h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

Hi there, Twophlag!

Thanks for the invite. I'd like to comment on your "Critical Rationalism" piece, if you don't mind?

Before I start rambling in earnest, I'd like to make it clear that I'm not attacking Barbour, or any other philosopher. Instead, I'm offering a summary of how my views differ from his (which they do in detail only, I suspect), in the hope that I can persuade you to comment on *my* views. OK?

>>In other words, subjectivity is pervasive and objectivity is a pipe-dream. To this end, Barbour proposes we do away with quaint concepts like 'truth' and 'falsehood' and discuss instead what is meaningful.<<

Comment: I assume that Barbour refers here to *absolute* truth and *absolute* falsehood, where "absolute" is more or less synonymous with "objective" (in the normally accepted sense of the term).

>>He strongly felt that a study of these various modes of gathering and interpreting information would aid those seeking to find a forum for dialogue between different and distinct disciplines such as 'religion' and 'science'...<<

I am not convinced that 'religion' and 'science' can be successfully distinguished from one another, in this sense:

'Religion' is a belief system typically based on dogma. Dogma consists of one or more statements that are accepted as true without proof.

'Science' is a belief system typically based on axioms. Axioms are statements that are accepted as true without proof.

I can see no distinction between dogma and axioms - both are assumptions. Thus I see no fundamental difference between 'religion' and 'science'.

>>In a sense, the process of empirical verification cannot itself be empirically verified; therefore by its own definition, it would seem that logical positivism is a meaningless stance.<<

This is the argument that I use to refute (or try to!) so-called 'objectivism'. I don't subscribe to it, but it seems to me that it is undermined because it does not conform to its own standards of 'truth'.

>>...Therefore, they tend to look for relative meaning in any cognitive model of reality, accepting them as models but not as truths or falsehoods.<<

I'm not as 'relative' as this. I contend that life, as experienced via our subjective perception, is mostly consistent and rational. OK, so the lack of objective perception means that we have no absolutes on which to lean, but we *do* have beliefs whose probability of correctness is high. [This probability is estimated on the basis of experience: I confidently expect the Sun to rise tomorrow morning, because it has risen on every morning of my life so far. In corroboration, ohers with whom I have spoken also believe this, for much the same reasons.]

In abandoning objectivity, we lose only the certainty which was never really there anyway. We just pretended it was. Objectivity has been a millstone around our necks for far too long. Leaving it behind is progress, IMO.

>>A summary: You don't know everything. You don't know anything, in fact. The best you can do is make guesses about things. If those guesses keep you from being run over in traffic, then they can be considered extremely meaningful, relevent, and otherwise accurate, but 'truth' and 'falsehood' went out the window with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.<<

Well, I go along with this to some extent. However, consider the success of classical (i.e. 'objective') science. That it is so successful in predicting the behaviour of the real world indicates (to me) that its (objective) world model must bear *some* similarity to the real world. We just can't show that this is *objectively* so, and we would be wasting our time to try.

Pattern-chaser

Good to see you.

I should preface this by saying I found Barbour's books a bit boring, but I wanted to refer to the works of someone else to provide a bit of grounding and context for saying what I might have said anyways. Sssssh don't tell anyone.

>>In other words, subjectivity is pervasive and objectivity is a pipe-dream. To this end, Barbour proposes we do away with quaint concepts like 'truth' and 'falsehood' and discuss instead what is meaningful.<<

>>Comment: I assume that Barbour refers here to *absolute* truth and *absolute* falsehood, where "absolute" is more or less synonymous with "objective" (in the normally accepted sense of the term).<<

Yes. Truth and falsehood are meaningful but not independently verifiable.


>>I am not convinced that 'religion' and 'science' can be successfully distinguished from one another, in this sense:
'Religion' is a belief system typically based on dogma. Dogma consists of one or more statements that are accepted as true without proof.
'Science' is a belief system typically based on axioms. Axioms are statements that are accepted as true without proof.
I can see no distinction between dogma and axioms - both are assumptions. Thus I see no fundamental difference between 'religion' and 'science'.<<

I agree, and I suspect Barbour would have as well. I think he may have offered his writing in this context because he was aiming to communicate with people who hadn't figured this out for themselves yet. Both terms are simply labels of methodology.


