h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

Hi Bx4,

I've read some Dennett and Dawkins but not TGD and nothing by Hitchens or Harris. I think reading Boyer and then Atran has changed my view considerably and I don't feel inclined to read new atheist stuff any more.

I look forward to some more chewiness, although one day if we discuss something and it turns out more like lemon sorbet, then that might be a refreshing change.

I missed The Prisoner remake on the telly. Have you seen it?

bsy

hi psi

I had read Atran, Hinde and Sloan Wilson before starting TGD or the other 'New Atheists', who in addition to those you mention included Stenger, Shermer and Grayling (though the last two were not deep sixed) but not the serial ideological zealot, Hitchens.

The only other Dawkins books I've finished were 'The Selfish Gene' (which probably accounts for aversion to things analogical) and his 'serious' book, 'The Extended Phenotype' which I thought 'not even wrong'.

I am quite happy to go for a fluffy topic. What do you have in mind? Clearly it must be selected to absolutely exclude any likelihood of chewiness.

I did watch part of the first episode of the remake but gave up before the end.

Any explanation of why would involve a rant about 'pasteurised' product, focus groups, target demographics and an adverse comparison of the naturalistic style of the remake with the original. The possibility of a passing reference to 'Twin Peaks' could not be excluded.

Contrariwise Sir Ian McKellen who (fresh from his recent successes as the definitive Gandalf and Magneto) plays Number 2 thinks it 'adult', 'good' and 'has a genius ending'.

Anyhow back to Object O

bsy

Hi Bx4,

I have read some Shermer but wouldn't have counted him as a new atheist and Grayling is ok on some things but I don't think he really gets people like Boyer. I've only read DSW online.

I'm not sure about a fluffy topic, as that might end up more candy floss than sorbet.

Shame about The Prisoner. I loved it from when I first saw it rerun in the 70's. Mind you, I did like Twin Peaks.

hi psi-

Busy in the world today but a couple of points:

'I have read some Shermer but wouldn't have counted him as a new atheist....'

The label is probably ambiguous. 'New Atheist' apparently first appeared in a Wired article which I think we briefly discussed on 'Delusion'

http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.11/atheism.html

and where the label seems to have only been applied, to Dawkins, Dennett, Harris and, presumably, their acolytes.

The issue of whether Shermer (and Grayling) are New Atheists may depend on how it is understood. I came upon this rather odd site:

http://newatheism.org/

which has it that:

'Intolerance of ignorance, myth and superstition; disregard for the tolerance of religion. Indoctrination of logic, reason and the advancement of a naturalistic worldview.'

If this is the sense I would agree that Shermer (with his 'Open Letter') could not be so classified.

The philosopher John Gray has a different viewpoint: rather than being a revolution against religion, the new atheism is, like other modern ideologies, rather a late evolution of Protestant millenarianism where reason is substituted for superstition and which has as a supposed outcome a natural utopia rather than a supernatural one. (see for example his excellent (though Grayling did not find it so) 'Black Mass' )

'...I don't think he really gets people like Boyer.'

I don't think any of them do. Remember Atran's comments at the 2006 'Beyond Belief'. In TGD Dawkins presents a rather coddish interpretation of Atran and Boyer as providing support for his position. Strange for someone who is a strict adaptationist.

'I've only read DSW online.'

I was thinking of his Darwin's Cathedral which gives an adaptationist account of religion as persisting because it confers selective advantages and thus has to be-seen as distinct from Atran and Boyer's non-adaptationist stance. Clearly such a notion is anathema to Dawkins despite DSW being an avowed atheist The fact that DSW is a proponent of multilevel adaptation may also be of significance.

'I'm not sure about a fluffy topic, as that might end up more candy floss than sorbet'


Clearly I need to be more rigorous. I am suggesting that that you provide a topic which is philosophically interesting but has not been, is not, and cannot become, chewy.

