The hijacking in October 1985 of a Mediterranean cruise ship attracted the personal involvement of the Presidents of Italy, Egypt, the USA and various other countries. The incident involved the killing of American tourist Leon Klinghoffer. The way in which this incident was handled by the authorities caused tensions between a number of allies, eventually resulted in the collapse of a friendly government, and left the person suspected of being the mastermind behind the operation at liberty in the Middle East.

Even though the incident made headline news across the world at the time, after a few years the whole affair would probably have been consigned to the history books - but for one thing. An opera was written, based on the incident and entitled The Death of Klinghoffer (music by John Adams, libretto by Alice Goodman, directed by Peter Sellars).

This opera attracted considerable controversy at its world premiere (Brussels, Belgium, 1991), its US premiere (Brooklyn, New York, 1991) and ever since. Ten years on, after the terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September 2001, the opera has continued to ignite passions

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, especially over the cancellation of four performances of excerpts from the opera which had been scheduled for November 2001 in Boston, USA. Other planned productions, notably for the opera houses of Los Angeles (USA) and Glyndebourne (UK), were also mothballed.

The opera serves to remind us of the original incident and the wider subject of terrorism and freedom fighters. It is the hijack incident itself, however, rather than the opera, that is the focus of this Entry.

The Achille Lauro

The Italian liner Achille Lauro was on a 12-day Mediterranean cruise with about 680 passengers and a mostly Italian and Portuguese crew of about 350. On the Monday (7 October 1985) it had left Alexandria in Egypt and was heading for Port Said (its next Egyptian port of call) when the captain sent out an emergency radio message. The message, picked up by a radio station in Gothenburg, Sweden, said that the ship was under the control of a group of armed men. The following day the men themselves sent a message, claiming that they were members of the Palestinian Liberation Front. They demanded the release of 50 Palestinians held in prison in Israel, failing which they would start killing the people on board (who were now hostages), starting with the American passengers. They threatened to blow up the ship in the event that anyone tried to rescue the passengers or capture the gunmen. As it turned out, the American tourist, a disabled Jewish man, was later shot and killed and his body and wheelchair were thrown overboard.

Meanwhile groups of experts were hastily assembling in Rome and Washington to handle the incident. But it was proving extremely difficult to collect even the most basic information about what was going on out there in the Mediterranean.

For one thing, it wasn’t known exactly who was on the vessel. Most of the passengers had disembarked at Alexandria to go on a sight-seeing trip to the Pyramids, followed by a trip to Port Said. There they were to rejoin the ship and sail on to Ashdod, an Israeli port some 40km south of Tel-Aviv and close to the Palestinian area known as the Gaza Strip. The Italian authorities estimated that, in addition to the crew, there were perhaps 60 to 80 passengers of many different nationalities still left on board. US authorities on the ground started interviewing those passengers who had opted for the sight-seeing trip. Their responses indicated that about a dozen of those left on board were US citizens.

Another problem was that the ship had, for all the authorities could tell, disappeared. Once the hijackers

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had radioed their demands on Monday night the ship’s radio was turned off and she sailed away into the busy Mediterranean. The whole area was now being monitored by the Egyptian and Israeli authorities, and both US and British reconnaissance aircraft were sent in, but at various times during the next few days the authorities just didn’t know where the ship was.

Who Were the Hijackers?

It was vitally important to establish the identity of the hijackers. Just who were these people? This question was never going to be fully answered, even after the hijacking incident was over. They claimed to be members of the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF). Sure enough, when they demanded the release of 50 Palestinian prisoners, one they mentioned specifically by name was Samir Qantari, a known PLF member. He had been captured six years earlier during a raid in which three Israelis had been killed. But the PLF was a generic term covering three different and conflicting factions. It was crucial to the US to know whom they were dealing with, but at this stage they could only hazard a guess.