>>In a sense, the process of empirical verification cannot itself be empirically verified; therefore by its own definition, it would seem that logical positivism is a meaningless stance.<<

>>This is the argument that I use to refute (or try to!) so-called 'objectivism'. I don't subscribe to it, but it seems to me that it is undermined because it does not conform to its own standards of 'truth'.<<

I was sort of proud of this observation at the time that I made it, and I would have loved to argue it with David Hume.


>>...Therefore, they tend to look for relative meaning in any cognitive model of reality, accepting them as models but not as truths or falsehoods.<<

>>I'm not as 'relative' as this. I contend that life, as experienced via our subjective perception, is mostly consistent and rational. OK, so the lack of objective perception means that we have no absolutes on which to lean, but we *do* have beliefs whose probability of correctness is high. [This probability is estimated on the basis of experience: I confidently expect the Sun to rise tomorrow morning, because it has risen on every morning of my life so far. In corroboration, ohers with whom I have spoken also believe this, for much the same reasons.]<<

Sure, you have a functionally accurate map in your brain by which you navigate through reality. But you and your corroborater would both be 'wrong' in the sense that the sun isn't actually rising, is it? It's the effects of the earth's rotation you are observing. The point of relativism is not to deny the usefulness of using sensory data to estimate probabilities that will be meaningful to your frame of reference, but to point out the futility of attempting to use our senses to determine absolutes, because the model you are drawing from is a function of your particular perspective on the universe.

>>In abandoning objectivity, we lose only the certainty which was never really there anyway. We just pretended it was. Objectivity has been a millstone around our necks for far too long. Leaving it behind is progress, IMO.<<

What we lose is the egotistical tendency to assume we have actually figured something out with any degree of final certainty.


>>A summary: You don't know everything. You don't know anything, in fact. The best you can do is make guesses about things. If those guesses keep you from being run over in traffic, then they can be considered extremely meaningful, relevent, and otherwise accurate, but 'truth' and 'falsehood' went out the window with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.<<

>>Well, I go along with this to some extent. However, consider the success of classical (i.e. 'objective') science. That it is so successful in predicting the behaviour of the real world indicates (to me) that its (objective) world model must bear *some* similarity to the real world. We just can't show that this is *objectively* so, and we would be wasting our time to try. <<

I would agree that science is a powerful method of building meaningful and useful cognitive models of reality, but the mistake practitioners of the art make is confusing their model with the real thing. The second law of thermodynamics is a good example of a useful model being taken as fact (this law is considered a fundamental principle of modern physics) in spite of the blindingly obvious contradiction represented by life, the universe, and everything in general. In fact, you would think that since this century passing has produced the ground-breaking 'special theory of relativity' that there would be a lot more scientists capable of recognizing the implications of relativism. Even Stephen Hawking manages to let it slip by him, when he goes around writing about the universe being a subset of linear process, after Einstein clearly and mathematically demonstrated that the inverse was far more likely to be the case.

"...I found Barbour's books a bit boring"

Although I find philosophy fascinating in general, I skip the details if they bore me. I'm an enthusiast, not a professional philosopher, so I don't need to suffer the tedious bits if I don't want to. I think philosophy lets itself down badly when it descends into metaphysical micro-surgery (e.g. some of the more 'subtle' points regarding 'qualia'...)!

>>Sure, you have a functionally accurate map in your brain by which you navigate through reality. But you and your corroborater would both be 'wrong' in the sense that the sun isn't actually rising, is it? It's the effects of the earth's rotation you are observing.<<

The motion of the planets appears simpler if you assume the Sun is at rest, and they revolve around it. But this is merely a convenience. I see the Sun rise in the sky every morning. Neither me nor my corroborator are 'wrong' in any significant sense. I think you may be (falsely) assuming that two different but equally valid points of view are mutually exclusive.

>>The point of relativism is ... to point out the futility of attempting to use our senses to determine absolutes<<

Absolutely.

>>...'truth' and 'falsehood' went out the window with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.<<

Naughty, naughty! You are using the fact that the same word - "uncertainty" - occurs in two different places to equate them. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle says that if you measure the position of (say) an electron, it's velocity becomes uncertain, and vice versa. This is not the same as the lack of certainty brought about by non-objective perception, IMO.

