h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

This post has been removed.

after all the problems i have had posting here, the Mods pulled my post! think i found the offending item, now removed. this is all i had to say in case you'd missed it.


dear both,

been having immense problems getting this h2g2 thread to open for me, and now that it's possible am stuck for words......that's what you get to for steak/red wine/ at half 8 on a saturday. party on.


have signed up for that Google chat thingy Bx4, but other than supply them with a username and p-word not sure what buttons to press next?

apropos of nothing, the other day when i had a disastrous hangover and still went to work at Satan's Towers, a colleague advised some Californian soft rock as a remedy. so i found;

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylr2D4Pwn58


had forgotten all about them and those timeless tunes wot they wrote. hmm, am i alone in thinking this......?

windsurfing season is open as of tomorrow, so will be out and about wind permitting.

hoi!

hi psi;

Little time for 'Displacement activities' a the moment but I have been noodling away at yr lat and will reply 'soon'.

hi jank:

Wot did you say?

Timeless toons: I am a fan of the early SD and still own 'Can't Buy a Thrill, Pretzel Logic, Countdown to Ecstasy and Katy Lied. Nothing after that though.

I thought they were an East Coast rather than a West Coast band though.

We had a party at the weekend to celebrate successful test of Beowulf pilot. Surprisingly no cake but an excess of Sekt and Asbach Uralt. Something of a head next day and no restorative Irn Bru on hand.

Enjoy surfing.

bs

hi Bx4

"Wot did you say?"; i dared to state that they were not the handsomest of specimins using a term normally associated with not fully knowing one's parentage..... and i even substituted the "a" letters with *........


"I am a fan of the early SD "; great. that's essentially the stuff i am currently drumming along to on my old acoustic kit. top grooves, killer drummers all over these records.

"East Coast"; drat, you're right! though in those days it didn't quite have the Biggy Smalls hip-hop turf war connotations....



"no restorative Irn Bru "; made of girders dontchaknow.....


ttfn

Hi jank

Who were the Bs?

Google Group: I set you up as a member of:

http://groups.google.com/group/not_even_wrong

last Feb using your ntlworld e-mail address. Dont know if this has worked but if it has then if you go to the above link and sign in using your google id/password and you should be able to start a conversation.

If not when you get to the Home page there should be option on the left hand side 'Join this group' or 'Apply for group membership' or somesuch.

Hip-hop: I avoid......

Irn Bru: Can be had here though only in cans:

http://www.british-shopping.de/index.php?cPath=600

and with the risk of meeting tediously nostalgic ex-pats. Best avoided.

When does this MB disappear?

bs

hey Bx4

"Who were the Bs?"; just those handsome lady killers Steely Dan......like i said, it was just a throw away comment but the Mods took offense on their behalf.


"Irn Bru: Can be had here though only in cans:" i have a new Dutch colleague at Plastic Towers who has a bottle on her desk all day every day....she blames the fact she was married to a Scotchman for a few years. i can't stand the stuff, she confirms your claim that it's a great hangover cure.

a fan from years and years ago sent me this youtube link the other day. it's us on the Jon Stewart show back in 1994. we were sure that the world would be ours any day soon........


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpFN8ldMi-g


ho hum...........


ttfn

hi psi

Apologies for the delayed a somewhat lengthy reponse. (A consequence of intermittent noodling?)


//'I don't see the B-theoretic model as particularly problematic for causality'//

I think the difficulty lies in the different consequences that result from A-properties and the consequential A-series in an A-universe and the B-relations and the consequential B-series in a B-universe.

In an A-model universe time is dynamic,it has has a direction, 'time flow's, 'time passes' and so forth, and also has the /temporal/ ontological properties, 'pastness', 'presentness', and 'futurity' (A-properties)*. Therefore members of the A-series (and the objects and states of affairs that obtain at them) can be ontologically different if they do not share the same temporal properties determined by where they stand with respect to the 'flow' of the present. As a consequence their temporal position is not 'fixed' because the temporal property of an individual member of the A-series varies from 'futurity' through, briefly. 'presentness', to finally 'pastness'.