Although the hijacking of a ship was a new twist, a few months before this incident a US TWA passenger jet aircraft had been hijacked by Palestinians, and passengers had been held hostage for more than two weeks in Beirut. This incident also involved the killing of an American, and the hijackers escaped. The Reagan administration in the USA was therefore determined that the same thing would not happen this time. But history has a knack of repeating itself.

The Governments Respond

By Monday night groups consisting largely of top brass who had handled the TWA hijacking were being hastily convened in Washington, with lines of communication to President Reagan. An emergency team of experts in counter-terrorism and communications was sent to Rome to advise the US ambassador there. Special forces (the Delta Force) were sent on their way from their base in North Carolina to a NATO air base in Sicily.

The consensus in Washington was that to prepare for a military rescue mission the ship should be denied a safe haven and kept on the high seas, since the permission of other countries would not be required for a military action on a vessel in international waters.

At the same time the Italian government was forming a crisis management group. This of course faced the same basic problems of not knowing the affiliations of the hijackers or the details of which passengers were on board. This group was headed by Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, and Defence Minister Giovanni Spadolini. They also decided to launch a military rescue mission. So by Tuesday morning ships of the Italian navy were sailing to the eastern Mediterranean; Italian special forces had been sent by helicopter to Akrotiri, a British airbase in Cyprus; and the Italian forces generally were put on a state of high alert.

On the Tuesday afternoon the Achille Lauro was finally spotted off the coast of Syria. It contacted the Syrian port authorities for permission to dock at Tartus. The hijackers also wanted to hold negotiations with the ambassadors of Italy, West Germany, the UK and the US. Both Italy and the US urged the Syrian government to refuse, and the Syrian navy ensured that the ship stayed outside its territorial waters, while the port authorities in Tartus remained non-committal on the request for negotiations.

Murder

It was reported that, in the course of the exchanges between the hijackers and the Syrian port officials, some comments made by the hijackers suggested that one or two American passengers had been killed. The hijackers reportedly issued an ultimatum after which, they said, they would start killing American hostages. Once their deadline had passed, the hijackers were sending messages such as, ‘What are the developments, Tartus? We will kill the second. We are losing patience.’ The Syrians later claimed to have informed the Italian government of this situation, but the Italians claimed that there was no confirmation of such reports and that they were under the impression that all the passengers were still safe.

In Washington, however, reports that American hostages may have been killed caused great consternation and dramatically affected the US approach to the whole hijacking incident. But organising a rescue operation in the current circumstances was thought to be very risky. And the logistics of such an operation were such that it would take some time just to get all the various forces - including navy frogmen, army commando units, helicopters and so on - together. Another problem for the management teams was how to assess the likely reaction of the hijackers to a military assault. They still didn’t know who the hijackers were, which was a considerable impediment to the Americans.

Which Faction?

Experts from the CIA and other US intelligence agencies had come up with different guesses as to which of three different factions of the PLF the hijackers were from. That mattered, because the hijackers could be expected to react quite differently to an attack depending on whether they were pro- or anti- Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Two of these factions were opposed to Yasser Arafat and were trying to get rid of him, whereas the third faction, led by Mohammed Abbas (alias Abul Abbas) had remained loyal to Arafat, as a mark of which Abbas was elected to the executive committee of the PLO.

The general consensus among the US intelligence agencies was that the hijackers were probably anti-PLO. They thought it made no sense for a pro-PLO group to hijack an Italian ship in Egyptian waters, since the PLO had good relations with both those countries. They thought it was more likely that a dissident Palestinian group was trying to make things difficult for Arafat. (The dissidents disagreed with Arafat’s apparent willingness to pursue peace talks brokered by the Americans.) But other US intelligence experts speculated (probably accurately, as it turned out) that the hijackers were probably making their way to Ashdod when something happened on board and they panicked and seized command of the ship.

