A Hijack on the High Seas - Part Three
Created | Updated Jul 22, 2002
In October 1985, the cruise liner Achille Lauro was hijacked in the Mediterranean by a group of armed Palestinians, who later killed Leon Klinghoffer, an American tourist. The subsequent events led to increasing diplomatic tension between Italy, Egypt and the USA.
The Story So Far
Part One - the Achille Lauro is hijacked and ends up anchored off the coast of Egypt.
Part Two - the aircraft transporting the hijackers out of Egypt is diverted to Sicily by the US Air Force.
Diplomatic Immunity
After long negotiations, the hijackers had been removed to a jail on the Italian airbase, leaving delegates from Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) on board the aircraft. The Egyptians then announced that the PLO delegates, Mohammed 'Abul' Abbas and Hassan had been brought to Sicily against their will and had no intention of getting off the plane. They were claiming diplomatic immunity as emissaries of Yasser Arafat. The Egyptians claimed diplomatic immunity for the plane itself, which they said was Egyptian territory that they would defend with arms if necessary. They then formally requested that the plane be allowed to leave the Italian airbase together with all its remaining passengers, including Abbas and Hassan. Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi sent an envoy to talk to the PLO men, but they said nothing useful and protested that the plane should be allowed to leave with them on board.
Meanwhile, the Achille Lauro, anchored off Port Said with its largely Italian crew still on board, was being held by the Egyptians. The Egyptians were clearly trying to use the ship as a bargaining counter, indicating that it would be released to the Italians if the Egyptian plane was released.
Legal Problems
The jailed hijackers were of great interest to the magistrates in Syracuse, Sicily, where they were being detained; the magistrates in Genoa, the home port of the Achille Lauro; and, of course, the American FBI. But it turned out that the existing law, while providing for the death penalty for murder aboard a hijacked aeroplane, did not cover the case of a US citizen murdered on board a foreign ship. The USA were concerned that the Italian authorities might not take action, so they were keen to try to secure the extradition of the four hijackers. The hijackers had been picked out at an identification parade by five of the hostages from the Achille Lauro, with Marilyn Klinghoffer, widow of the murdered American, specifically identifying the man who killed her husband. The other three were also identified, and their names and details established by the authorities.
But the real prize sought by the Americans was not so much the four hijackers, who were comparatively small fry, but the PLO representative Mohammed 'Abul' Abbas, who was well known to US Intelligence and was believed to be a senior figure in a terrorist organisation. Craxi now proposed that, as the initial investigation was complete and the identities of the hijackers established, the plane should be moved to Ciampino, a military airfield near Rome. He later claimed that he was trying to keep the Egyptian plane in Italy for as long as possible, but US officials suspected a cover-up and thought this was the first step towards letting Abbas go free.
The US were concerned that, after taking off from Sicily, the Egyptian plane would leave Italian air space and not go to Rome at all. They decided to follow the flight from Sicily to Rome. So three minutes after the plane took off a US Navy jet taxied out of its hangar at the airbase and headed for the runway. Italian troops brought in some heavy equipment to block it, but it just turned round and took off anyway, narrowly missing some Italian officers who had to duck to avoid it. It followed the Egyptian plane all the way to Ciampino, flew in under the airport radar to avoid detection, then announced that it had to make an emergency landing there. This highly unconventional behaviour of course infuriated the Italian government, who immediately demanded an apology from Washington.
They Land in Rome
The transfer to Rome seriously weakened the American position. While the US Air Force had official access to the NATO airbase in Sicily, this was not the case at Ciampino. And besides, it would probably be much harder to convince the Roman authorities to arrest Abul Abbas than it would have been in Sicily. So the transfer to Rome set alarm bells ringing in Washington, and Reagan sent a message to Craxi reminding him of his obligation to detain Abbas. American intelligence intercepts and Israeli sources had both provided evidence of Abbas' involvement with the hijackers and his prior knowledge of the whole affair.
Warrants were issued in Washington for the arrest of the four hijackers and Abbas on charges of hostage-taking, piracy and conspiracy. US officials believed that, under existing US-Italian treaties, the issue of these warrants would be all that was necessary to force the Italian government to arrest and detain Abbas. National and international law enforcement agencies, including Interpol, were informed that warrants had been issued and that the US would formally request extradition. Such a request was delivered to the Italian Foreign Ministry. This was backed up with evidence gathered by the USA against Abbas. The US communications intercepts and other evidence were disclosed to the Italians.