In a B-model universe time is static and has no direction, etc. Moreover the ontological properties, 'pastness', 'presentness' and 'futurity' are absent. So the members of the B-series are not made ontologically different because of them. Moreover, the members of the B-series are fixed, because, their order is determined /solely/ by the invariant B-relations and not by variant A-properties.

However, 'The standard view on the direction of causation is that it reduces to the direction of time: causes occur prior to their effect.' (The Metaphysics of Causation' SEP). So the standard view cannot apply in a B-universe since time has no direction** in it.

//'I didn't say that we should treat 'possible' as the opposite of 'actual'//

Apologies, badly phrased. I did not mean to imply that you had. Substitute 'one' for 'we' and omit the point it was relevant only to PWS and not germane.

//'I was pointing out that they don't have the same ontological status.'//

Indeed though you have not said what the difference in ontological status is. My view, which may be different from yours, is that 'possibilities' have no ontological status without the /unproven/ presupposition that objects and states of affairs obtaining at members of the B series are contingent or, contrariwise, necessary. This seems problematic.

Suppose (x,y,z,t) is a member of the B-series at which the state of affairs rain, S1, /obtains/, then the opposite state, no-rain, S2, does /not/ obtain at it. Since S1 is an invariant state of affairs at (x,y,z,t) and the supposed ontological possibility could only obtain if S1(x,y,z,t) was not invariant.

//'so long as we are clear that we are talking about causal necessity rather than logical necessity'//

I am assuming that advocates of the DT would hold that 'all S are /ontologically/ necessary'(1) and advocates of the IT would hold that' at least some S are /ontologically/ contingent' (2). Of course, I think that, without proof, the predicates in (1) and (2) are ontologically irrelevant (redundant) and do not qualify the actual state of affairs, S1(x,y,z,t). Clearly, since DT and IT are unprovable neither provides any basis for the actuality S1(x,y,z,t) being ontologically necessary or, contrariwise, ontologically contingent.

I'm not really clear what 'causal necessity' is supposed to be. There seem to be a number of different accounts,none of which are wholly persuasive. It would be helpful if you could clarify how you understand it.

Logical necessity is concerned with the truth value of a specific subset of propositional sentences.*** However,I am unclear how the notion of logical necessity would be relevant since the truth value of an atomic proposition about some putative ontological S(x,y,z,t) are not true or false 'in virtue of their logical form alone'

//'We could say S is logically possible,...'//

I'm not sure we could given:

'[Logical impossibility] involves some kind of [internal] contradiction or inconsistency [in a proposition].' ('Logical Forms: an Introduction to Philosophica Logic', R M Sainsbury, Blackwell, 2001, p.15)

So 'logical possibility' is merely saying /no/ /more/ than that a propositional sentence is well formed to the extent that it does not contain an internal contradiction or inconsistency. One obvious difficulty is that 'logical possibility' is about the absence of inconsistency and contradiction in a /proposition/ and S is not a proposition but an ontological state of affairs independent of the internal consistency of propositions that have it as a referent.

Suppose the state of affairs, S1, rain(x,y,z,t) obtains then neither of two contradictory propositions P1,('It is raining at (x,y,z,t)'), nor P2, ('It is not raining at (x,y,z,t)') are logically impossible, because neither contains any internal inconsistency or contradiction. The difference between P1 and P2 is that the former has S1(x,y,z,t) as a truthbearer and P2 does not. Clearly, S1 (x,y,z,t) affects of the different truth values of the propositions but not their (common)logical possibility.

I'm not clear whether you mean 'logically possible' in this sense or rather are invoking the notion of modal possibility with propositions like P3, ('it is possible that it is raining at (x,y,z,t)') or P4, ('It is possible that it is not raining at (x,y,z,t)').

However there would seem to be a number of difficulties here to do with the relationship, if any, between the modal proposition P4(¬(#rain(x,y,z,t))) and the ontological (actual) state of affairs, S1(rain(x,y,z,t). If you do mean /modal/ possibility rather /logical/ possibility then it would help if you explained what you see as the relation between P4 and S1.

//'it just doesn't happen to be the case.'//

I don't want to commit the error of wrongly interpreting your meaning here but the 'just happens to be the case' seems to imply S1 is ontologically /contingent/. I'm unclear what logical or modal possibility has to do with this. I am not, of course, persuaded by Hume's 'established maxim of metaphysics' or any of its modern variants.****


* Except, of course for presentism in which the 'unreality' of the past and future would seem to present severe difficulties for causality.