Some of the experts in the US State Department fought shy of arguing that the hijackers were from a pro-PLO group. The US were sensitive about disrupting the ongoing Middle East peace process, and if they started to put the blame on Arafat that would amount to calling him a terrorist. This would make it impossible for the Americans to continue to negotiate with him. So there was an inbuilt tendency to give the PLO the benefit of the doubt. There was no clear line coming out of Washington, and the general feeling was that the hijackers were pro-PLO and therefore no rescue should be attempted. Yet somehow the Operational Sub-Group decided to go ahead anyway, and a military rescue mission was planned for Wednesday night.

Under international law the US was within its rights to board and seize a vessel under the control of pirates, but Craxi wasn't convinced. He insisted that the Achille Lauro was an Italian ship, and that while the Italian government was prepared to use force if absolutely necessary, it felt that the best way forward was to enter into negotiations with the hijackers. Thus a gulf was developing between the US and Italian governments over the best way to resolve the crisis.

By Tuesday evening the ship had sailed away from the coast of Syria. US intelligence believed it was heading for Cyprus, but once again it seemed to vanish, and the best efforts of US satellites and reconnaissance flights failed to locate it. Later, an Israeli patrol spotted the ship off the coast of Israel on a heading towards Egypt, and informed the US. From then on the Achille Lauro was followed by three vessels of the US navy in a position to launch an attack. US diplomats in Rome and Cairo were trying to avoid negotiations with the hijackers and keep the ship outside Egyptian territorial waters. But the Egyptian government was happy to allow her to enter its waters in spite of US opposition, and the Italians were happy about that too.

Anchorage and Release

On Wednesday morning the ship anchored off Port Said and a radio telephone link was set up between the hijackers and the Egyptian authorities. Later, an Egyptian-Palestinian contingent sailed out in a small boat for face-to-face discussions with the hijackers. The Palestinians involved were representatives sent by Yasser Arafat, one of whom was Mohammed ‘Abul’ Abbas, the leader of the pro-PLO faction of the PLF.

Around midday Arafat informed Craxi that the ship could be released with all passengers safe and sound if the Egyptian and Italian governments gave the hijackers safe conduct and turned them over to the PLO for trial. But the hijackers were also asking that the Italian, US, British and West German ambassadors join the negotiations.

The governments of those countries each appeared to refuse, though the Italians had already decided to allow the hijackers safe conduct. Compromises were suggested, and politely declined. The US were strongly opposed. Any agreement to allow the PLO to try the hijackers would amount to a far stronger recognition of the legitimacy of the PLO than the Americans had been willing to admit. It would also be an enormous propaganda coup for Arafat, since in mounting such a trial he could appear to the world to be demonstrating a strong anti-terrorist policy.

While all this was being thrashed out the news came through that the hijackers had released the Achille Lauro with all passengers and crew safe! In mid-afternoon the four hijackers were shown live on TV making victory signs as a patrol boat of the Egyptian navy carried them into Port Said harbour, where a cheering group awaited them. But how the Italian authorities had decided that all aboard were safe, and when and how the Italians found out about the murder of the American citizen Leon Klinghoffer, were questions which aggravated the friction between the Italian and US authorities.

The Death of Klinghoffer

Craxi later claimed that he only found out about the death of Klinghoffer early on Wednesday evening, when he personally spoke to the captain of the Achille Lauro while it was anchored some 15 miles off Port Said. And even then, Craxi said, the captain wasn’t absolutely certain about it. But later on Wednesday evening the captain himself appeared on Italian television and confirmed that he knew about the death of Klinghoffer immediately after it had occurred, on Tuesday, off the coast of Tartus. He said the hijackers had come to him immediately after the killing, to tell him about it. He saw that their shoes and clothes were still spattered with blood. The captain said the hijackers had held a gun to his head and told him that he and his crew would be killed unless he told the Egyptian authorities that everyone was safe. Both the American officials and the Italian newspapers felt that Craxi’s account of events was questionable. The Italian Foreign Ministry had spoken to the captain that Wednesday afternoon, so Craxi would have had no reason to contact the captain again - unless he already knew that the killing had taken place. There were other inconsistencies, too.

