h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

Hi Clive!

Good Afternoon. I'm watching you're maths lesson with interest.
I'm a bit rusty as well.

I'll probably not end up needing it (standard deviation) but reading around the job description I'm thinking it might come in useful.

>>I'm thinking it might come in useful<<
I don't know about you, but I find the subject very interesting.
I suppose it helps, but I have to admit that I only got a 'D' grade in A level Maths.
My excuse; did it at night as mature student.

Nevertheless, I did very well in Statistics in my first year in Uni ..

Agree with this?

"The theologian accepts authority and faith as his starting point and then proceeds to conclusions using reason; the philosopher, on the other hand, relies solely on the natural light of reason.
Thomas Aquinas was the first to view theology expressly in this way or at least to present it systematically, and in doing so he raised a storm of opposition in various quarters. Even today this opposition endures, especially among religious enthusiasts for whom reason remains an intruder in the realm of mystical communion, contemplation, and the sudden ecstasy of evangelical fervour."

It seems Aqinas who was later made a Saint by the Catholic church, studied master of Theology at Paris Uni in 1245.
He was influenced by 'Averroes' the Arabic philosopher in Spain, who was known as the great commentator
and interpreter of Aristotle.
There's many h2g2 entries on Aquinas, so it's all woven in History.

Evenin' Warner...

Yes and no.

>>The theologian accepts authority and faith as his starting point and then proceeds to conclusions using reason<<

I would substitute as:

"The theologian accepts authority and faith as his starting point and then proceeds to conclusions."

This is because reason is amenable to reason. One should (if one's premises or axioms areshown to lead to absurdities or falsehoods) be willing always to abandon those premises and axioms in favour of new ones. Since theology routinely fails to do this, I would put it to you that theology is neither reasonable nor proceeds by reason, as the quote boldly suggests.


>>The philosopher, on the other hand, relies solely on the natural light of reason.<<

Hmm that's probably true of certain kinds of philosopher but it's not without it's critics (eg Immanuel Kant - hence the title of his book), but broadly speaking philosophy has relied on the wit and argumentative discourse of reasoned arguments.

Now, implied I think in your question, is do I identify with this concept of the philosopher as one steeped in pure reason? And the answer to that is no.


Part of my acceptance of my atheism was a realisation that I didn't believe in dualism.

This is the Cartesian idea of mind and body being two categorically different types of thing. So where the body was material and extended in space and time, mind was not. Descartres' famous argument begins with him doubting all things including his body and, being left with just the act of doubt remaining, concludes that the mind is something other than the body a thinking thing in it's own right. This is the meaning of cogito ergo sum, "I think therefore I am."

I was specialising in Early 20th century French Existentialism for my degree, which has a lineage stretching back to Descartes, but rather than casting mind as a separate thing, in existentialism (particularly from Sartre drawing on Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger) mind was explicitly not-a-thing: it was "nothing", and expelled ego in the word of things.

Now this thought occupied me for most of my undergraduancy and postgraduancy, until I basically realised I couldn't resolve the idea of mind as being something other than brain. Something which was implicit to the concept of expelled egos, and self-negating nothingnesses.

The context of this was actually a bit of wider reading about the observer effect in quantum physics double-slit experiment - but since then I've come to have an even greater appreciation of neurology and the realisation that mind and brain are one and the same.

Now why does this matter? Becuase I wasn't proceeding by pure reason any more, I was awakening to the argument of materialism, which as we've previously discussed is one of the pillars on which science is built.

Now this coincides in me with a general realisation that I also didn't believe in gods. Or rather hadn't believed in god for a long time but now only sort of realised it.

So thought I have no formal training in science outside of school, I am passionately interested in it, and read as many science books as I can. And at every stage I sense the understanding of science and materialism as greater than ever was by proceeding by reason alone.

So whilst I recognise that concept of the philosopher, I am pleased and proud to say it no longer describes me.

Well then Clive, can you try to be gentle with me, please.
Is there no reason at all, that you can see in my guide entries ? >> A46533909
ie. 'Which is the first commandment of all ?' and 'Early Christianity'

And I've begun another titled 'Heaven and hell'

I'm still here, what's wrong with my reasoning, please ..

I'm not sure what it is you are asking me to do?

Well, my Guide Entries imply a theological argument in favour of the truth of Scripture.
They show the belief in the Trinity to be illogical and incorrect, from a historical perspective etc.
I just wondered if you could comment on my possible errors, or flaws in my reasoning.
Please ..