**The SEP entry describes non-standard views in which the direction of causation is supposed not reduce to the direction of time but none seem to have been applied to the B-series ontology of a B-universe

*** 'Logical Necessity: The necessity of what is logically true and guaranteed by the laws of logic... It is ascribed to analytical truths , originally understood as subject-predicate sentences in which the predicate term is contained in the subject, but now understood as sentences that are true in virtue of their logical form alone.'(The Blackwell Dictionay of Western Philosophy)

**** 'We can at least conceive a change in the course of nature; which sufficiently proves, that such a change is not absolutely impossible.'(Treatise, Book I, Part III, Section 6)

bs

Hi jank

We are flying out tomorrow for a spell on the island sailing and sea kayaking (me only) and part-tie horticultural labouring (me again) though we will also be doing some remote working (she more than me).

Our Finnish guests/interns left to begin their Wanderjahr early this morning.

Irn Bru: Its efficacy as a hangover cure is almost certainly a Scotch urban myth. My partner who claims to know of wot she speaks says water, multivitamins and painkillers are all that's needed. I claim that (more) Sekt is the German equivalent though not everyone here seems to agree:

http://news.scotsman.com/latestnews/Ich-bin-ein-IrnBru-drinker.4163991.jp

Irn Bru the drink of choice for Lower Saxon political fashionistas?

Thanks for the Compulsion link. The only Cd I have is 'The Future Is Medium' where you appear as a short haired 'ginger' rather than as a pig-tailed brunette. The hyphenated for name was unexpected.

Anyhow much to do so going AFK.

bis spater

Hi Bx4,

I agree with a lot of your latest and will try to clarify how I see some of the issues you have raised when time permits.

We seem to have got a little diverted from the strand of thought on the meaning of '@p' and hope that you will be able to address #1225 in due course.

have a good trip!

ttfn

hi psi

//have got a little diverted from the strand of thought on the meaning of '@p' and hope that you will be able to address #1225 in due course.//

Indeed, we have though before I get round to the many issues you raise in #1225. However I think that your claimed role for a Ramsey's Ladder in @p can be dealt with separately from other issues in #1225.

On the compatibilism thread (#557 ) you say:

'@p means necessarily p, which is short for 'necessarily p is the case, ie p is true, recall Ramsay's Ladder"

However Blackburn describes his 'Ramsey's Ladder thus:

'We can see why this is so if we put it in terms of what we can call Ramsey’s ladder. This takes us from p to it is true that p, to it is really true that p, to it is really a fact that it is true that p, and if we like to it is really a fact about the independent order of things ordained by objective Platonic normative structures with which we resonate in harmony that it is true that p...Ramsey’s ladder is horizontal. The view from the top is just the same as the view from the bottom, and the view is p.'
(Review of Thomas Nagel, The Last Word).

Now notably in none of the rungs does the modal operator '@' appear In fact we have two distinct ladders:

(a) p(rung 1)=='p is true'(rung 2)==.... (Blackburn)

and

(b) @p(rung 1)== @pis the case(rung 2)...(psiomniac)

You also claim that your rung 2 '@p is the case' is equivalent to Blackburn's rung 2 though this would seem to mean that your rung 1 @p is equivalent to Blackburn's p. So if p==@p then since (p==@p)==(p==p) the modal operator '@' seems to be redundant in a 'Ramsey's Ladder' since the modal qualifier seems to do no work in it.