Washington officials had strong suspicions that Craxi already knew about the death of Klinghoffer before he spoke to the captain, and that he was hiding this fact from them. This of course only served to heighten the tension and distrust between the US and Italian governments.

The reaction in the US was initially one of unhappiness at the negotiated release of the ship, and then outrage as news came through of the death of Klinghoffer. The US government reaffirmed its determination to bring the hijackers to justice, that there must be no safe haven for terrorists, and that the Egyptian government should not release them or make any concessions to them. The whole thing seemed to be a stitch-up with the Italians leaning on Arafat to lean on the Egyptians. So the Americans now leaned on Craxi to get the hijackers extradited from Egypt.

The Hijackers Leave Egypt

The Egyptians had a problem. They wanted to get rid of the hijackers sure enough, so they could wash their hands of the whole affair. But the US wanted the hijackers extradited to Italy or the USA, while Arafat was insisting that if they were Palestinians they must be handed over to the PLO. Egypt’s President Mubarak then stated that the hijackers had already left Egypt, destination unknown but possibly Tunis, claiming that they had been allowed to leave before the news came through of the death of Klinghoffer.

More intelligence was received which seemed to confirm that the hijackers were members of the pro-PLO faction of the PLF, and that Mohammed 'Abul' Abbas had masterminded the bungled terrorist operation that resulted in the hijacking. Then his faction of the PLF issued a statement claiming responsibility for the incident and actually apologising for it. They said they had not intended to cause any embarrassment to friendly states such as Egypt and Italy, but were just trying to get a group of their people to Ashdod. It was only because the weapons being carried by the Palestinians were accidentally discovered by a member of the ship’s crew that, in a state of panic and confusion, they hijacked the ship. This claim seemed to be supported by statements made by the passengers and crew, and fitted in with the American intelligence assessments.

The Americans were trying to get confirmation of Mubarak’s statement that the hijackers had left Egypt, when they received intelligence from the Israelis that the group was still at an air base outside Cairo. By means of electronic surveillance the Americans were able to listen-in to Mubarak’s conversations from his Cairo office, which confirmed the Israeli intelligence reports. The Egyptians were planning to fly the hijackers out on a special flight to Algiers, and the Americans even got hold of the aircraft’s identification details (it was an EgyptAir plane, a Boeing 737) and a preliminary flight plan. The Americans decided to intercept the aircraft and force it to land at the NATO air base in Sicily. There was also a contingency plan: Israeli jets would be scrambled and ready to assist should it prove necessary to escort the Egyptian Boeing to an Israeli military airfield.

Detailed plans for the interception were worked out, and duly approved by Reagan, who was given details of the rules of engagement and assessments of the risk of casualties. Four F14 fighter planes took off from a US carrier in the eastern Mediterranean, supported by communications and electronic reconnaissance planes and tanker planes for mid-air refuelling. The F14s flew around the region under cover of darkness and observing complete radio silence. After some time they located the EgyptAir flight, got close to it and established radio contact. The Egyptian pilot immediately agreed to allow his aircraft to be escorted to Sigonella, the NATO air base in Sicily.

The US Blunder

But landing the aircraft in Sicily was a blunder on the part of the Americans. For one thing, the Achille Lauro was Italian-registered, making it the Italians’ responsibility, and even though Klinghoffer was an American his death took place on Italian territory. Also, under the Italian constitution its law officers have to act on information - they have no discretion in the matter - so once the aircraft landed on Italian soil they had no choice but to act on the case. And the whole episode of the Americans virtually forcing down the EgyptAir plane in Sicily did nothing to help the existing tension and bad feeling between the Italian and American authorities.