Italian Dilemma
But Craxi decided that there was no basis under Italian law for detaining Abbas. The USA believed that the Italians were trying to wash their hands of the whole affair so as not to upset their Egyptian and Arab friends in the Mediterranean region. Reagan sent a message to Craxi stating that this was a matter of the greatest importance for the American people and for him, Reagan, personally. He hoped that the Italian government's response would not be such as to create big problems between the two countries. The US ambassador also provided further evidence of Abbas' long history of involvement in terrorist operations.
Craxi's government was also coming up against the magistrates in Sicily and in Rome, who were becoming antagonised at having the matter unjustifiably taken out of their hands by the central government. The Roman judges were furious that they had been unable to find out where Abbas was being held. Both they and the Sicilian judges were highly displeased at the lack of co-operation they were experiencing from the Roman police and the government. Craxi was also running the risk that a decision to allow Abbas to leave the country would split his coalition government. In particular, his Defence Minister (a Republican, whereas Craxi was a Socialist) was strongly pro-USA and anti-terrorist.
On the other hand, if he arrested Abbas, let alone allowed him to be extradited to the USA, this would cause immense complications with Egypt and the PLO. They would no doubt feel aggrieved that this was how their assistance and friendship were being rewarded. Such action carried the risk of further political instability for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, as well as disturbing the delicate relationships that Italy had with the Middle East in general.
Thousands of students took part in a protest demonstration at the American University in Cairo, and Mubarak's previously mild tone altered. He denounced the USA as international pirates, and laid into the Italians, with particular direct reference to Craxi himself. All the old arguments were trotted out about Egyptian sovereignty over the EgyptAir plane, and Egyptian protection for Abbas. Furthermore, the Achille Lauro still remained at anchor off Port Said, with its Italian crew virtually held prisoner on board - one Italian sailor who tried to go ashore was caught and beaten up by the Egyptian police. Craxi was also being leant on by Arafat, who claimed that it was the PLO who secured the release of the Achille Lauro and if Abbas was handed over to the USA there was no telling what the repercussions might be.
Abbas Escapes
Craxi decided to allow Abbas to leave the country. It was arranged with the help of the Yugoslav government and, after various hitches, a flight was arranged for Abbas and Hassan from Rome to Belgrade. They stayed in Yugoslavia for two days, during which time the US Department of Justice tried to convince the Yugoslav authorities to respect the international arrest warrant that was out for Abbas, but to no avail. Abbas flew from Belgrade to Aden, South Yemen, and on to Baghdad, Iraq.
Washington was furious. The White House issued a statement saying that the USA were 'astonished and disappointed' and found it 'incomprehensible' that the Italians allowed Abbas to leave Italy in spite of the US request for his arrest and detention. It spoke of Abbas as 'one of the most notorious Palestinian terrorists ... involved in savage attacks on civilians'. Reagan was said by White House sources to be very angry and feeling personally betrayed by Craxi's decision. There was talk of recalling Washington's ambassador in Rome.
The US media had of course been full of the story of the paralysed Leon Klinghoffer and his shocking murder. It seemed that US citizens at that time were the targets of terrorist attacks everywhere and this was the latest in a long line of such outrages. Therefore, the US interception of the EgyptAir plane was being seen in terms of the USA striking back at terrorism. Italy was portrayed as having bowed to PLO pressure and fear of terrorist reprisals on Italian soil. In Rome there was a flurry of activity in an attempt to protect US-Italian relations, but however the diplomats tried to paper over the cracks, there was clearly a deep rift.
Italian Government Crisis
The issue rumbled on for the Craxi government at home. The Socialist and Republican factions within Craxi's coalition seized upon this issue to create a face-off over more basic questions of Italian foreign policy. And there was considerable anti-American feeling developing in the Italian press. Typical at the time were headlines such as: 'Italy, an American Province', 'The American Enemy', and so forth. When Craxi decided to allow Abbas to leave the country, the Socialist Party newspaper carried the massive headline, 'Craxi Mocks Reagan'. The anti-American frenzy in Italy at this time was being described as far worse even than at the height of the Vietnam War.