Another problem with your ''necessarily p is the case, ie p is true' is that the SEP article 'Modal Logic' points out that 'p is true' does not entail that 'necessarily p is true'. You simply cannot substitute your second rung in RL(b) for that in Blackburn's RL(a)

You also seem to place a emphasis on the fact that RL(a) contains the pseudo-predicate 'is true' in its second rung. However the closest Ramsey himself gets to articulating a ladder is:

'[I]t is evident that 'It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered. They are phrases which we sometimes use for emphasis or for stylistic reasons, or to indicate the position occupied by the statement in our argument.
('Facts and Proposition

Giving distinct Ramsey Ladders

(c) 'Caesar was murdered' (rung 1) == 'Caesar was not murdered is true (rung 2)
(d) 'Caesar was not murdered' (rung 1) == 'Caesar was not murdered is false (rung 2)

Blackburn's Rl(a) is a generalisation of Ramsey's RL(c). However I can see nothing that would preclude a generalisation of Ramsey's RL(d) to

(e) ¬p (rung 1) == '¬p is false'(rung 2)

Nor does it it require that rung 1 contain the '¬' operator since 'Caesar died in his bed' would yield:

(f) Caesar died in his bed' (rung 1) == 'Caesar died in his bed is false' (rung 2)

which is generalisable as

(g) q (rung 1) == q is false' (rung 2)

So I don't think that Blackburn's inclusion of the pseudo-predicate 'is true' in RL(a) can be read as saying that it is a necessary feature of /all/ Ramsey Ladders since clearly from (f) and (g) it is not.

One should also note that in the modal qualifier '@' does not appear either Ramsey's RL(c) or RL(d).

In 'Facts and Propositions' does discuss 'necessary' propositions such as 'Either Caesar was murdered or Caesar was not murdered'(1) and 'Caesar was murdered and Caesar was not murdered' however such propositions are true, or false, 'by virtue of their logical form' (see definition of 'Logical Necessity' in my previous post)

Since I think I have shown that the second rung of a Ramsey ladder need not contain the pseudo-predicate 'is true' to the exclusion of 'is false' and that 'p is necessarily true' is not equivalent to 'p is necessarily true' then I am still not persuaded that your claim that Ramsey's Ladder lend any support your interpretation of @p, in strict conditionals.

written in haste so usual apologies.

bs

Oops!

'that 'p is necessarily true' is not equivalent to 'p is necessarily true' '

should read

'that 'p is true' is not equivalent to 'p is necessarily true'

Hi Bx4,

I'll get back to the B-theory causality question soon I hope.

"Now notably in none of the rungs does the modal operator '@' appear In fact we have two distinct ladders:

(a) p(rung 1)=='p is true'(rung 2)==.... (Blackburn)

and

(b) @p(rung 1)== @pis the case(rung 2)...(psiomniac)"

As I said in #1204, my intention was that RL operates inside the scope of the @ only. So it isn't as if the @ plays a part on the rungs. Perhaps it would be clearer if a separated out the application of RL like so:

1) @(p)
2) (p) == (p is true) (by RL)
therefore
3) @(p is true) by 1) and 2)

"You also claim that your rung 2 '@p is the case' is equivalent to Blackburn's rung 2 though this would seem to mean that your rung 1 @p is equivalent to Blackburn's p. So if p==@p then since (p==@p)==(p==p) the modal operator '@' seems to be redundant in a 'Ramsey's Ladder' since the modal qualifier seems to do no work in it."
I agree, I said in #1204, the @ is on the outside, RL works on p only, but if we have @(p) then we have @(anything equivalent to p).

"Another problem with your ''necessarily p is the case, ie p is true' is that the SEP article 'Modal Logic' points out that 'p is true' does not entail that 'necessarily p is true'. You simply cannot substitute your second rung in RL(b) for that in Blackburn's RL(a)"
I have already explained that what I meant by 'necessarily p is the case, ie p is true' was 'necessarily p is the case, ie necessarily p is true' but missed out the second 'necessarily' because I was writing as it might sound out loud, as in necessarily(p is the case, ie p is true). This comes under @(p) == @(anything equivalent to p). That's what I meant and I don't see a problem with it.

"[I]t is evident that 'It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered. They are phrases which we sometimes use for emphasis or for stylistic reasons, or to indicate the position occupied by the statement in our argument.
('Facts and Proposition"
That does the trick doesn't it? That implies RL well enough I think.

"(c) 'Caesar was murdered' (rung 1) == 'Caesar was not murdered is true (rung 2)
(d) 'Caesar was not murdered' (rung 1) == 'Caesar was not murdered is false (rung 2)"

I think (c) has a typo and should read:
(c) 'Caesar was murdered' (rung 1) == 'Caesar was murdered is true (rung 2)
(d) is wrong also and should be:
(d) 'Caesar was not murdered' (rung 1) == 'Caesar was murdered is false (rung 2)"
Which shows the assymmetry I was talking about before. RL doesn't work in the same way with falsehoods because we do need ¬ operators to avoid contradictions.