'Shame about The Prisoner. I loved it from when I first saw it rerun in the 70's. Mind you, I did like Twin Peaks'

I own (courtesy of the SO) the 40th anniversary DVD. I appear to inadvertently misled you. I too liked 'Twin Peaks'. What I was suggesting that whereas the surrealism of the original 'The Prisoner' came from its non-naturalistic treatment whereas Twin Peaks intially presented as naturalist but developed its surrealism by gradually introducing a increasing incongruous elements and themes.

I thought the remake unsuccessfully (unlike 'Twin Peaks') essayed the latter approach.

bsy

Hi Bx4,

Yes I've had 'Black Mass' recommended to me, I'll have to chase it up.

On DSW I think you are right about Dawkins' antipathy to his ideas. Dawkins rejects multilevel selection I think.

"I am suggesting that that you provide a topic which is philosophically interesting but has not been, is not, and cannot become, chewy."
Oh. That should be easy...

"I thought the remake unsuccessfully (unlike 'Twin Peaks') essayed the latter approach."
Ah got it now.

hi psi

Some what off-piste at the moment since I have caught a virulent cold and streaming eyes make it difficult to read or write.

'Yes I've had 'Black Mass' recommended to me, I'll have to chase it up.'

It only mentions 'new atheism' briefly. Basically it looks at the way that religious millenialism influenced the emergence of the secular utopianism of the Enlightenment and its persistence in the ideologies of the 19thC and 20thC, latterly in neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism.

Some sections refer to events and individuals that were topical at the time of writing which are now outdated but rest of it is still worth a read.

He did write somewhat polemical newspaper article specifically on the new atheism:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2008/mar/15/society

The headline and text above the photo are not his (in a different edition of the Guardian the headline was 'Godless Evangelicals'.

'On DSW I think you are right about Dawkins' antipathy to his ideas. Dawkins rejects multilevel selection I think.'

Though of course, Atran and Boyer, argue a non-adaptationist account of religion which Dawkins should, as a strict adaptationist, reject, yet he doesn't.

I think there is personal animosity between DSW and Dawkins. You may recall an article you linked to from, I think, The Skeptic' in which he called Dawkins, not wholly unfairly, imo, a 'Mycroft'.

In the end the explanations favoted in TGD are, inevitably, the meme and the faith virus though as a true mycroftian Dawkins has never produced any empirical evidence of either.

'Oh. That should be easy..'

The suggestion for ¬chewy was yours....I'm sure you can manage something.

'Ah got it now.'

rg (previously royalgrounded) suggested the cherry pie was an hommage to Twin Peak. Sadly I was in error. It was a cake...with glace cherries.

I need a hot toddy......easy on the lemon

bsy

hi psi

The pruning took longer than anticipated..........


'if we are taking a statement in ordinary language and contextualising it such that it can be a proposition, don't we choose a target proposition which reflects the meaning of the statement as we understand it? To do that we have to make choices about issues of salience'.

Somewhat chewy and my original reply was even chewier involving as it did excessive twittering about semantic values, the relation of a theory meaning to a theory of reference, T sentences and Davidson's arguments of about the meaning of natural statements.
(Sometimes I just get carried way. My excuse is that it often helps me think things through.)

Here is the uber-precis which can be expanded if necessary.

Let 'a is x' be a natural language statement (N) which expresses S, the abstract statement 'b is y'. Further let S be a Perry-type propositional function P(x)(x > 0) so that it must take as arguments some set, excluding the null set, of contexts @ sufficient to generate the propositional statement ( a statement that takes truth values) P(@) such that:

(a) 'P(@)'is true iff T(@)

for example

( b) 'Any object has weight {in a gravitational field}' is true iff any object has weight {in a gravitational field

I think the problem with your argument is that a natural sentence, assuming it does not express a proposition simpliciter, (P(x), x=0), ,then nothing precludes different sets contextuals as arguments, as a consequence producing different 'target propositions' with different meanings.

For example suppose N is ' Any object has weight' and your context set is r{in a gravitational field} wheres mine is s{ in a gravitational field, not acted on by any other gravitational fields whose combined effect is precisely equal in quantity and whose combined vector is precisely opposite in direction}, such that we have respectively:

(c) 'S{r}'is true iff T{r}

(d)'S{s}'is true iff T{s}

Two different 'propositions' with two different meanings.