Well initial thoughts - not very profound you understand - it strikes me that all this 'god is one' business could be an argument against polytheism, the obvious question is what words is being translated to mean one? Certainly in modern usage we can conflate one with "whole" or "undivided" but without know more of what lies behind the text I find that impossible to judge. Superficially then; given that the religion Christianity replaced in Rome under Constantine was polytheistic, it seems more reasonable to think that "one god" is a matter of enumeration and isn't addressing your issue of "one god, divided"

The desert religions tend to be monotheisms just as the rainforest, and mountainous regions (I'm thinking India and asia) tended to be polytheisms.

Also deduct points for using the King James Bible. It is the least reliable of the English translations due to it's reliance of the text produced by Erasmus, which is as I noted a compilation of hastily gathered texts not cross-referenced for accuracy.

This is important because, as it happens that edition the first published Greek bible in 1516 *does not* contain the the statement in 1 John 5:7-8 regarding the doctrine of the trinity known as the Johannine Comma.

**There are three that bear wittness in heaven: the father, the son, and the spirit, and these three are one; and there are three that bear wittness on earth, the spirit , the water, and the blood, and these three are one.**

So the story goes: Theologians in Erasmus's time were outraged at the omission of this passage and demanded he rectify this in future publications.

Bearing in mind the haste with which he collected the manuscripts of his editio princeps (first publication) his reply is perhaps understandable: 'if anyone can find a Greek manuscript with the passage in' he would include it in future publication, he said.

Lo' and behold and duly one did turn up, probably transcribed to order from the Latin to the Greek by the scribes who wanted it included.

Now grabbing my copy of the bible of my shelf and turning to 1 John 5: 7-8 I have in my copy the following:

7For there are three that testify*: 8The spirit**, the water, and the blood; and the three are in agreement.

with a footnotes around "testify" and "the spirit" to the following: Late manuscripts of the Vulgate substitute: "that testify....*in heaven: The father, the Word, and The Holy Spirit, and these three are one. And there are three that testify on earth: **the spirit, the water... etc.

And note that these passage is not found in any Greek manuscript dating to before the sixteenth century. (end of footnote)

Which rather makes the point, oddly in support of your positionm that that the doctrine of the trinity is a fictitious invention but based on the rational inquiry into historical accuracy of the texts rather than the essentially non-rational comparison of scriptural meaning.

Clive.

Thanks, Clive
I believe you when you say the Greek bible is more accurate, but most people in UK are familiar
with King James version and IMO, is preferable to NRSV (New Revised) Bible etc.

>> believe you when you say the Greek bible is more accurate, <<

Hmmm...Up to a point. Modern day translations do or should (I've not checked all of them to be certain) check all these issues I specifically chose this bible for the pagination notes on the translation.

As for the accuracy of the text, well yes, I think 'more like the original' is correct, but there is a transition point between the kind of issues I'm raising in the 16th century which boil down to a kind of fraud on the part of scribes. To a time even further back when the copyists and the tranmiters of these books were not "professionals" but parties of vested intrest (one of the doctrinal sects in the middle east) with an axe to grind on how scripture would be interpreted.

The accuracy is to be found in cross-referencing the different editions (or surviving fragments) to see what they changed or omitted or deciding on grounds of parsimony what was more likely, for example Manuscript A) is an early copy with a doctrinal change in it. Manuscript B is much later copy the same passage without the change. Although the second manuscript is 'newer' it may be *more accurate* transmitted of an even earlier (but now destroyed manuscript) and what was more likely: "that the issues X was altered in the 'whatever century' to suit the needs of whatever sect" - (A) or is (B) more accurate either the passage was deleted for heretical reason or possibly it represent a later copy of an earlier draft. Beyond this point we enter into the professional world of textual criticism about which I am not qualified to discuss, but you get the picture I hope?

Beyond a further point nothing survives at all, so there is, as yet, no way of knowing what was **originally** in the bible and what was added later, ins some cases centuries and tens of centuries later.


>>Most people in UK are familiar with King James version <<
Yes and it did me a good turn when trying to prove to my lecturers I could handle grammar because all those those "thys" "thines" "thous" and "thees" are excellent examples of 2nd and 3rd person singular and plural pronouns.
The 'poetry', if I can call it that of the book is undeniable and indeed familiar than more modern day renditions, but to anyone who gives a damn the King James version is the least reliable, since it's inception relies of questionable documents.

