h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

God? Dog? Bob Dylan said he was on everyones side, shame Jesus wasn't so generous but essentialy he was a good guy. I wonder what he did from the age of 18-33? The vatican must have secret files i'll bet.

Jesus was also on everybody's side. He said so.

Okay, let me clarify my argument. Lets throw in a bit of syllogism so I can flaunt the Philosophy degree I havn't yet finished. Right:

Argument 1:

P1: If an ultimate being exists that being exists necessarily.
P2: Necessary existence means that such a being exists in all possible worlds.
C: Therefore, if an ultimate being exists, that being exists in all possible worlds.

Now, I think your question was asking why ultimateness in one world implies necessary existence in all worlds.

The reason for this is that Kripke defined 'necessary' and 'contingent' in very particular ways: Necessary means that which must exist in all possible worlds. Contingent means that which can exist in some possible worlds, but can also not exist in some possible worlds. I think if you look at the above argument with those definitions in mind, you will see why an ultimate being, if he exists, must exist in all possible worlds.

As to your other question; I would answer that even if our existence was derived from a contingent being, then it would have to have ultimately derived from a necessary being, because a contingent being, by definition, has to derive its existence from something other than itself. Because it can not be.

Andúril

Sorry, missed the two posts above.

Jesus was a carpenter. He made tables and stuff. I'd be surprised if the Vatican has much of interest that is as verifiable as the Gospels anyway. The Gospel accounts have much more verification than almost all of the other documents of that time put together.

And Jesus was not on everybodies side. If he was, why did they execute him?

You're playing tricks with definitions here. An ultimate being's existance implies its necesity in the world it exists in, not in all possible worlds. So if we accept P2, then P1 is false, and vice versa, since they only make sense with different definitions of necesity. Thus, C is unsupported.

Keeping someone else's definitions in mind can't make an invalid proof valid--either the logic follows without the specific definition of necesity or it doesn't follow at all. Because either the definition of necesity in P2 can be shown to follow from P1--in which case you don't need to use some philosopher's definition to prove P2--or else it doesn't, in which case P1 cannot be justified using that definition.


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It would still depend on the contingent being just as much, if that contingent being existance doesn't imply its existance.

You're right. That was a rubbish argument. Let me address the contingency thing again. I dont see how one can say you exist necessarily from a contingent being, becuase the whole notion of necessary existence implies that it must be derived from a necessary being. Indeed, if our existence is derived from a contingent being, to me that MUST be a contingent link, becuase surely if we are contingent beings then we could have not been and if the reason for our existence is necessary, then surely we must be necessary beings as well.

Okay, as I failed to make a valid argument myself, howabout I borrow an argument from Plantinga:

P1: There is a possible world in which a necessary being exists (becuase the concept is not logically contradictory)
P2: If such a being exists, then it must exist in all possible worlds (if you define necessity in terms of a being existing in all possible worlds - Kripke's definition incidentally)
P3: This world is a possible world (since it exists)
P4: Therefore, if God exists in this world, he must exist necessarily.

Plantinga used this ontological argument to show that God actually exists. I rather see that if God exists, he must exist necessarily.

Andúril

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Since we are contingent beings we could have not been. It seems that you say we should worship necesary beings because they make us exist when we could have not been. However, some contingent beings are essential for our being just as much as necesary beings are--I could not be, but for me to be, my parents must be, and must have taken certain actions. So I owe my existance to them as much as to a necesary creator, since either one could have prevented my existance equally completely (existance is Boolean--either I do or don't).




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These two arguements are still playing tricks with definitions. For the whole arguement to make logical sense, you must be using the same definition of necessary in both. But that means that P1 really reads that in all possible worlds a necesary being exists, since by Kripke's definition of necessary, saying one exists in any world is equivalent to saying one exists in all worlds. So P2 doesn't follow from P1, it just repeats P1. And P1 is equivalent to saying that if a necessary being exists in all worlds, than it does.

I am, actually using the same definition. You could, however replace the argument you quoted with with:

P1: It is possible that a necessary being (a being which exists in all possible worlds) exists.
P2: If this being exists, the only possible world which could exist is one in which this being exists.
P3: If this being exists in one possible world, it must exist in all possible worlds.
P4: A necessary being must exist in all possible worlds...

Which is what we started with... I'm beginning to think these lines of argument don't work.