"The issue is whether 'popishness' is at all relevant to the fact I want to convey."

It probably isn't since I should have said 'popiness' rather than 'popishness' which is rather more an abstraction of a property ascribed of CoE clerics of the High Church tendency.

My position would be I think that the 'popiness' of one, suitably contextualised, Joseph Ratzinger, obtains from

P('Joseph Ratzinger is the Pope {c}') is true iff T(Joseph Ratzinger is the Pope { having been assigned, by due process, the function of current head of the Roman Catholic Church})

However onwards and upwards-

'If I am trying to convey something like the conjunction:

2) X is a paperweight AND X is in the sea

then this is ontologically subjective since the first clause is an institutional fact.'

I think we need to be quite careful here to distinguish between a proposition and a fact. Your secondary proposition conjoins two primitive propositions not two facts. Moreover a proposition, as distinct from a fact, will always and necessarily be observer dependent.

I have explained elsewhere why it might be better consider a conjoint proposition like:

(a) 'The stone is a paperweight AND the stone is in the sea'

But I think it is a mistake to consider the first clause (primitive proposition) to be an institutional fact rather than being made true by having as its referent an institutional (observer-dependent) fact.

(b) 'The stone is a paperweight' is true iff the stone is a paperweight

Similarly for the second primitive we have:

(c) 'The stone is in the sea' is true iff the stone is in the sea

except of course in this case the referent is a brute ( observer-independent) fact

Moreover, the conjoint proposition (a) is made true not by the facts that make its primitives true but by the truth values of those primitives:

'The stone is in a paperweight AND the stone is in the sea' is true iff 'the stone is a paperweight' is true' AND 'the stone is in the sea' is true.

To re-iterate, while the conjoint proposition may be observer-dependent this is because all propositions are such and not because one of its primitives is made true by a specific observer-dependent institutional fact.

'But suppose the fact that it is a paperweight is relevant only in that I use this label to pick out the object'

The difficulty here is that you seem to be eliding two /different/ institutional facts, the object's function and its name. The two facts are related if the name has a descriptive component but not if it is purely denotative, serving only to identify the object.

On the latter view, I agree, there is nothing that requires that the object's name relate to the object's function and as such there is no reason to name the object 'The paperweight' rather than say 'Bill'.

Moreover, if the name 'The paperweight' is merely denotative then, given that the two types of institutional facts are unrelated, there is no reason why the object named 'The paperweight' should ever have functioned as a paperweight. This allows the ordinary language utterance:

'The paperweight is not a paperweight'

Which would leapt be leapt upon by professional philosophical mincers, of the direct reference persuasion who have academic careers to build but which would more generally lead to its utterer being considered a bit of an odd duck or a singularly unimaginative Zen sensei.

'3) Object O is at time t submerged by a body of water at latitude x and longitude y. '

True contextualisation would surely also require a vertical co-ordinate?

'When contextualised properly, the fact by reference to which the proposition formed from 3 would be assigned its truth value, would be ontologically objective. That was my point,....'

Indeed, though I am I'm not clear what purpose is served by replacing the /purely/ denotative name 'The paperweight' with the denotative name ' Object O'.

Nor am I clear how your point applies to the conjoint proposition

Object O is submerged in a body of water {time a, location(d,e,f) AND Object O is (functioned as) a paperweight {time b, location (g,h,i)}

'.....you can't do the same trick for 'forbidding' though'

Indeed, unless one could find a way of submerging the Natural Law.

'I know, but once that was done, again this could be ontologically objective. The same is true for the pope I think.'

If we accept your purely denotative use of names then nothing precludes us from denoting, for example, the person currently denoted by the name 'Sherpa Tenzing' by the name 'the pope', and since that person has never been assigned, by due process, the function the pope then a direct referentialist could say:

'The pope is not the pope AND the pope climbed Mount Everest'

and the conjoint proposition would be true whereas for a descriptivist, since the name describes the function, it would be false.

'No I agree with you that if the true source of the prohibition is Moral Law then this fits with SMR.'