The Italian military had picked up the US Air Force activity on their radar at the time of the interception, but didn’t realise what was actually going on until they were informed by the US commander some time later. The Italians believed the US had deliberately delayed telling them for as long as possible, so as to present them with a fait accompli. They also felt that the US were holding out on them regarding their plans for the hijackers on board the plane. The US actually intended to seize the hijackers and fly them to the USA. To get the hijackers off the plane and deal with any possible resistance they sent a group of some 50 special operatives to the Sicilian air base. They believed that the Egyptians would have disarmed the four hijackers, and that though the Egyptians might resist handing them over they were unlikely to try to use force against US personnel to prevent a handover.

They also believed that the Italians wouldn’t really object, because they would be quite happy for the US to take these people off their hands. The US calculated that if they requested the Italians to hand the hijackers over, the Italians would be forced to protest, if only because of national pride. But they thought Craxi might quietly allow the Americans to take the prisoners, only to then protest in outrage at such US violation of Italian sovereignty. The only way for the US to find out about this for sure was for them to send in the Delta Force (the secret, specialised, elite hostage rescue team flown in from North Carolina) and see what the Italians did.

The Italian traffic controllers at the air base refused permission for the planes to land, even though they were told that the civilian airliner was running out of fuel and that their own Ministry of Defence had already granted permission. The controllers refused to give the necessary approach vectors, so the US escort craft attempted to guide the EgyptAir plane in without them. Its first approach was too low and it was warned to abandon the approach and circle round for another attempt. This was successful, but the Italians were surprised and outraged to find that the Egyptian plane was accompanied not by the escorts which the US had told them about but by two US troop transport aircraft.

Deadlock

As soon as they had landed, more than 50 US troops rushed to surround the Egyptian plane. But they were confronted by a similar sized group of Italian soldiers and Carabinieri who also surrounded the Egyptian plane. The US troops moved fuel trucks in to block any possible movement of the Egyptian plane. The Italian troops moved heavy machinery in to block the US troop planes and a US Air Force transport that was waiting to pick up the hijackers. In the ensuing stand-off more than 100 heavily-armed US and Italian troops stood facing each other while their top brass engaged in a long shouting match. It was stalemate.

A torrent of telephone calls ensued. The general situation was that the Americans wanted to take custody of the hijackers, who had killed an American citizen. The Italians retorted that the hijackers, who were now on Italian soil, had committed a crime on an Italian ship and were under Italian jurisdiction. The phone calls escalated to Presidential level, with Reagan demanding that Craxi release the men to the US authorities, while Craxi stood firm. Reagan finally accepted Craxi’s position but sought assurances that the Italians would seize and prosecute the hijackers. He stated that the US would seek their extradition under existing treaties. But there was confusion and misunderstanding about who exactly would be prosecuted and whether this included Abbas and his colleague.

Craxi tried to put it about that the capture of the hijackers was as a result of some wide-ranging process of co-operation between Italy, the US, Egypt, and the PLO. Reagan wanted the world to know that the US alone had caught the hijackers, as a message to terrorists everywhere that they might run but they couldn’t hide. The New York Daily News ran a banner headline: ‘We Bag the Bums’. But they spoke too soon.

The Italian press complained loudly about the unilateral arrogance of the American military forces. But the Italians had a problem: the hijackers were still on board an Egyptian plane, and the extent of Egyptian co-operation remained in question. The Italian base commander boarded the plane with an Egyptian diplomat, and after about two hours of negotiations the Italians managed to remove the four hijackers and put them in a military jail at the air base. Abbas and his colleague, Hassan, remained on the plane, as did about a dozen armed Egyptian soldiers.

Diplomatic Immunity

Then the Egyptians announced that Abbas and Hassan, the delegates from the PLO, had been brought to Sicily against their will and had no intention of getting off the plane. They were claiming diplomatic immunity as emissaries of Yasser Arafat. The Egyptians claimed diplomatic immunity for the plane itself, which they said was Egyptian territory which they would defend with arms if necessary. They then formally requested that the plane be allowed to leave the Italian air base together with all its remaining passengers, including the PLO men Abbas and Hassan. Craxi sent an envoy to talk to the PLO men, but they said nothing useful and protested that the plane should be allowed to leave with them on board.