I think we retain truth and falsehood as meaningful concepts, in the same way that we retained 'knowledge' when we stopped striving towards 'objective knowledge'. It's the certainty that's gone, not the whole concept.

>>I would agree that science is a powerful method of building meaningful and useful cognitive models of reality...<<

This isn't what I was saying. I was observing that science - based on the assumption of an objective world - is impressively successful in predicting the behaviour of the real world. I conclude from this that the real world must be similar to the scientific world model. If not, scientific predictions would be wrong much more often.

>>...but the mistake practitioners of the art make is confusing their model with the real thing.<<

"Ceci n'est pas une pipe" (Magritte's picture). But be kind: mistaking the model (or name) for the thing is easy to do; we can all be caught out from time to time.

Pattern-chaser

"The motion of the planets appears simpler if you assume the Sun is at rest, and they revolve around it. But this is merely a convenience. I see the Sun rise in the sky every morning. Neither me nor my corroborator are 'wrong' in any significant sense. I think you may be (falsely) assuming that two different but equally valid points of view are mutually exclusive"

No, I was pointing out that your statement seemed to neglect the variety of ways in which 'facts' can be interpreted depending on the standpoint from which measurements of the system in question are taken. It is more 'true' to say that the moon is made of rock than to say that it is made of green cheese, but saying that it is made out of rock doesn't convey any information about the motion of the particles or fields composing that rock, so the statement of 'fact' is simply a simplified description. Likewise, saying that the sun will 'rise' tomorrow makes all sorts of unqualified assumptions that I could turn head over heels, like by pointing out that it's already tomorrow in a different time zone, if I felt like being an ass. Your last sentence seems sort of self-defeating, by the way, but it is a neat turn of phrase.

"Naughty, naughty! You are using the fact that the same word - "uncertainty" - occurs in two different places to equate them. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle says that if you measure the position of (say) an electron, it's velocity becomes uncertain, and vice versa. This is not the same as the lack of certainty brought about by non-objective perception, IMO."

There you go on about facts again. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle also implies that taking measurements of a quantum system blurs the boundary between observer and observed, thus making objective statements meaningless and bringing into play the concept of observer participancy. Not only, says Heisenberg, are we uncertain of the electron's position... the electron itself is uncertain of its position. The uncertainty principle is an intrinsic 'gap' in reality. Whatever position you take regarding this principle, I see an obvious correlation to any discussion of truth, falsehood, and relative meaning.

"I think we retain truth and falsehood as meaningful concepts, in the same way that we retained 'knowledge' when we stopped striving towards 'objective knowledge'. It's the certainty that's gone, not the whole concept."

I believe the entry states this several times... truth and falsehood remain useful terms to denote measurements of the degree of verifiability of, or subjective meaning taken from, a given system or model. You have a peculiar way of agreeing with me and making it sound like an argument.

">>I would agree that science is a powerful method of building meaningful and useful cognitive models of reality...<<

This isn't what I was saying. I was observing that science - based on the assumption of an objective world - is impressively successful in predicting the behaviour of the real world. I conclude from this that the real world must be similar to the scientific world model. If not, scientific predictions would be wrong much more often."

No, but it's what I am saying, and I'll say it again. I will agree only to concede that science is a powerful method of building meaningful and useful cognitive models of reality. I do feel, however, that scientific predictions, usually laden as they are with subjectivity and bias on the part of the predictors, are quite often 'wrong' or at least laughably inept. Empiricism is a lot like communism.. looks great on paper, doesn't do what it's supposed to in practice.

Going back to the uncertainty principle again, it might be noted that science, or at least some branches of it, is starting to show signs of stepping away from being 'based on the assumption of an objective world'. Curiously, this hasn't muddled its efficacy or usefulness at all.

Hi Twophlag,

First things first: "You have a peculiar way of agreeing with me and making it sound like an argument." Sorry, it isn't intentional.

"Going back to the uncertainty principle again, it might be noted that science, or at least some branches of it, is starting to show signs of stepping away from being 'based on the assumption of an objective world'. Curiously, this hasn't muddled its efficacy or usefulness at all."

I assumne your "curiously" is ironic? It would have been if I'd written it!

Pattern-chaser