I'm not sure it is quite that straightforward. The pope presumably agrees with Aquinas' position that the natural law is "nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law" (Summa Theologica I-II.94) and since for Aquinas the eternal law pre-exists in the mind of God so DCT than SMR.

However, in the Western pre-Christian tradition, '[a]ncient Greek and Roman thought, particularly Stoicism, introduced the ideas of eternal laws directing the actions of every rational being, and built directly into the structure of the universe' (CDP) which would be consistent with SMR.

'But that wasn't my point. My point was that my 'popish subset' didn't refer to the Moral Law, just to the Pope forbidding stuff'.'

It wasn't my intention to suggest you were. There is however the issue of whether it is the /denoted/individual, sui generis, doing the forbidding or is it the same individual functioning as Pope so doing? In which case

'the Pope might have an off-day and forbid the eating of strawberries despite the fact that the Moral Law had nothing to say about it'

is somewhat ambiguous since we can have:

'The Pope is the Pope AND the Pope forbids strawberries {at time t, location (p,q,r)}

and it is unclear whether the second occurrence of 'the Pope' simply refers to the denoted individual, sui generis, or the function assigned to the individual.

'So they had two Popes? Sounds like interesting times in 1378'

In fact between 1378 and 1417 there were several occasions when there were two popes and, possibly, once three. It was all tidied up retrospectively in 1417 when one of the various popes in each set was uniquely assigned the function of pope and the others the function of anti-pope. Fiddly things institutional facts.

Now for 'Objective'.

bsy

That was the /pruned/ version? Awesome...

I think some of the things that you cite as problems for my argument are actually elements of my argument. I'm happy with 'the pope is not the pope' though.

You were right that I was imprecise in the first part when I said that "then this is ontologically subjective since the first clause is an institutional fact."

I did use the correct locution later on:
"'When contextualised properly, the fact by reference to which the proposition formed from 3 would be assigned its truth value"
But this is cumbersome, so forgive the shorthand.

I'll have a think about how to respond in detail since although I think I can glimpse a path to resolution, there are some pitfalls

hi psi

'Awesome'

More longish.


'respond'

No great hurry I'm flying out tomorrow to start getting ready for my bike tour.

bsy

hi jank

My 'banned' post to on 2CJC is out of poky . Now I'll never know.

I had thought that surfing the waves would have replaced surfing the boards, but apparently not......

I'm off on a 2-3month biking trip in a few days

So if I don't catch you before then-

Bis später!

hi psi

A minor point:

'
I did use the correct locution later on'

Indeed, though this referred to the primitive proposition

3) Object O is at time t submerged by a body of water at latitude x and longitude y.

Whereas, your:

' "then this is ontologically subjective since the first clause is an institutional fact."'

referred to a conjoint, rather than a primitive, proposition.

The point I was trying to make was that the truth value of a conjoint proposition is determined solely the truth values of its primitive, /irrespective/ of the ontological status of the facts that make the primitives true.

Hi Bx4,

"The point I was trying to make was that the truth value of a conjoint proposition is determined solely the truth values of its primitive, /irrespective/ of the ontological status of the facts that make the primitives true."
This is surely the case, but I'm not sure how that relates to the current problem, since if we have p AND q, and either p or q having a truth value assigned in virtue of reference to institutional facts, then it remains the case that the truth value of p AND q cannot be determined without reference to institutional facts, albeit via one extra step.

Will respond to your chewy one soon.

ttfn

hi psi

' I'm not sure how that relates to the current problem, since if we have p AND q, and either p or q having a truth value assigned in virtue of reference to institutional facts, then it remains the case that the truth value of p AND q cannot be determined without reference to institutional facts, albeit via one extra step.'


I'm perhaps not being quite clear. I'm was making a quite narrow point about the truth value of a conjoint prposition


It was the /referents/ which make the conjoint proposition true are the truth values of the primitives not their referring facts. Let me try and show why .

