoway-Edinburgh sail, Festival, Edinburgh-Hamburg sail.

Somewhat diverted by success semanticists 'Ramsey's Principle', which, imo, has a similar status to Blackburn's 'Ramsey's Ladder'.

Next week I'm of on a windsurfing course so I'm not sure when a response will be forthcoming.

psi

//But even in the B-series, we can have binary relations such that E1 can be prior to E2//


'The dispute between the B-theory (tenseless theory) and the A-theory (tensed theory) concerns, respectively, whether time consists entirely of the serial relations of simultaneous with, earlier than, and later than, or that the notions of past, present, and future are necessary metaphysical features of time in addition to or in place of the serial relations'
(A Brief History of the A-Theory/B-Theory Debate about Time; Cheryl E. Fitzgerald)

The difference is that the elements of the A-series have properties (past, present or future0 additional to the elements of the B-series. So for the A-series the relation 'prior' between two events E1 and E2 must include these properties whereas in the B series the relation 'prior' does not include them.


//So why can't causes be prior to effects in this sense?//


'The B-theory argues that time is static..' (ibid)

As Markosian points out ('Time', SEP) 'there is nothing more to a series than some specific items in a particular order' and that 'the order of the items in the B series is the same as the order of the items in the A series'.

The obvious difference between the two series is that in the A series time is not static and in the B series it is.

So that we have two non-equivalent binary relations:

(a) In the A series E1 is in the past of E2 (dynamic time, temporal ordering)

and

(b) In the B series E1 is before E2 (static time, non-temporal ordering)

It would seem to follow that if one says, tensed

(c) E1 causes E2 (temporal 'binary relation')

then one is asserting a tensed fact which presupposes the tensed 'binary relation' (a), that is E1 has as part of its 'binary relation' the A series property of being in its past. This obviously implies time is dynamic.

However if one says, tenselessly

(d) E1 causes E2 (non-temporal 'binary relation')

then this presupposes a temporally static B series without E1 having a 'binary relation' to E2 in which the property of 'pastness' is lacking.

However, what seems clear is that the 'binary relation' /'causes'/ in (d) is different from what it is in (c).

So to answer your (presummbly rhetorical) question you would have to give an account of causation founded in the ordered but temporally static B series.

Originally involved because of the metrocentric BBC News24 using the 'UK Riots' (later revised to 'English Riots') strapline then the bizarre 'Starkie'(sic) thread which before my second sail had gone off topic because of an argumentum ad nazium by one Haesten resulting in argument about whether Hitler was a member of the Spartakusbund.

John Gray: I had read his Black Mass (mentioned by blue icthus02 whom you may recall from the Today 'Delusion' thread) and subsequently 'Straw Dogs'. I have bought but not yet read his 'Gray's Anatomy'.

Interesting aside in Black Mass that the 'New Atheism' has it roots in post reformation millenarianism/utopianism.

Not sure how long I'll be on here: According to one Taylor Cresswell on the Archers boards I should have had e-mail asking if I want to transfer to the post-BBC h2g2 but I haven't received it.

bs

Hi Bx4,

"So to answer your (presummbly rhetorical) question you would have to give an account of causation founded in the ordered but temporally static B series."
That's where we came in to this strand isn't it? In other words, a full account of how causality works has not been given in either the A-theoretic nor B-theoretic context, but nothing you have said indicates to me that the B-version is more problematic. Unless i've missed something.

"John Gray: I had read his Black Mass (mentioned by blue icthus02 whom you may recall from the Today 'Delusion' thread) and subsequently 'Straw Dogs'. I have bought but not yet read his 'Gray's Anatomy'."

I liked 'Straw Dogs'. Gray is doing 'A Point of View' on R4 for this part of the run.

"Not sure how long I'll be on here: According to one Taylor Cresswell on the Archers boards I should have had e-mail asking if I want to transfer to the post-BBC h2g2 but I haven't received it."

My understanding was that if you do nothing it transfers automatically, but I could be wrong of course.

ttfn

//'a full account of how causality works has not been given in either the A-theoretic nor B-theoretic context, but nothing you have said indicates to me that the B-version is more problematic. Unless i've missed something. '//

'The standard view on the direction of causation is that it reduces to the direction of time: causes occur prior to their effects'
(The Metaphysics of Time' SEP)

The A-theoretic model treats time as having a flow (direction) the B-theoretic model does not.