Right. Lets revert to language games, thats always fun. I think the problem here is that we are using different bliks. When you use the word God, you mean something which isn't necessarily ultimate. When I use the word God, I mean a necessary being which is ultimate. Therefore, we are not talking about the same thing... I dont really know what I'm saying I guess. Happens a lot.

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Your argument works for me, Anduril.

Its Wittgenstein's argument actually... *sigh*

Its amazing how when you study philosophy you realise most other stuff has already been thought about, so theres rather little to do thats new. Actually, thats not true, theres loads, but its so intricate, detailed, and completely pointless that I dont see why they bother... I went to a talk on the difference between borders and boundaries at the beginning of term... Its amazing how people choose to spend their lives...

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This arguement works perfectly well for prooving that if a being must exist in all possible worlds, it exists in all possible worlds. The problem is, all you've proven is a tautology. You've defined God and world so that God must exist in all or no possible worlds--which means that any logic trying to prove that is sort of circular.


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The thing is, I don't think it makes sense to be able to refer to anything as relevant to all possible worlds. It is possible that for a world to be possible, it must have a being that is ultimate in its own frame of reference, so to speak--but I don't think that makes all those ultimate beings the same ultimate being, or that it even makes sense to speak of beings in different worlds as being the same.

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I have never wanted to study philosophy, and it is so complicated!Very abstruse.

Yes... They are circular arn't they... As I said...

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Really? I do.

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Did you mean:

"If a world is possible, then it possibly has an ultimate being in within that possible world."?

If you did, then yes, I agree.

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Thats odd... Why not? The being is ultimate... like frisbee.. no NOT like frisbee. The being is ultimate... as in completely ultimate... ultimate means infinite. Infinite means infinite, without end or boundaries... (or are they borders.. perhaps both). Thus, an ultimate being would be able to transcend the boundaries of time, space, and possibility. He is... omnipossible?

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If the being exists in/is ultimate in two different worlds, they're really the same world because they share and entity that is in both. Infinite without end/boundries--but it doesn't make sense for the same being to be in mutliple worlds, because multiple possible worlds must contradict each other--if two possible worlds weren't mutually inconsistant, they would be the same possible world. And for your ultimate being to be in all possible worlds, it would need to be in an infinity of contradictory states--much worse than the simple microwaved burrito so hot God can't touch it paradox.

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Wrong. You see, think of it like this. There is a possible world in which I exist. There is a possible world in which I dont exist. These two worlds are seperate possible worlds. But the ultimate being can be the same being, existing in exactly the same way in both possible worlds. Do these possible worlds become the same? No, because they are different in terms of their contingent parts.

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This is an interesting one. Think of it like this: God can make microwaved burritos of infinite heat. God can also touch anything of infinite heat. Put them together and you see that God cannot create a microwaved burrito so hot that he cannot touch it, but that in no way limits God.

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Even if each world contains an ultimate being that is identical to the one in the other world, they aren't the same being. For them to be the same being makes no sense, although they are identical. Two electrons in identical orbitals in identical atoms are not the same electron.

<< Two electrons in identical orbitals in identical atoms are not the same electron.>>

I don't have the philosophical background to argue the necessary and contingent being issue...

But I have to say, R Daneel, that God is non-physical, a spiritual being, therefore electrons can only be an analogy, and not perfect.

True... but it was a good point.

I would counter that they in fact *are* the same being. When we are talking about possible worlds, we are talking about concepts and not reality. I am not proposing that these possible worlds actually exist in any non-conceptual form at all. Therefore, one can meaningfully talk about the same being existing in two possible worlds. Only when we say that our world is a possible world do we move from a concept of reality to reality itself. I do not think that such a notion is justifiable when arguing the existence of God in this world, which is why I reject the Ontological Argument. I do however think it is justifiable when arguing the concept of the nature of God's existence.

The thing is, I do think these alternate possible worlds are as real as this one. Which is why I think it makes sense for a God to be ultimate in one but not another, even if that other has its own ultimate being. Since there is no communication between the worlds (or they wouldn't be seperate) a being within one cannot also be within another without being two seperate beings.

Oh really? Why? There is no evidence for them existing (unless you think they exist necessarily, though I dont think thats justifiable either). In reality, there is only one truth. Are you suggesting that each possible world exists in its own antireality?