Now , naturally the highly questionable parts, may not refer to the bit you are quoting (though as I've pointed out to you the issue of the Johannine Comma which is directly relevant to your article *does*.) So I suppose if for nothing else than intellectual probity's sake you'd look to see if you can find the same meaning in other translations (bearing also in mind what the translation of "one" is actually referring to "one" as in 1, 2, 3, 4, or "one amongst us" or beat the egg and flour into one mixture" - the differences should be clear.

The Modern English language is adept at this sort of thing, having imbibed influences from a vast array of different cultures. Archaic language wasn't so flexible and parsing the *ahem* one into the other needs care and attention.

Since your article turns on this issue of what "one" means my advice for what it's worth is to sort our what the translation is otherwise you're really dealing in the semantics of translation and not the substantive theological point your want to make.

>>but you get the picture I hope?<<
I certainly do.

>>no way of knowing what was **originally** in the bible<<
That's true, up to a point. But I believe, that if you study many different translations,
and even some of the existing 'earlier documents', one can see agreement on many of the main themes.
Regards different denominations adding or removing passages etc, I'm sure corruption of texts occured
in that way, mankind being mankind.

>>you're really dealing in the semantics of translation and not the substantive theological point
your want to make.<<
I accept that while trying to demonstrate the importance of "Oneness" ie. that God is unique and has
no sons and daughters, and can't be compared to any material thing in the universe, my main weakness
is by siting possibly non-authentic material.

Thanks again!

A pleasure.

I'm not an expert on this. and though we each hold radically different perspectives, I've no objection to helping out if it is corrective for your article. That's part of the beauty of being in a community for editing guide entries.

My final thoughts:

>>I believe, that if you study many different translations,
and even some of the existing 'earlier documents', one can see agreement on many of the main themes.<<

Well that's fair enough but be aware in doing so you are essentially creating a whole new set of scripture.* And this is important for two reasons:

1.) It sets a kind of precedent. What is to stop someone coming along and doing the same as you and reaching a radically different conclusion (say about the oneness of god) if your method is valid for you then it's valid for them and isn't a line of reproach.

2.)This means that *no-one* is using the original. It's up to you whether you think that's important.

Clive.

*a brief anecdote to illustrate the point. I was struck by this one day ...umm. two years ago... when I accompanied a school trip to a church for Easter, and as part of the event, the priest was going to read to them about the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ.

So curious I asked him which Gospel he was reading from.

And he said, 'oh I kind of make it up as I go.'

Now you'll know, the gospels don't agree precisely on the details of what takes place, nor are the gospels free of the kind of translation and transmission errors we've been discussing.

And the thing was he was going to make it up as he went. Now clearly he knew the four gospels, but was picking and choosing the elements from one to the next in order to spin his tale. Now this could, just for arguments sake have been the moment for one of these kids where faith enters their life, and it's doing it on the concocted version of someone who has studied the agreements and disagreements, knows 'the main themes' and delivers it accordingly.

The point is he wasn't delivering scripture, he was delivering *his* version of scripture.

That's why my point 2.) above is important. People create new scripture all the time, if they are going to refer to the written word, well then you've got to have some hold on which words do and don't belong there and ultimately have some way of interpreting them.

This is why I resist calls on scriptural inerrancy but it also I think raises a challenge: what level of accuracy are you willing to accept, at what point is your scepticism satisfied?

Well, I'm sure you're aware that I take the Qur'an in arabic to be completely authentic.
Furthermore, I consider it to be 'the word of God' (and to me that's how it comes across).

So the issue is one of interpretation of a ~1500 year old Scripture, needing knowledge of the lives
of those involved at the time of its revelation. One also needs to rely on the many scholars through the ages,
to understand different points of view etc and also a knowledge of classical arabic is extremely useful.

It is also of great benefit to know the general gist of previous Scripture, but to rely on precise detail
is not possible, imo, as you yourself have also suggested. For me, coming from a culture familiar
with the Bible, has only served to strenghen my belief considerably.
ie. I believe there is One Creator God, BigG, who caused some men in the past, to be Apostles to guide us

Well, I listened to one of those philosophical lectures, as you asked Clive.
"Lecture 4 - Introduction to Plato's Phaedo; Arguments for the Existence of the Soul, Part II"
Prof Kagan ends up writing the three points on the blackboard:

1) We have free will.
2) Nothing subject to determinism has free will.
3) All purely physical systems are subject to determinism.

That's as far as I've got. It's very well presented, I enjoyed listening to it.