'Events exist equally or ontologically on par regardless of whether they are earlier than 2007, simultaneous with 2007, or later than 2007.'
(A Brief History of the A-Theory/B-Theory Debate about Time', Fitzgerald)

If the pair E1 and E2 have a binary relationship that involves them having different (or variable) A properties then they are not 'ontologically on a par' since E1 has, for example, the A-property of pastness as /part/ of its relation with E2

In B theory, the B-series elements have no A series properties and hence these are not components of the relation of E1 to E2

So I don't think you need a 'full account of causality' to see that a B series account of causality must differ from an A series account precisely on whether A-properties are present or absent in the relations between members of the series.

Hi Bx4,

"So I don't think you need a 'full account of causality' to see that a B series account of causality must differ from an A series account precisely on whether A-properties are present or absent in the relations between members of the series."

I agree, I don't have a problem with B-series terms being ontologically on a par. If a full account of causality is given which depends on terms in the series having say, the property 'pastness' which puts E1 on a different ontological footing than E2, then /that/ would be a problem for causality in a B-theoretic context.

However I came into this strand by making the point that I see no greater problems for B-theory than A-theory in respect of causality. That is because no sufficiently detailed account of causality has been given (as far as I know) to suggest /why/ ontological disparity is necessary for causation. Hence the binary relation 'prior' will suffice.

ttfn

psi

//'That is because no sufficiently detailed account of causality has been given (as far as I know) to suggest /why/ ontological disparity is necessary for causation.'//

'The attempt to "analyze" causation seems to have reached an impasse; the proposals on hand seem so widely divergent that one wonders whether they are all analyses of one and the same concept'.
('Causation', Jaegwon Kim)

which might suggest that the notion of 'a sufficiently detailed account' is highly unlikely to be produced by the semantic legerdemain that passes for contemporary linguistic philosophy.


//'Hence the binary relation 'prior' will suffice.'//

Not sure it will since:

'prior: (adj.) preceding in time or in order'
(Random House Dictionary)

suggests that the relation 'prior' that holds between two elements of a temporally ordered A series /differs/ from that which holds between two elements of an atemporally ordered B series.

However, in neither case does the relation 'E1 is prior to E2' necessarily entail that it is /subvenient/ to some putative relation 'E1 causes E2'

Of course even if we accept that either A-series ordering or, alternatively, B series ordering accurately descibes the /ontology/ of space-time it does not follow that causation is part of either ontology rather than simply a consequence of variable anthropocentric cognitive structures.

'Those who make causality one of the original elements in the universe or one of the fundamental categories of thought... have one very awkward fact to explain away. It is that men's conceptions of a cause are in different stages of scientific culture entirely different and inconsistent. The great principle of causation which, we are told, it is absolutely impossible not to believe, has been one proposition at one period in history and an entirely disparate one at another is still a third one for the modern physicist. The only thing about it which has stood... is the name of it.'

('Reasoning and the Logic of Things', Charles Sanders Peirce)

bs

Hi Bx4,

"which might suggest that the notion of 'a sufficiently detailed account' is highly unlikely to be produced by the semantic legerdemain that passes for contemporary linguistic philosophy."

You might be right, as it stands I agree that there is a long way to go before the concept is well understood.

"Not sure it will since:

'prior: (adj.) preceding in time or in order'
(Random House Dictionary)

suggests that the relation 'prior' that holds between two elements of a temporally ordered A series /differs/ from that which holds between two elements of an atemporally ordered B series."

I still don't see a problem, since in the B-series, there is still an ordering, otherwise it wouldn't be a series. So preceding in order will do the trick.

"Of course even if we accept that either A-series ordering or, alternatively, B series ordering accurately descibes the /ontology/ of space-time it does not follow that causation is part of either ontology rather than simply a consequence of variable anthropocentric cognitive structures."

I agree. Hence the B-series is no more problematic for causality than the A-series. I think the Peirce quote puts it well.

ttfn

psi

//'You might be right, as it stands I agree that there is a long way to go before the concept is well understood.'//

'Essentially a philosophy is a system of definitions ... '
('Foundations of Mathematics', F.P. Ramsey)

I take the point of the comments by Pierce and Kim to be that there are many concepts linked only by their having a common label and not a common meaning.

Therefore your claim that causation presents no greater problem for an B-series ontology than it does for an A-series presupposes, at a minimum, either:

(a) A /single/ definition of causation that is compatible with both a /dynamic/ A series ontology and a /static/ B series ontology.

(b) Two /different/ definitions of causation one applicable to an A series ontology and one applicable to a B-series ontology

Only in case (a) would your contention apply since in case (b) though the word, 'causation', is the same the concepts are not.

