h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

"In fact, Amnesty International, and various other groups, such as Human Rights Watch, and various governments had, for years been trying to bring an end to these attrocities. However, because of US reluctance to lose the madman as an ally in the covert actions against Iran, they managed to subvert these attempts."

"Surprise, folks! We were. Why was the US not upset when these atrocities were actually going on? Why was the US supporting this monster while the rest of the world was crying out against him?"

Exactly, but the point is to be consistant. I was hugely against the "policy of containment" against Iraq in the 1990s because it punished Iraqis for a government they didn't choose and could do nothing about. America backed Saddam in the 1980s, refused to remove him in the 1990s and instead "contained" Iraq and sporadically bombed it. When Bush decided in 2002 that he was going to remove Saddam and end the containment and the "slow war", which was the position I'd adopted in the 1990s, I was pleased that they'd finally seen sense. A lot of other people who took the view I did in the 1990s suddenly decided that no one had any right to act against Saddam Hussein. Like I've been trying to say, for a hell of a lot of people, backing the American-led war to remove Saddam wasn't suddenly siding with them, it was being consistent and having them suddenly agree to a position you've pushing for ages.

"Now, of course, the US would have us believe that this war was to rid the world of a torturer and that the US is alone in their disgust of Saddam Hussein's tortures."

They've never claimed that. I don't think any country has ever openly supported Saddam, even nations that opposed the war agreed his regime should be removed.

"To top it off, they try to excuse the actions of their soldiers as "not that bad" as Hussein's and reacts to the rest of the world's outrage with "why was the rest of the world not upset at the dictator's crimes".""

Again, the US government hasn't (as far as I know) taken this line. I think you're associating the opinions of a few idiotic rightwingers on the internet and elsewhere with "America". Bush was fairly condemnatory of the crimes of those US soldiers, as far as I know the only member of his cabinet that seemed unwilling to outright condemn was Donald Rumsfeld, which doesn't really surprise me. And he's probably changed his tune by now.

"They've never claimed that. I don't think any country has ever openly supported Saddam, even nations that opposed the war agreed his regime should be removed."

Referring to the last two years, of course. Saddam has been supported by other nations in the past, not least the Reagan administration and various Western governments during the Cold War.

Found this quote: "But war’s a game, which, were their subjects wise,
Kings would not play at." - William Cowper (1785)

Regarding the US Government not saying the torutures were "all that bad". A number of Government officials, and Republican Representatives have said just that.

"I'm probably not the only one up at this table that is more outraged by the outrage than we are by the treatment [of Iraqi POWs]," spat Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma, a card-holding member of the Party of Lincoln, to fellow members of the Armed Services Committee. "You know, they're not there for traffic violations. They're murderers, they're terrorists, they're insurgents."

Actually, according to the Red Cross report on Abu Ghraib, 90 percent of the detainees had been "arrested by mistake."

Inhofe's rant continued: "I have to say when we talk about the treatment of these prisoners that I would guess that these prisoners wake up every morning thanking Allah that Saddam Hussein is not in charge of these prisons."

The Bush Administration knew about the torture in the prison for over a year, and yet did nothing about it until it hit the papers. At that point, they referred to it as "regrettable" and other superlatives. They made such remarks as "this just gives people an excuse to hate us" and tried to get the Pentagon from releasing the photos and the media to stop showing them Supposedly, this was for the safety of the soldiers in Iraq. In fact, it was more to save face.

They tried to downplay the torture, took a "you have to break some eggs to make an omelet" view of the torture, and tried to say that they were not legally prohibited from torture.

May 6, 2004 Bush "I told [King Abdullah] I was sorry for the humiliation suffered by the Iraqi prisoners, and the humiliation suffered by their families. I told him I was equally sorry that people who have been seeing those pictures didn't understand the true nature and heart of America." This has been translated into an open apology from Bush. In fact, he was relating a private conversation he had with a dignitary.

"Two weeks ago, 60 Minutes II received an appeal from the Defense Department, and eventually from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers, to delay this broadcast—given the danger and tension on the ground in Iraq."—CBS News statement on its broadcast of photographs of Iraqi prisoner abuse, April 29, 2004, referring to a DOD appeal received on or near April 15, 2004

Conservative Linda Chavez thought women were behind the weird sex torture at Abu Ghraib. Having women in the military caused men to do bad things.