How are you getting on with his lectures? Have you listened to many?
What's your latest argument against their existence? (I know you're not a dualist)

Warner I am very impressed and very glad that you are taking the opportunity to broaden your understanding and engage with other argument.

I got as far as lecture 13, but I've had to take a break been a bit busy last few days with other things. I shall resume watching them shortly. I enjoy hem very much.

I will be very interested to learn if you find any of the arguments against dualism persuasive, or can mount a reasoned defence of an argument Kagan ends up dismissing as unsatisfactory.

I hope you'll note that he does repeatedly postulate a soul as a possible explanation for each stage of argument, although at each stage demonstrating why ultimately as a hypothesis it fails or is, at best, inconclusive.

Taking those three predicates:

1) We have free will.
2) Nothing subject to determinism has free will.
3) All purely physical systems are subject to determinism.

Ask yourself are each of those *necessarily* true? If one or more was *not true* do the others necessarily follow or are they dependent? Are they any examples real or imagined that can question an postulate like "we have free will" Could it have been otherwise?

What if I recall correctly, Kagan will do is just what I've said - go on to show why each of these is *not* a slam dunk argument for concluding that there are souls or that, allowing that souls might exist, are able to do the things claimed of them. If the examples strike you as at all obtuse or a little silly (trains behind train sheds etc) remember that philosophy is about a way of thinking, a sort of training your mind to think a problem through. This is not science. (i.e we're not dealing in evidences) but rather the nature of the argument itself. Do the premises follow to logical and acceptable conclusions? So we can consider examples like trains obscured by train sheds as a means of examining the *kind of claim* being made and the structure of the argument - in that case: whether or not 'sameness' carries through space and time.

I note you say, and I hope I' not misconstruing you, that you've watched only one lecture (number 4) it's really worth listening to them all and in order because the arguments develop and refer back to each other as the problems are complexified.

That being said, I do appreciate that you are taking my advice on this matter seriously - it truly is something worthy of applause - I hope you get something useful out of it.

They remind me of a lot of my early philosophy lectures.

Clive

Yes, I have got something useful from listening to it. I will try to listen to a few more. It seems to me, that the postulate of dualism, although it seems alien to the materialist, has a very strong foundation, and is more than part of one's religion (if any).

The fact that several if not conclusive arguments, can be put forward, suggests to me that the existence of a soul becomes more than likely, even if one doesn't believe in Almighty God.

>>dualism has a very strong foundation<<
Hmm. It's certainly an idea that has persisted. Whether or not it has a strong foundation I would question. It is an alternative explanation for monism; that much is obviously true. Whether or not it is any good as a position I have some doubts. That is at least as far as I go philosophically; in reality, dualism starts to fall apart once you start trying to integrate it with scientific ideas but it doesn;t fare too well against philosophical cases either.


>>The fact that several if not conclusive arguments, can be put forward, suggests to me that the existence of a soul becomes more than likely<<

I'm avoiding consciously turning this into a religious debate like we are used to having I'm pelased and happy to continue in the philosophical mode as long as we can maintain it - but forgive me if I borrow an argument from those discussion it is relevant here also.

I could argue that what gives this body it's sense of (my) self is the that lives at the bottom of my garden.

However when I die, the fairy will die too. She exists only to give this body a self-awareness and through that act are linked. We are two separate entities My fairy and me. IF you ever read Philip Pullman's Dark materials Trilogy you'll find a very simialr idea only using animals locums called 'daemons' as external and independent expressions of each persons character, personality, memories etc. When the person dies the daemon evaporates, so my example isn't entirely fatuous.

The point is that's a dualistic argument. The mere fact that I can make that arguemtn doesn't make the extistence of my fairy or a daemon any more or less likely. In no way could you construe from my argument as presented that the existence of my daemon is more likely.

But this is exactly what you are saying about the soul.
Look:
>>The fact that several if not conclusive arguments, can be put forward, suggests to me that the existence of a soul becomes more than likely<<

I could if I felt so disposed put 10s of non conclusive arguments about dualism or souls that mer fact it's arguable isn't saying much.

You are correct we can consider souls as a concept apart from religion: Plato did. The soul has a pedigree as an idea that outlasts religious ones. (in fact if you listen to lecture 1 Kagan makes that very point that the students may have religious convictions but the lectures won't be addressing the theistic argument for souls) this is precisely because the you can consider a soul in abstraction as just the arguments for if a soul were true can it explain my sense of self, my consciousness, conscious choice, a sense of free will and can it survive death - if it could what does this mean? etc.