//'I still don't see a problem, since in the B-series, there is still an ordering, otherwise it wouldn't be a series. So preceding in order will do the trick.'//

It seems to me that the problem lies in the /absence/ of A-series properties. pastness, presentness, futureness' in the /relation/ between two elements of the B-series. That was the point of my earlier citation of the dictionary definition of 'prior'. NSN Encarta gives the similar:

'earlier in time or sequence'

Surely what distinguishes the relation 'prior' in the A series between t1 and t2 is that to say 't1 is prior to t2' is equivalent 't1 is in the past of t2'. Whereas in the B-series, with /no/ A-properties no such equivalence can exist?

The ontology of A-series presupposes that time is asymmetric, hence allowing A properties, whereas the B-series does not.

It would seem to follow that if the standard model applies and the direction of causation is the same as the direction of time then causation is also thereby asymmetric.

However as Faye points out:

'A proper notion of backward causation requires a /static/ account of time, in the sense that there is no objective becoming, no coming into being, such that future events exist on the par with present and past events.' [My emphasis]
('Backward Causation', SEP)

And since as Fitzgerald points out (see above)'The B-theory argues that time is static' then it follows that, in a B-theory ontology ,nothing precludes /some/ causes being anterior, rather than prior, to their effects.

So irrespective of how ill-defined a concept of causation is, the basis of how it is to be characterised under a symmetric (static) temporal ontology must be different from that under an asymmetric (dynamic) temporal ontology.

Clearly in terms of ordering in the asymmetric/static B series ontology nothing precludes the relation:

(c) E4 (at t4) is the anterior cause of E3(at t3)

in addition to

(d) E1 (at t1) is the prior cause E2 (at t2)

Whereas in the dynamic/asymmetric A series only the relation (d) would exist.

//'I agree. Hence the B-series is no more problematic for causality than the A-series. I think the Peirce quote puts it well. '//

Surely what the Pierce quote does is point out that there is no necessary unity of concept in different accounts of causation except the shared label causation?

My windsurfing course begins to-morrow so I'm not sure how much chance I'll get to be on here in the next week.

bs

Hi Bx4,

Maybe we are talking at crossed purposes. As far as I remember, I started this strand saying that I see no reason to suppose that a B-theory context poses more of a problem for causation than an A-theory context. I don't think I've argued that the account of causality given would have to be the same in each case. Of course, there are some accounts which won't work in a B-theory context, and some that are not suitable for the A-theory.

//"I take the point of the comments by Pierce and Kim to be that there are many concepts linked only by their having a common label and not a common meaning."//

Me too.

//"(a) A /single/ definition of causation that is compatible with both a /dynamic/ A series ontology and a /static/ B series ontology.

(b) Two /different/ definitions of causation one applicable to an A series ontology and one applicable to a B-series ontology

Only in case (a) would your contention apply since in case (b) though the word, 'causation', is the same the concepts are not."//

I think my claim is:

C1: A B-theoretic context presents no greater problem in terms of giving an account of causality than an A-theoretic context.

That's roughly what I started out saying isn't it?

Now as far as I can see, your (b) is compatible with C1. It is not required that the concepts of causation in each case be the same, only that they can reasonably be called concepts of causation.

//"It seems to me that the problem lies in the /absence/ of A-series properties. pastness, presentness, futureness' in the /relation/ between two elements of the B-series. That was the point of my earlier citation of the dictionary definition of 'prior'. NSN Encarta gives the similar:

'earlier in time or sequence'

Surely what distinguishes the relation 'prior' in the A series between t1 and t2 is that to say 't1 is prior to t2' is equivalent 't1 is in the past of t2'. Whereas in the B-series, with /no/ A-properties no such equivalence can exist?"//

In the B-context we still have a series. It isn't that time disappears completely in B-theory, we can still define 'prior' in terms of t1<t2.

//"So irrespective of how ill-defined a concept of causation is, the basis of how it is to be characterised under a symmetric (static) temporal ontology must be different from that under an asymmetric (dynamic) temporal ontology."//

Yes, but given we don't know whether or not backwards causation is possible and nor do we know why we conceptualise causation in such a way as to infer cause as prior to effect, we don't know whether the /ontological/ commitments of each theory impinge on our account of causality in a problematic way. Even if something does preclude backwards causation, we don't know what that is in either the A or B context. You say that it is precluded in the A but nothing would do so in the B. But actually we just don't know what might or might not preclude it in either case. So this is still compatible with C1 as far as I can see.

//"Surely what the Pierce quote does is point out that there is no necessary unity of concept in different accounts of causation except the shared label causation?"//

Yes.

//"My windsurfing course begins to-morrow so I'm not sure how much chance I'll get to be on here in the next week."//

I hope that goes well.

ttfn

Hmmm looks much the same...

Looks quite different now!