"Blackburn's Rl(a) is a generalisation of Ramsey's RL(c). However I can see nothing that would preclude a generalisation of Ramsey's RL(d) to

(e) ¬p (rung 1) == '¬p is false'(rung 2)

Nor does it it require that rung 1 contain the '¬' operator since 'Caesar died in his bed' would yield:

(f) Caesar died in his bed' (rung 1) == 'Caesar died in his bed is false' (rung 2)

which is generalisable as

(g) q (rung 1) == q is false' (rung 2)"
No this doesn't work. (e), (f) and (g) are contradictory as far as I can tell. They inherit the problem with assymettry from your (d), which is wrong. You can say:

(d) "'Caesar was not murdered' == 'Caesar was murdered is false'"

or

(d) "'Caesar was not murdered' == 'Caesar was not murdered is true'"

but

(d) "'Caesar was not murdered' == 'Caesar was not murdered is false'"

is a contradiction.

So I don't think your conclusions follow.

Similar apologies for typos etc.

ttfn

psi

A bit busy today but it would be helpful why you think:

(d) "'Caesar was not murdered' == 'Caesar was not murdered is false'" w

is a contradiction since Ramsey says:


'[I]t is evident that 'It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered. '

Clearly asserting the equivalence of meaning between rung 1 and rung 2.

bs

Hi Bx4,

I'll try my best to explain.

First consider:

(d)'Caesar was not murdered' == 'Caesar was not murdered is false'

let p = 'Caesar was not murdered'

then (d) translates as:

p == ¬p

which is a contradiction.

Second, if we look at the Ramsey quote we can see an important difference:
"[I]t is evident that 'It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered."

... the difference is that Ramsey is not talking about p as above but q, where:

q = 'Caesar was murdered'

So Ramsey is drawing equivalences that can be translated like this:

'It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered' gives 'It is true that q == q'.

'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered." gives 'it is false that q == ¬q'.

Now I don't know what is says in the literature apart from the stuff like Blackburn which I've read, but it seems to me that if Ramsey is attempting to establish a symmetrical redundancy of 'is true' and 'is false' then the attempt fails. This is because 'is false' requires 'not' to be introduced, as Ramsey does in the ordinary language quote above and as I have done in the translation '¬q'. I think that's the point you have overlooked.

I hope that clarifies.

ttfn

Hi psi

Sorry much engaged in the world and somewhat bogged down by trying to figure out what it is Ramsey is trying to argue in the deeply unclear and inconsistent 'Facts and Propositions' As usual when I noodle away at things over a longish period I get diverted into by-ways only tangentially related to the main point which is your substitution of 'is false' by '¬'. I will brutally excise them (though of course saving them for later)

//I think that's the point you have overlooked//

No my problem is that I cannot see the justification that would legitimises your substitution of 'is false' by '¬'.

Given:

'Logical negation is an operation on one logical value, typically the value of a proposition, that produces a value of true when its operand is false and a value of false when its operand is true.'

http://www.mathweb.org/wiki/Logical_negation

Since 'operator' and 'operand' are quite distinct and different things I see no obvious justification for substituting one for the other. The substitution seems illegitimate to me. Perhaps you would explain your thinking?

I am also becoming concerned about the substitution of the equivalence operator '==' as substitute for 'means no more than that' as I don't think they are really synonynmous. Ramsey is quite specific in the sense in which the operands 'is true' and 'is false' are 'superfluous':

(a) [The] statement though false...has the /same/ /meaning/ as it would have as it would have if it were true' [my emphases]

This is consistent with:

'[Redundancy theory's] primary significance is as an overt rejection of the notions of truth and falsity are central to a theory of meaning: to accept the redundancy theory is to deny that a grasp of the meaning of a sentence consists in an apprehension of its truth conditions, in knowing what has to be the case for it to be true,...'
('Frege: Philosopy of Language, Duckworth, 2nd Ed.,1981 p.458)

which I quoted upthread.So it seems to be that what Ramsey is arguing is that /meaning/ of a proposition is independent of its truth conditions and hence the operands, 'is true' and 'is false'. These are 'superfluous' but only the limited sense of the /meaning/ of a sentence. Suppose the statement in (a) is r 'there is a teapot orbiting S Doradus' then we can understand the /meaning/ of r without knowing if it 'is true' or 'is false' or even knowing the truth conditions that determine which truth value applies**.