Suppose we take your argument for p and q then I presume we agree that given


'p' is true iff (a). (1)**

'q' is true iff (b). (2)

then

'p AND q' is true iff 'p' is true AND 'q' is true (3)

However suppose it transpires that referent of 'q' is not the institutional fact (b) but some other institutional fact (c) giving

'q' is true iff (c); (4)

Then (3) still holds because it's referents are the truth values of the primitives which are still the same despite the referring fact of one of them having changed.

**While "'p' is true iff (p)" is more usual there is no requirement that the proposition and its referent should be homophonic. I've only used non-homophonic referents to make the argument more readable. Also the intent of the brackets round the referents which also has no other significance

There is no need to rush a reply to to my 'longish' chewy one as I will be leaving soon so any reply of my is likely to be delayed. However, I've nearly finished a reply to your last on 'objective' and hope to post it before I leave'

One of my holiday reads (or a re-read in this case) is Rorty's 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature'. I may well return as an Anti-philosopher.

bsy

Hi Bx4,

"I'm perhaps not being quite clear. I'm was making a quite narrow point about the truth value of a conjoint prposition"
No, I think you were clear, and I agree with your narrow point. I'm not clear as to its relevance though.

Have a good trip!

ttfn

hi psi

'I'm not clear as to its relevance though.'

It was intended as a response to your (#957)

'If I am trying to convey something like the conjunction:

2) X is a paperweight AND X is in the sea

then this is ontologically subjective since the first clause is an institutional fact.'

whose significance and hence relevance continue to elude me,

'Have a good trip.'

Thank you. I don't leave until May 7 but I am deep in preparation. It would appear that the lands of the far north are rich in wi-fi hot-spots so thanks to the gift of a spiffy new mini-notebook from the SO I will not be wholly denied the richness that is t'interweb thingy.

bsy

hi Bored,

"My 'banned' post to on 2CJC is out of poky . Now I'll never know.";
and having finally read it i do think that your neologism was the sole reason for being pokied at all. really Bored, how on earth do you find this terminology! tracked it down in an online Urban Dictionary......

" surfing the waves would have replaced surfing the boards, but apparently not......";
have been out as much as possible, have had a few awesome (dude) sessions, but too little wind most of the time. so the more surf the less waffle.

but delighted to see you flexing y'r digits, thought you did have the double nelson of the day yesterday!


2-3month biking trip
wow, as ever my skin tone is turning various shades of green. hope you have a great time, be safe.

groetjes,

hi jank

I didn't actually 'find' it but used it as an alternative to the more common 'f**t' because that might be thought of as too offensive by the more linguistically benighted amongst the dementors. I tracked down your Urban Dictionary entry. Sadly my usage lacked the shower overtones...

I had thought it might have been 'furriner' that did it. The dementors also have an irony bypass.

I'm a glad hear about the windsurfing. I had thought Global Plastic and your 'frequent flyer status' hereabouts might be diverting you.

Half Nelson: On reflection, it could have been more polished.

Green: Your are young, my padawan, much before you lies. For me perhaps it is the penultimate journey....

hi jank

I see our 'nemesis' has returned. An atheist BA.

bsy

Hi Bx4,

"It was intended as a response to your (#957)"
Ah I see, ok.

"whose significance and hence relevance continue to elude me,"
The point is this: there is a way that 'the pope climbed mount Everest' can be contextualised rendering a proposition which has a truth value by reference to an ontologically objective fact. However this is not possible if the fact that Ratzinger is pope is relevant to the intended meaning in any way other than to pick out a unique individual.

ttfn

hi psi

I need to be careful here I don't want to get into the tricky waters of propositional while brandishing a copy of TGD at all and sundry to prove my atheist credentials, Nevertheless.

'The point is this:'

I'm still not getting it since your original was a conjunction of two primitives not a single primitive.

Surely the institutional fact that Ratzinger /is/ the pope influences your choice of label. If it did not why use 'the Pope' rather than 'Joseph Ratzinger' giving, for example, the conjoint proposition:

'Joseph Ratzinger is the Pope AND Joseph Ratzinger climbed Mount Everest'

Rather than

'Joseph Ratzinger is the Pope AND the Pope climbed Mount Everest'

bsy