The recent Justice Department memo argues that "certain acts may be cruel, unusual or degrading, but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity" to be considered torture. To be considered torture, the physical pain must be equivalent to "organ failure, impairment of bodily function or death." For mental pain to count as torture it must result in significant psychological harm "lasting months or even years."

While more and more reports and evidence of torture and humiliation were surfacing in the media, Bush and his administration kept crowing about how there were "no more torture cambers and rape-rooms in Iraq". It wasn't until the could avoid it no longer did they make half-hearted statements about how aqwful the images were. There were no real apologies, nor have there been any apologies from the Bush Administration that weren't qualified in some way.

Since no one seems to bother reading this when I provide the link, and is clearly shows that the US supported Iraq well into the 80s and, even when they while they were preventing the sale of technology and arms, were busy preventing actual condemnation of Iraq's nuclear weapons program by the UN, adopting a NO to the resolution, or at least abstaining from voting. The reason? The US held more value in using Iraq as a buffer against Iraq, than in the actual danger of Iraq's use of such weapons, or even in the acknowledged threat of terrorism.

The following is quoted at length from: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm#docs
Which is located here: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
By mid-1982, Iraq was on the defensive against Iranian human-wave attacks. The U.S., having decided that an Iranian victory would not serve its interests, began supporting Iraq: measures already underway to upgrade U.S.-Iraq relations were accelerated, high-level officials exchanged visits, and in February 1982 the State Department removed Iraq from its list of states supporting international terrorism. (It had been included several years earlier because of ties with several Palestinian nationalist groups, not Islamicists sharing the worldview of al-Qaeda. Activism by Iraq's main Shiite Islamicist opposition group, al-Dawa, was a major factor precipitating the war -- stirred by Iran's Islamic revolution, its endeavors included the attempted assassination of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.)

Prolonging the war was phenomenally expensive. Iraq received massive external financial support from the Gulf states, and assistance through loan programs from the U.S. The White House and State Department pressured the Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with financing, to enhance its credit standing and enable it to obtain loans from other international financial institutions. The U.S. Agriculture Department provided taxpayer-guaranteed loans for purchases of American commodities, to the satisfaction of U.S. grain exporters.

The U.S. restored formal relations with Iraq in November 1984, but the U.S. had begun, several years earlier, to provide it with intelligence and military support (in secret and contrary to this country's official neutrality) in accordance with policy directives from President Ronald Reagan. These were prepared pursuant to his March 1982 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 4-82) asking for a review of U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

One of these directives from Reagan, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 99, signed on July 12, 1983, is available only in a highly redacted version [Document 21]. It reviews U.S. regional interests in the Middle East and South Asia, and U.S. objectives, including peace between Israel and the Arabs, resolution of other regional conflicts, and economic and military improvements, "to strengthen regional stability." It deals with threats to the U.S., strategic planning, cooperation with other countries, including the Arab states, and plans for action. An interdepartmental review of the implications of shifting policy in favor of Iraq was conducted following promulgation of the directive.

By the summer of 1983 Iran had been reporting Iraqi use of using chemical weapons for some time. The Geneva protocol requires that the international community respond to chemical warfare, but a diplomatically isolated Iran received only a muted response to its complaints [Note 1]. It intensified its accusations in October 1983, however, and in November asked for a United Nations Security Council investigation.

The U.S., which followed developments in the Iran-Iraq war with extraordinary intensity, had intelligence confirming Iran's accusations, and describing Iraq's "almost daily" use of chemical weapons, concurrent with its policy review and decision to support Iraq in the war [Document 24]. The intelligence indicated that Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian forces, and, according to a November 1983 memo, against "Kurdish insurgents" as well [Document 25].

What was the Reagan administration's response? A State Department account indicates that the administration had decided to limit its "efforts against the Iraqi CW program to close monitoring because of our strict neutrality in the Gulf war, the sensitivity of sources, and the low probability of achieving desired results." But the department noted in late November 1983 that "with the essential assistance of foreign firms, Iraq ha[d] become able to deploy and use CW and probably has built up large reserves of CW for further use. Given its desperation to end the war, Iraq may again use lethal or incapacitating CW, particularly if Iran threatens to break through Iraqi lines in a large-scale attack" [Document 25]. The State Department argued that the U.S. needed to respond in some way to maintain the credibility of its official opposition to chemical warfare, and recommended that the National Security Council discuss the issue.