Meanwhile the Achille Lauro, anchored off Port Said with its largely Italian crew still on board, was being held by the Egyptians. The Egyptians were clearly trying to use the ship as a bargaining counter, indicating that it would be released to the Italians if the Egyptian plane was released.

Legal Problems

The jailed hijackers were of great interest to the magistrates in Syracuse, Sicily, where they were being detained, and the magistrates in Genoa, the home port of the Achille Lauro, and of course the American FBI. But it turned out that the existing law, while providing for the death penalty for murder aboard a hijacked aeroplane, did not cover the case of a US citizen murdered on board a foreign ship. The US were concerned that the Italian authorities might not take action, so they were keen to try and secure the extradition of the four hijackers. The hijackers had been picked out at an identification parade by five of the hostages from the Achille Lauro, including Marilyn Klinghoffer, widow of the murdered American, who identified the man who killed her husband. The other three were also identified, and their names and details established by the authorities.

But the real prize sought by the Americans was not so much the four hijackers, who were comparatively small fry, but the PLO representative Mohammed ‘Abul’ Abbas, who was well known to US Intelligence and was believed to be a senior figure in a terrorist organisation.
Craxi now proposed that, since the initial investigation was complete and the identities of the hijackers established, the plane should be moved to Ciampino, a military airfield near Rome. He later claimed that he was trying to keep the Egyptian plane in Italy for as long as possible, but US officials suspected a cover-up and thought this was the first step towards letting Abbas go free.

The US were concerned that once it took off from Sicily the Egyptian plane would leave Italian air space and not go to Rome at all. They decided to follow the flight from Sicily to Rome. So three minutes after the plane took off a US Navy jet taxied out of its hangar at the air base and headed for the runway. Italian troops brought in some heavy equipment to block it, but it just turned round and took off anyway, narrowly missing some Italian officers who had to duck to avoid it. It followed the Egyptian plane all the way to Ciampino, flew in under the airport radar to avoid detection, then announced that it had to make an emergency landing there. This highly unconventional behaviour of course infuriated the Italian government, which immediately demanded an apology from Washington.

They Land in Rome

The transfer to Rome seriously weakened the American position. While the US Air Force had official access to the NATO airbase in Sicily, such was not the case at Ciampino. And besides, it would probably be much harder to convince the Rome authorities to arrest Abul Abbas than it would have been in Sicily. So the transfer to Rome set alarm bells ringing in Washington, and Reagan sent a message to Craxi reminding him of his obligation to detain Abbas. Not only American intelligence intercepts but also Israeli sources had provided evidence of Abbas’ involvement with the hijackers and his prior knowledge of the whole affair.

Warrants were issued in Washington for the arrest of the four hijackers and Abbas on charges of hostage-taking, piracy and conspiracy. US officials believed that, under existing US-Italian treaties, the issue of these warrants would be all that was necessary to force the Italian government to arrest and detain Abbas. National and international law enforcement agencies including Interpol were informed that warrants had been issued and that the US would formally request extradition. Such a request was delivered to the Italian Foreign Ministry. This was backed up with evidence gathered by the US against Abbas. The US communications intercepts and other evidence were disclosed to the Italians.

Italian Dilemma

But Craxi decided that there was no basis under Italian law for detaining Abbas. The US believed that the Italians were trying to wash their hands of the whole affair, so as not to upset their Egyptian and Arab friends in the Mediterranean region. Reagan sent a message to Craxi stating that this was a matter of the greatest importance for the American people and for him, Reagan, personally. He hoped that the Italian government’s response would not be such as to create big problems between the two countries. The US ambassador also provided further evidence of Abbas’ long history of involvement in terrorist operations.