Since the last elections in Italy, the Republican Party had been gaining ground from Craxi and the Socialists. In the present environment, Defence Minister Spadolini and other leading Republicans now forced a confrontation with the Socialist Party. It called upon Craxi's government to repudiate its decision to let Abbas leave the country, saying that this decision could only assist further unrest and the rise of international terrorism. Spadolini and the two other Republican ministers in the government handed in their resignations. Within a few hours, Prime Minister Craxi and his Cabinet had also resigned. Of course, since World War II Italian coalition governments had been collapsing frequently, and over all sorts of domestic issues, but this was the first time an Italian government had come adrift in this way over a foreign policy matter. Craxi's government had actually been one of the longest-serving, and had in fact been presiding over a period of comparative political and economic stability in Italy. The fact that it now seemed to have fallen as a result of a dispute with the USA served only to heighten anti-American sentiment.
Craxi's Socialist Party had been pursuing a policy of keeping the Communist Party out of the governing coalition, and Craxi had been cracking down on his own left wing. Now the Achille Lauro crisis was leading to the re-emergence of the Communist Party as a credible force, a fact that worried the Americans. So an envoy was despatched from Washington to try to patch things up with Craxi, who was now the leader of an interim administration. Reagan even sent Craxi a conciliatory letter, which became known as the 'Dear Bettino Letter' and appeared to be a US apology for its actions. Craxi thus appeared to have triumphed over the USA.
Trial and Sentence
But there were other inter-party squabbles - over issues such as the definition of international terrorism and the nature of the PLO - that served only to highlight more differences and conflicts within the Italian political system. Craxi's government was reconstituted, but the legal investigations continued and six other Palestinians were arrested in Italy on suspicion of helping the hijackers with weapons, explosives and forged papers. Cases were duly brought to trial. One of the hijackers had his charges dropped, and the other three continued to claim that their mission was planned as an attack on Ashdod, the Israeli port towards which the Achille Lauro had been heading.
Magied al-Molqi, the head of the hijackers who was accused of the murder of Klinghoffer, received a 30-year jail sentence instead of the life sentence demanded by the prosecution. Ibrahim Abdel Atif, the second in command, got 24 years and Ahmed al-Hassani 15 years. Abul Abbas and two other Palestine Liberation Front officials were given life sentences in their absence. Of the six other accused, some were acquitted and others received lesser jail sentences.
Epilogue
Abul Abbas
Abbas remains a fugitive from justice. The US government continues to believe that he was the mastermind of the Achille Lauro affair, and suggests that his continued public reappearances as a high-ranking PLO figure point to the continuing involvement of the PLO in acts of international terrorism.
He returned to live in Gaza City, telling his supporters on his return, 'I have no regrets about what I did. I am proud to have been privileged to take part in the struggle'. Abbas' entry into Gaza was reportedly authorised by the Israeli Security Service (Shin Bet) as a gesture towards the Palestinians and against the advice of the Israeli Ministry of Defence.
Yasser Arafat
Arafat's involvement with the Achille Lauro hijacking is not in doubt, but the extent of it is unclear. Arafat's relationship with Abbas, however, and the fact that Abbas was a member of the PLO's Executive Committee from 1984 to 1991, led to a US decision to refuse Arafat a visa to enter the USA to address the United Nations General Assembly in November 1988.
Magied al-Molqi
Molqi, jailed for 30 years in 1985 for the murder of Klinghoffer, was released in 1996 by Italian magistrates on 12 days' parole 'for good behaviour'. He disappeared. Another Achille Lauro hijacker had already vanished in the same way in 1991. This left only one of the hijackers - Atif - still in an Italian prison.
The Italian newspaper La Repubblica commented that Italy had a long record of leniency when it came to Arab terrorists. In 1996, while Molqi was being let out of jail, the Italians were visiting Saddam Hussein in Baghdad to talk about reopening the Italian embassy. At the same time the Italian oil company Agip was negotiating the construction of a $4 billion trans-Mediterranean oil pipeline with Colonel Gaddafi in Libya. La Repubblica said that such coincidences gave rise to 'grave suspicions which the Italian Government would do well to clear up'.
Bettino Craxi
Craxi was convicted on corruption charges in 1993 and subsequently fled to self-imposed exile in Tunisia.