Following further high-level policy review, Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114, dated November 26, 1983, concerned specifically with U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The directive reflects the administration's priorities: it calls for heightened regional military cooperation to defend oil facilities, and measures to improve U.S. military capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and directs the secretaries of state and defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take appropriate measures to respond to tensions in the area. It states, "Because of the real and psychological impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the international economic system, we must assure our readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic." It does not mention chemical weapons [Document 26].

Soon thereafter, Donald Rumsfeld (who had served in various positions in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including as President Ford's defense secretary, and at this time headed the multinational pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle & Co.) was dispatched to the Middle East as a presidential envoy. His December 1983 tour of regional capitals included Baghdad, where he was to establish "direct contact between an envoy of President Reagan and President Saddam Hussein," while emphasizing "his close relationship" with the president [Document 28]. Rumsfeld met with Saddam, and the two discussed regional issues of mutual interest, shared enmity toward Iran and Syria, and the U.S.'s efforts to find alternative routes to transport Iraq's oil; its facilities in the Persian Gulf had been shut down by Iran, and Iran's ally, Syria, had cut off a pipeline that transported Iraqi oil through its territory. Rumsfeld made no reference to chemical weapons, according to detailed notes on the meeting [Document 31].

Rumsfeld also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, and the two agreed, "the U.S. and Iraq shared many common interests." Rumsfeld affirmed the Reagan administration's "willingness to do more" regarding the Iran-Iraq war, but "made clear that our efforts to assist were inhibited by certain things that made it difficult for us, citing the use of chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human rights." He then moved on to other U.S. concerns [Document 32]. Later, Rumsfeld was assured by the U.S. interests section that Iraq's leadership had been "extremely pleased" with the visit, and that "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way to praise Rumsfeld as a person" [Document 36 and Document 37].

Rumsfeld returned to Baghdad in late March 1984. By this time, the U.S. had publicly condemned Iraq's chemical weapons use, stating, "The United States has concluded that the available evidence substantiates Iran's charges that Iraq used chemical weapons" [Document 47]. Briefings for Rumsfeld's meetings noted that atmospherics in Iraq had deteriorated since his December visit because of Iraqi military reverses and because "bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March 5 condemnation of Iraq for CW use, despite our repeated warnings that this issue would emerge sooner or later" [Document 48]. Rumsfeld was to discuss with Iraqi officials the Reagan administration's hope that it could obtain Export-Import Bank credits for Iraq, the Aqaba pipeline, and its vigorous efforts to cut off arms exports to Iran. According to an affidavit prepared by one of Rumsfeld's companions during his Mideast travels, former NSC staff member Howard Teicher, Rumsfeld also conveyed to Iraq an offer from Israel to provide assistance, which was rejected [Document 61].

Although official U.S. policy still barred the export of U.S. military equipment to Iraq, some was evidently provided on a "don't ask - don't tell" basis. In April 1984, the Baghdad interests section asked to be kept apprised of Bell Helicopter Textron's negotiations to sell helicopters to Iraq, which were not to be "in any way configured for military use" [Document 55]. The purchaser was the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. In December 1982, Bell Textron's Italian subsidiary had informed the U.S. embassy in Rome that it turned down a request from Iraq to militarize recently purchased Hughes helicopters. An allied government, South Korea, informed the State Department that it had received a similar request in June 1983 (when a congressional aide asked in March 1983 whether heavy trucks recently sold to Iraq were intended for military purposes, a State Department official replied "we presumed that this was Iraq's intention, and had not asked.") [Document 44]

During the spring of 1984 the U.S. reconsidered policy for the sale of dual-use equipment to Iraq's nuclear program, and its "preliminary results favor[ed] expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities" [Document 57]. Several months later, a Defense Intelligence Agency analysis said that even after the war ended, Iraq was likely to "continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons" [Document 58]. (Iraq is situated in a dangerous neighborhood, and Israel had stockpiled a large nuclear weapons arsenal without international censure. Nuclear nonproliferation was not a high priority of the Reagan administration - throughout the 1980s it downplayed Pakistan's nuclear program, though its intelligence indicated that a weapons capability was being pursued, in order to avert congressionally mandated sanctions. Sanctions would have impeded the administration's massive military assistance to Pakistan provided in return for its support of the mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.)

In February 1984, Iraq's military, expecting a major Iranian attack, issued a warning that "the invaders should know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever the number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide" [Document 41]. On March 3, the State Department intervened to prevent a U.S. company from shipping 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride, a chemical weapons precursor, to Iraq. Washington instructed the U.S. interests section to protest to the Iraqi government, and to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "we anticipate making a public condemnation of Iraqi use of chemical weapons in the near future," and that "we are adamantly opposed to Iraq's attempting to acquire the raw materials, equipment, or expertise to manufacture chemical weapons from the United States. When we become aware of attempts to do so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq" [Document 42].

