h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

If free will exists, it is obviously the product of our physical universe. So there is not merely a subjective limitation to determining the state of our will, it is a physical one.
Secondly, (free) will is not a singular phenomenon. It cannot exist outside a nurturing structure such as the brain.
Consciousness and will deal only and comprehensivily in experience. There not being anything else to be aware *of*, our will can simply never be hampered in any true sense. Thus 'free' seems a very appropriate adjective to attach.
Chris

I agree with you, though many lifetimes have been spent arguing about the relationship between the mind, our experience, and the physical world, so I doubt we'll clear the question up in this thread!

I agree that the question of free will doesn't arise unless there is a will to be free (or not free). The idea of superdeterminism expands determinism into realms which we have traditionally asserted it not to apply, whilst enjoying the fruits of the knowledge gained in spheres where we are comfortable for it to apply. It is the attempt to extend determinism into the realm of consciousness and who we feel we are which makes this whole area interesting.

Consciousness and will deal, as you say, only in experience, though again, we need to be aware that we can't easily pin-down or limit what we mean by "experience". Part of our experience is of that which we create within our own mind. This influences our actions and shapes our world.

I suppose I could imagine a state where I was not possessed of free will, and was aware of it, like being a sentient machine. This seems like a nasty state, and, I'm glad to say, does not correspond to my experience.

So, I can say that I experience the world as being a place where free will exists. Someone else, with what we would describe as mental problems, could feel differently. I suppose you would class this as falling outside your "true sense" clause, and I recognise the sense in that. This would throw up issues like, who is the crazy one? (We would probably have to vote on it!)

I feel you are right, we have free will, but I don't know if, by the nature of our consciousness, we can't experience its absence (and if, either way, this helps crack the theoretical nut of superdeterminism).

You are saying, if I've understood, that the nature of consciousness is to be free, that it can't be hampered in reality, and that is because it can only deal with experience.

Could you expand on how dealing in experience leads to free will? I need more detail to get my head around this.

There are many ways to put it, but simply said I regard (free) will as a phenomenon emergent from experience. By experience I mean being aware of 'otherness', events not yet registered in, or symbolically represented by, the cerebrum.
Now the regular counterargument to free will is its supposed inability to percieve and affect certain phenomena. By my definition will's existence is limited by all possible objects of awareness(experiences). Since there is no perception of extraconscious or extramanipulable events, they cannot be 'missed' in any real sense.
Hence, however you define free will (even as nonexistent), no organism or matter would ever be aware of a lack of free will..
Don't you agree this this view at least gets rid of region 2 and 4?
As to region 1 and 3, do they actually contradict each other? I think any machine (capable of discussing this matter) could be hardcoded to assume it has free will. The free will from region 1 would, by sheer definition, be able to assume anything at all, including it is free.
It is very interesting, however, to ponder on the effect the conviction of having no free will would have on the subject's choices and actions! Douglas Hofstadter (the co-author of The Mind's Eye, etc) claims to actually hold this view. He also states this opinion did not in fact alter his ideas at all.
Taoists of the Wu-Wei school seem to have debated this issue for two thousands years. Personally I feel an awareness of one's own deterministic identity runs into the fundamental mind/body duality: a machine could *think* it knows it's a machine, but could it truly be aware of this?

Being pedantic, regions 2 and 4 depend on the *belief* in a lack of free will, rather than the perception, awareness, possibility or reality of it. If Douglas Hofstadter really thinks the Universe is superdetermined, then he is in one of these two regions. How different that makes his life from being in 1 or 3 depends on how this belief influences him (he says it doesn't, but it influenced him enough to assert his feelings on his position, so there is some effect there.)

The points set out in the Entry don't actually require anoyone to be in any particular region. It's just a justification of people allowing the way they feel about the world to influence thier thoughts and actions, (overriding an apparently insoluble logical dillemma), and a suggestion that regions 1 and 3 are nicer places to live. If other people feel more comfortable in 2 or 4, fine.

Incidentally, I can imagine some people taking the belief in a lack of free will in a few ways, including:

1) It's in the physics! Wow! Freaky! I have no free will! OK, now let's get a pizza. (i.e. superdeterminism as administrative detail)

2) I have no free will, yet I can still get a pizza when I feel I want one! Wow, God is making all of this work out perfectly! (Superdeterminism as heavenly gift/wrathful punishment (depending on what sort of day you've had)).

3) Life is a hollow sham, we think we are free, but we are really running along on pre-determined railway tracks, what is the point? I think I'll lie in a darkened room for the rest of my pointless life. (Superdeterminism as teenage lifestyle)

and so on.

I think that if we "know" things based on our experience (even if it is just our experience of "knowing" them (intuition)), then we can never know the truth of the matter of free will. This doesn't necessarily matter.

It would take an observer outside this Universe (and in a non-superdeterministic one (and how would she know this?)) to draw any meaningful conclusions as to the reality of free will here. So the point doesn't look likely to be resolved anytime soon!

Re. 1 and 3, they do contradict each other, but as I said, they look identical when we look into the world to see which fits best. Does this make them identical? Logically, no. Outside of logic/philosophy/physics, it doesn't matter, because we would experience them identically.

Thinking machine? Some people assert that this is what we are. (I'm not one of those people.) I don't feel comfortable asserting too much about the reality or nature of thinking machines. My perceptions are limited to some degree by my human-beingness. I simply don't know how they would feel, or if they do or could exist, so I can't really comment too much.

As I write this, I wonder if my PC is trying to attract my attention at this point, but the OS doesn't include the necessary code!

Pushing my thinking a bit further: Can I imagine a thinking machine hard-coded to feel it has no free-will? We, actually, yes I can.

Or at least I recognise that I have no idea how a thinking machine could be constructed, and I have no idea how anyone could hard code either a belief in free will or its absence. If I allow the concept of a thinking machine (the first impossible thing before breakfast), I can also allow one that is aware of its lack of free will (the second one).

Even so, this still can't help us get to the root of the truth or otherwise of superdeterminism, as this hypothetical machine (well, my hypothetical machine) would still be under the same constraints we are in terms of knowing the truth of free will (or anything else).

Ultimately, we reach the point where hands get thrown in the air, and we all go off and do something more useful.

I do think discussing this stuff can be useful, because it is fun, and I am interested in using logic/thought to free the mind from the artificial constraints of logic/thought, whilst still being allowed out in traffic.