Craxi’s government was also coming up against the magistrates in Sicily and in Rome, who were becoming antagonised at having the matter unjustifiably taken out of their hands by the central government. The Roman judges were furious that they had been unable to find out where Abbas was being held. Both they and the Sicilian judges were highly displeased at the lack of co-operation they were experiencing from the Rome police and the government. Craxi was also running the risk that a decision to allow Abbas to leave the country would split his coalition government. In particular, his Defence Minister (a Republican, whereas Craxi was a Socialist) was strongly pro-US and anti-terrorist.

On the other hand, if he arrested Abbas, let alone allowed him to be extradited to the USA, this would cause immense complications with Egypt and the PLO. They would be bound to feel aggrieved that this was how their assistance and friendship were being rewarded. Such action carried the risk of further political instability for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, as well as disturbing the delicate relationships which Italy had with the Middle East in general.

Thousands of students took part in a protest demonstration at the American University in Cairo, and Mubarak’s previously mild tone altered. He denounced the USA as international pirates, and laid into the Italians, with particular direct reference to Craxi himself. All the old arguments were trotted out about Egyptian sovereignty over the EgyptAir plane, and Egyptian protection for Abbas. Furthermore, the Achille Lauro still remained at anchor off Port Said, with its Italian crew virtually held prisoner on board - one Italian sailor who tried to go ashore was caught and beaten up by the Egyptian police. Craxi was also being leant on by Arafat, who claimed that it was the PLO who secured the release of the Achille Lauro and if Abbas was handed over to the US there was no telling what the repercussions might be.

Abbas Escapes

Craxi decided to allow Abbas to leave the country. It was arranged with the help of the Yugoslav government, and after various hitches a flight was arranged for Abbas and Hassan from Rome to Belgrade. They stayed in Yugoslavia for two days. The US Department of Justice tried to convince the Yugoslav authorities to respect the international arrest warrant that was out for Abbas, but to no avail. Abbas flew from Belgrade to Aden, South Yemen, and on to Baghdad, Iraq.

Washington was furious. The White House issued a statement saying that the US were ‘astonished and disappointed’ and found it ‘incomprehensible’ that the Italians allowed Abbas to leave Italy in spite of the US request for his arrest and detention. It spoke of Abbas as ‘one of the most notorious Palestinian terrorists ... involved in savage attacks on civilians’. Reagan was said by White House sources to be very angry and feeling personally betrayed by Craxi’s decision. There was talk of recalling Washington’s ambassador in Rome.

The US media had of course been full of the story of the paralysed Leon Klinghoffer and his shocking murder. It seemed that US citizens at that time were the targets of terrorist attacks everywhere and this was the latest in a long line of such outrages. Therefore the US interception of the EgyptAir plane was being seen in terms of the US striking back at terrorism. Italy was portrayed as having bowed to PLO pressure and fear of terrorist reprisals on Italian soil. In Rome there was a flurry of activity in an attempt to protect US-Italian relations, but however the diplomats might try to paper over the cracks, there was clearly a deep rift.

Italian Government Crisis

The issue rumbled on for the Craxi government at home. The Socialist and Republican factions within Craxi’s coalition seized upon this issue to create a face-off over more basic questions of Italian foreign policy. And there was considerable anti-American feeling developing in the Italian press. Typical at the time were headlines such as: ‘Italy, an American Province’, ‘The American Enemy’, and so forth. When Craxi decided to allow Abbas to leave the country, the Socialist Party newspaper carried the massive headline, ‘Craxi Mocks Reagan’. The anti-American frenzy in Italy at this time was being described as far worse even than at the height of the Vietnam War.