The public condemnation was issued on March 5. It said, "While condemning Iraq's chemical weapons use . . . The United States finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims" [Document 43].

Later in the month, the State Department briefed the press on its decision to strengthen controls on the export of chemical weapons precursors to Iran and Iraq, in response to intelligence and media reports that precursors supplied to Iraq originated in Western countries. When asked whether the U.S.'s conclusion that Iraq had used chemical weapons would have "any effect on U.S. recent initiatives to expand commercial relationships with Iraq across a broad range, and also a willingness to open diplomatic relations," the department's spokesperson said "No. I'm not aware of any change in our position. We're interested in being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq" [Document 52].

Iran had submitted a draft resolution asking the U.N. to condemn Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S. delegate to the U.N. was instructed to lobby friendly delegations in order to obtain a general motion of "no decision" on the resolution. If this was not achievable, the U.S. delegate was to abstain on the issue. Iraq's ambassador met with the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick, and asked for "restraint" in responding to the issue - as did the representatives of both France and Britain.

A senior U.N. official who had participated in a fact-finding mission to investigate Iran's complaint commented "Iranians may well decide to manufacture and use chemical weapons themselves if [the] international community does not condemn Iraq. He said Iranian assembly speaker Rafsanjani [had] made public statements to this effect" [Document 50].

Iraqi interests section head Nizar Hamdoon met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Placke on March 29. Hamdoon said that Iraq strongly preferred a Security Council presidential statement to a resolution, and wanted the response to refer to former resolutions on the war, progress toward ending the conflict, but to not identify any specific country as responsible for chemical weapons use. Placke said the U.S. could accept Iraqi proposals if the Security Council went along. He asked for the Iraqi government's help "in avoiding . . . embarrassing situation[s]" but also noted that the U.S. did "not want this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship" [Document 54].

On March 30, 1984, the Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning the use of chemical weapons, without naming Iraq as the offending party. A State Department memo circulating the draft text observed that, "The statement, by the way contains all three elements Hamdoon wanted" [Document 51].

On April 5, 1984, Ronald Reagan issued another presidential directive (NSDD 139), emphasizing the U.S. objective of ensuring access to military facilities in the Gulf region, and instructing the director of central intelligence and the secretary of defense to upgrade U.S. intelligence gathering capabilities. It codified U.S. determination to develop plans "to avert an Iraqi collapse." Reagan's directive said that U.S. policy required "unambiguous" condemnation of chemical warfare (without naming Iraq), while including the caveat that the U.S. should "place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives." The directive does not suggest that "condemning" chemical warfare required any hesitation about or modification of U.S. support for Iraq

A State Department background paper dated November 16, 1984 said that Iraq had stopped using chemical weapons after a November 1983 demarche from the U.S., but had resumed their use in February 1984. On November 26, 1984, Iraq and the U.S. restored diplomatic relations. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, in Washington for the formal resumption of ties, met with Secretary of State George Shultz. When their discussion turned to the Iran-Iraq war, Aziz said that his country was satisfied that "the U.S. analysis of the war's threat to regional stability is 'in agreement in principle' with Iraq's," and expressed thanks for U.S. efforts to cut off international arms sales to Iran. He said that "Iraq's superiority in weaponry" assured Iraq's defense. Shultz, with presumed sardonic intent, "remarked that superior intelligence must also be an important factor in Iraq's defense;" Tariq Aziz had to agree [Document 60].

s'got to be a candidate for the longest postings list....

Oh.... and this: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB107/iraq11.pdf
September 13, 1988
This cable from U.S. Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie reports on a haranguing by Saddam Hussein's Minister of Industry and son-in-law, Husayn Kamil, to representatives of construction giant Bechtel following the U.S. Senate's passage of the "Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988." The Senate's move, on September 8, came on the heels of a series of Iraqi chemical weapons assaults against Kurds - most notably in Halabja in March of that year - atrocities Kamil denied had taken place. Kamil "vented his spleen for one and a half hours," according to the report. The reason for his vehemence was that the Senate Act called for strict economic sanctions against Baghdad including blocking all international loans, credits and other types of assistance - actions that "caught his government completely by surprise." Kamil, the report notes, "insisted that a clear pattern of 'Zionist undermining of Iraqi-U.S. relations' is now apparent." Two days later, representatives of Bechtel, which remains a major presence in post-Saddam Iraq, met with Glaspie to describe Kamil's outburst. Glaspie made note of the fact that as "one of Saddam Hussein's closest advisors, some say his closest … we take Kamil's angry reaction … to be an accurate reflection of Saddam's own reaction."