So from (a) we can say that it is not (meaning of r)(truth conditions of r for)(truth value of r){rung 2} that is equivalent to (meaning of r) {rung 2) but only the (meaning of r){rung 2} that is equivalent to (meaning of r){rung 1} irrespective of whatever (truth conditions of r for)(truth value of r) obtain.

//the stuff like Blackburn which I've read//

One difficulty I have with Blackburn is that although I have read most of what he has to say about his 'Ramsey's Ladder' I have come across nothing which seems to give an account of whether his theory of meaning of a sentence includes or excludes its truth conditions. Are you aware of anything

* For Ramsey :

'The problem with which I propose to deal is the logical analysis of what may be called by any of the terms judgment, belief, or assertion. Suppose I am at this moment judging that Caesar was murdered: then it is natural to distinguish in this fact on the one side either my mind, or my present mental state, or words or images in my mind, which we will call the mental factor or factors, and on the other side either Caesar, or Caesar's murder, or Caesar and murder, or the proposition Caesar was murdered, or the fact that Caesar was murdered, which we will call the objective factor or factors; and to suppose that the fact that I am judging that Caesar was murdered consists in the holding of some relation or relations between these mental and objective factors'

Though there is no explanation what is is for a proposition to be objective.


** Ramsey, does give a truth condition for determining the truth value of an 'objective'* proposition:

'That Caesar died' is... an existential proposition asserting the existence of an event of a certain sort...The event which is of that sort is called the death of Caesar...' "

though he is more concerned with what are the "truth conditions" of the 'mental factor' 'of what may be called by any of the terms judgment, belief or assertion'.

hi psi

//Ramsey is attempting to establish a symmetrical redundancy of 'is true' and 'is false' then the attempt fails.//

I am not sure it does.
You have lost me here since in the above quote Ramsey clearly /is/ talking /both/ about q, 'Caesar was murdered' and about p, 'Caesar was not murdered' giving the substitution

(f) 'It is false that q' means 'p'

from which we can get

(g) 'It is false that q' means 'it is true that ¬q' means 'it is true that p'

where the three possible alternatives on the second rung are /semantically/ equivalent and so we have the ladder:

(h) ('It is false that q' means 'it is true that ¬q' means 'it is true that p')**

However I think there is an easier way to get symmetry. Earlier in 'Facts and Propositions' Ramsey says:

'That Caesar died' is... an existential proposition asserting the existence of an event of a certain sort...The event which is of that sort is called the death of Caesar...'

Suppose the existential event is E1, the death of Caesar by murder, then we would have the pair:

(i) 'That Caesar died by murder is true' (R2) means no more than 'that Caesar died by murder'(R1)

(j) 'That Caesar did not die by murder is false' (R1) means no more than 'that Caesar did not die by murder'(R2)

Suppose instead that the existential event is E2, the death of Caesar by suicide then we would have the pair:

(k) 'That Caesar did not die by murder is true' (R1) means no more than 'that Caesar did not die by murder'

(l) 'That Caesar died by murder is false' (R2) means no more than 'that Caesar died by murder'(R1)

So on rung 2 which of q, 'that Caesar died by murder' or p, 'that Caesar did not die by murder' is solely determined by the actual existential event that obtains and moreover whichever operand, 'is true' 'or 'is false', that thereby that attaches to q then both operands are redundant and hence eliminated on rung 1.

So nothing seems to preclude the operand 'is false' from being treated in precisely the same way as 'is true.

If I am correct the symmetry is preserved.