Since the last elections in Italy the Republican Party had been gaining ground from Craxi and the Socialists. In the present environment Defence Minister Spadolini and other leading Republicans now forced a confrontation with the Socialist Party. It called upon Craxi's government to repudiate its decision to let Abbas leave the country, saying that this decision could only assist further unrest and the rise of international terrorism. Spadolini and the two other Republican ministers in the government handed in their resignations. Within a few hours, Prime Minister Craxi and his Cabinet had also resigned. Of course since World War II Italian coalition governments had been collapsing frequently, and over all sorts of domestic issues, but this was the first time an Italian government had come adrift in this way over a foreign policy matter. Craxi’s government had actually been one of the longest-serving, and had in fact been presiding over a period of comparative political and economic stability in Italy. The fact that it now seemed to have fallen as a result of a dispute with the USA served only to heighten anti-American sentiment.

Craxi’s Socialist Party had been pursuing a policy of keeping the Communist Party out of the governing coalition, and Craxi had been cracking down on his own left wing. Now the Achille Lauro crisis was leading to the re-emergence of the Communist Party as a credible force, a fact which worried the Americans not a little. So an envoy was despatched from Washington to try to patch things up with Craxi, who was now the leader of an interim administration. Reagan even sent Craxi a conciliatory letter, which became known as the ‘Dear Bettino Letter’, which appeared to be a US apology for its actions. Craxi thus appeared to have triumphed over the US.

Trial and Sentence

But there were other inter-party squabbles (over issues such as the definition of international terrorism and the nature of the PLO), which served only to highlight more differences and conflicts within the Italian political system. Craxi’s government was reconstituted, but the legal investigations continued, and six other Palestinians were arrested in Italy on suspicion of helping the hijackers with weapons, explosives and forged papers. Cases were duly brought to trial. One of the hijackers had his charges dropped, and the other three continued to claim that their mission was planned as an attack on Ashdod, the Israeli port towards which the Achille Lauro had been heading.

Magied al-Molqi, the head of the hijackers who was accused of the murder of Klinghoffer, received a 30-year jail sentence instead of the life sentence demanded by the prosecution. Ibrahim Abdel Atif, the second in command, got 24 years and Ahmed al-Hassani 15 years. Abul Abbas and two other PLF officials were given life sentences in their absence. Of the six other accused, some were acquitted and others received lesser jail sentences.

Epilogue

• Abul Abbas remains a fugitive from justice. The US government continues to believe that he was the mastermind of the Achille Lauro affair, and suggests that his continued public reappearances as a high-ranking PLO figure point to the continuing involvement of the PLO in acts of international terrorism.
  
  
  
  He returned to live in Gaza City, telling his supporters on his return, 'I have no regrets about what I did. I am proud to have been privileged to take part in the struggle'. Abbas' entry into Gaza was reportedly authorised by the Israeli Security Service (Shin Bet)
  as a gesture towards the Palestinians and against the advice of the Israeli Ministry of Defence.



• Arafat's involvement with the Achille Lauro hijacking is not in doubt, but the extent of it is unclear. Arafat's relationship with Abbas, however, and the fact Abbas was a member of the PLO's Executive Committee from 1984 to 1991, led to a US decision to refuse Arafat a visa to enter the US to address the UN General Assembly in November 1988.



• Molqi, jailed in 1985 for 30 years for the murder of Klinghoffer, was released in 1996 by Italian magistrates on 12 days' parole 'for good behaviour'. He disappeared. Two other Achille Lauro hijackers had already vanished in the same way in 1991. This left only one of the hijackers - Atif - still in an Italian prison.
  
  
  
  The Italian newspaper La Repubblica commented that Italy had a long record of leniency when it came to Arab terrorists. In 1996, while Molqi was being let out of jail, the Italians were visiting Saddam Hussein in Baghdad to talk about reopening the Italian Embassy. At the same time the Italian oil company Agip was negotiating the construction of a $4 billion trans-Mediterranean oil pipeline with Colonel Gaddafi in Libya. La Repubblica said that such coincidences gave rise to 'grave suspicions which the Italian Government would do well to clear up'.



• Craxi was convicted on corruption charges in 1993 and subsequently fled to self-imposed exile in Tunisia.