But the ambassador failed to comment on Bechtel's intention to move ahead with its $2 billion project in Iraq regardless of the provisions of the Act. "Bechtel representatives said that if economic sanctions contained in Senate Act are signed into law, Bechtel will turn to non-U.S. suppliers of technology and continue to do business in Iraq."

In April 2003, Bechtel won USAID's largest grant at the time - worth up to $680 million - to help in the reconstruction of Iraq

Well, it gets a bit frustratng when people make the same arguements to facts, and you take the time to locate and post post links which will back up your points, and no one bothers to follow them....

That's that same ambassador that told Iraq that the U.S. had no interest in protecting Kuwait from an Iraqi invasion just before the second Gulf War (which, of course, got renamed to the First Gulf War when the real First Gulf War got demoted to the Iran/Iraq war [why did that happen, anyway?]), isn't it?

"Now, of course, the US would have us believe that this war was to rid the world of a torturer and that the US is alone in their disgust of Saddam Hussein's tortures."

"They've never claimed that."

In fact, that was battle cry #3 of Bush's supposed reasons for marching in ti Iraq....
#1 WMDs
#2 Iraq was (supposedly) in cahoots with al-Qaeda
#3 Saddam/Saddam's regime was monstrous and we "freed" the Iraqi people....

Of course, now that #1 and #2 have been pretty well put to rest as a pack of lies, Bush has been using the Saddam was an evil person as his reason.

In fact, he HAS also made it clear in his many, many statements about the war in Iraq, that the US was (in his opinion) the only nation that saw this and was willing to get rid of Saddam to "free the Iraqi people from tyranny".

And just to back that up: http://slate.msn.com/id/2100014/

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This is bizarre! (Not that I as a woman would ever want to be in the military, but obviously some do, and for her to say something like that is just weird...

What the world really needs is an honest politician.

I once considdered doing politics but decided it was far to beuraucratic for me.

(don't go on about the spelling mistakes. I do a lot of thinking, heck i even worked out the meaning of life, the universe and everything. I don't write. I think.)

Until a fact is a fact, we will continue to be mislead by our leaders. That's why i like the idea of non-absolute monarchy. Leaders without power that's the safest option! People's representatives with it, they do what we tell them so that we re-elect them, lets have more elections. A general one every year. Far mor democratic, don't you think.

That's what i'd do if i earned the leadership of a political party.

I've been told I'd make a good politician.

To this day I remain puzzled over whether that was intended as a compliment or an insult?

I confess I find party politics distasteful. I couldn't lower myself to doing what Our Glorious Leader, All Hail! (tm) *ahem* wanted, if it disagreed with my personal politics.

If I were in charge I'd have some sort of proportional representation, probably no parties and a motions of conscience on everthing, no whips. It wouldn't work sadly, but it's nice to think it might.

Here's a little something just for fun:

http://www.cbc.ca/cp/world/040808/w080838.html

Yes, and the disintegration proceeds apace...

This is interesting but not surprising: http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Salem_Chalabi

Indeed! I have bookmarked that site... I just heard on the BBC WS that an Iranian diplomat has disappeared in Iraq... possibly kidnapped. I will watch for more news about that.

"possibly kidnapped"?

They've just been saying "kidnapped" around here all day.

Speaking of Iran: isn't it interesting that Chalabi the Elder, who fell out of favour with the U.S. for (possibly) selling military secrets to Iran, was actually having a nice tete-a-tete in Tehran when his arrest warrant hit the bench?

I was just being journalistic in saying "possibly" kidnapped. (You know, newspapers have to say "alleged" until something is proven in court...
Yes, it's very interesting indeed! The BBC WS was just wondering what will become of Saddam's trial now a warrant has been issued for Salem Chalabi as well!

Newsflash - the BBC news summary just said "has been abducted", in so many words, whereas they've been saying "possibly" all morning (our time..) This time thing is confusing. It's 1423 hours here (2.23 pm) so it's 0223 there in London (2 am.) Good here in NZ, a neat 12 hours, easy to calculate.

it's 20:37 here