**I regard this somewhat tortuous argument as an hommage to the philosophical legerdemain and woo-woo I endure as I plough through the outpourings of the professional filosofickal gents.

hi psi

//I don't know what is says in the literature apart from the stuff like Blackburn which I've read//

As far as I can see Blackburn's 'Ramsey's Ladder' has not been widely discussed. There are a couple of papers by Huw Price and one by A W Moore. The latter makes an interesting point:


'Blackburn is quite right to say that Ramsey’s ladder is horizontal.However, he sometimes makes this sound like an exciting philosophical
thesis (e.g. p. 79 [of 'Ruling Passions'), whereas it is really just a matter of definition. For obviously it is not impossible to produce a proposition of this general stripe that is on a higher level than the proposition that p; it is just that what is produced will not then count as being on Ramsey’s ladder.'
('Quasi-realism and Relativism', A. W. Moore, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,Vol. LXV, No. 1, July 2002,p.152).

and

'In particular, if the proposition that p is an ethical proposition, then it is not impossible to produce a meta-ethical proposition, off the ladder, about what makes it true that p. Blackburn himself insists on this (p. 295 [of 'Ruling Passions']as of course he must, for quasi-realism itself involves producing
just such propositions.' (ibid)


I think that the last point can be generalised so that one or more meta-propositions can be produced then the putative ladder would not be a Ramsey Ladder but would involve something akin semantic ascent.

If it is possible to show that the supposed two rung ladder in Ramsey involves a semantic ascent while preserving redundancy, through application of some relevant meta-proposition (which I think on can) then the so called 'Ramsey Ladder' is trivial resulting, as Moore points out, from no more than a /definition/ of it by Blackburn that excludes the relevant meta-propositions from consideration.
must dash

bs

Hi Bx4,

"No my problem is that I cannot see the justification that would legitimises your substitution of 'is false' by '¬'."

Here's the Ramsay quote again and I've put multiple square brackets around the suspicious looking extra 'not':

'[I]t is evident that 'It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was [[[not]]] murdered.'

"Since 'operator' and 'operand' are quite distinct and different things I see no obvious justification for substituting one for the other."

If p = Caesar was murdered

then

¬p = it is not the case that Caesar was murdered = Caesar was not murdered

"(a) [The] statement though false...has the /same/ /meaning/ as it would have as it would have if it were true' [my emphases]"

I agree.

Back in #1208 I mentioned the distinction between the /meaning/ of a grammatical sentence (in logic notation or English) and its truth value.

There is also an important distinction between knowing the truth value of a sentence and knowing its truth conditions. it seems straightforward that I can know what 'there is a teapot orbiting S Doradus' means without knowing whether it is true. Whether or not I can know what it means without having the slightest idea what would make it true or false is less clear cut in my view.

What is being overlooked is that a proposition might be true or false, but by convention when I type:

1)p

then I assert p.

Maybe you could consider the illocutionary force as separate from the propositional content, I don't know, but you cannot say that when somebody types 'p' then they might be telling you 'p is false'. They are telling you 'p is true' and the 'is true' is redundant. To assert p is to say that p is the case.

"You have lost me here since in the above quote Ramsey clearly /is/ talking /both/ about q, 'Caesar was murdered' and about p, 'Caesar was not murdered' giving the substitution

(f) 'It is false that q' means 'p'"

That was my point. You have to change the propositional variable, or, as Ramsey does, introduce a 'not', spoiling the symmetry. You had not done this. You had written:

(d) 'Caesar was not murdered' == 'Caesar was not murdered is false'

Which has a 'not' in both and I have demonstrated that it is a contradiction.

In attempting symmetry with 'is false' you again fall into contradiction:

"(j) 'That Caesar did not die by murder is false' (R1) means no more than 'that Caesar did not die by murder'(R2)"

(j) and (l) are contradictions.

Whether E1 or E2 obtains makes no difference to meaning, just to the truth value of p and q.

So I don't think you are correct since your attempt to eliminate 'is false' has again led to contradictions.

ttfn

hi psi

Just quickie:. Still busy in the world so an reply will be delayed.

Do you know what is the status of Pravda-in-the-Wen's 'disposal' of ? My tarniness in replying seems to gave led to a fairly considerable of deferred areas of discussion.

It occurs to me that if closure imminent I should 'cut and paste' outstanding posts into notepad or somesuch.

Any sggestions as to which post to start from.

bs