h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

I guess the criteria of accuracy of maps are different to the criteria of accuracy for photographs.


Let me put it another way. Suppose you have 2 maps, one that I would call accurate, and one showing Carlisle to be where the other map shows Chesterfield.

I would consider the second map to suffer a gross error. You, if you followed the second map to Chesterfield (expecting to find Carlisle), and happened to meet the love of your life there, would consider it a better map. Would you continue to use it in preference to the first?

No! I would describe the first map as 'working', and the second as 'non-working'. I don't think fortuitous accidents take the 'non-working' map any closer to 'working'.

I think 'accurate' introduces inappropriate concepts to the discussion. It helps to confuse the map and the territory, IMO.

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

Not working, but by your standard it would be better, surely?

'Working' seems to imply a purpose? What then, would it mean for me to believe all sorts of things to be true, whose purpose I have not yet figured out?

And I don't agree that accuracy implied the confusion you suggest. If I say that of two measurements of the length of stick, 1.2m is the more accurate, it does not mean I think that "1.2m" IS a stick.

I do appreciate the question of the map and the territory. Philosophers of science have, for example, debated over whether gravity is real, i.e. whether it is a feature of the territory, or just of the maps. I think the debate has some merit, but probably goes nowhere.

Nevertheless, even if gravity were not considered real, statements of the measurement of gravity could still be accurate because they would be mathematically equivalent to other statements of measurement of, say, acceleration.

<'Working' seems to imply a purpose?>

Yes indeed. In this example, the criterion is whether or not the map enables me to drive to Carlisle, assuming that Carlsisle is where I wish to go.



I don't know. Do you?



The map is not the territory, nor is it a measurement. C'mon, Jowot, don't be daft!



If you did, why would you have presented a measurement as a 'map'?

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

Jowot:

"You [Pattern-chaser], if you followed the second map to Chesterfield (expecting to find Carlisle), and happened to meet the love of your life there, would consider it a better map."

I can't reply for P-c, but if this question were directed at me, this would be my response. The correct way to evaluate the usefulness of the map is not by its effects in a single isolated case, but instead by looking at (a) it's effects in many, repeated cases, and (b) looking at the standards and procedures which made the map, and accepting or rejecting them based on their effects. In this case: (a) Although an incorrect map might lead to beneficial effects in isolated cases, it won't in general. (b) The procedures used to make maps 'accurate' utilise a huge web of interrelated concepts, and we can say that if these procedures are followed the map will be accurate according to the standards of these concepts. That only leaves the 'accuracy', or better the 'usefulness' of these concepts and standards in question.

In general, when analysing a problem from a pragmatic point of view, which is roughly what P-c is doing I think, a subtle part of the analysis is choosing the right level at which to approach the question. Usually the individual level is not the right level, and we should be looking at the problem either at a systematic or social level.

Hope that makes some sense.

"

I don't know. Do you?"

Yes I do, becuase I hold that ideas can be meaningful irrespective of their purpose.


"The map is not the territory, nor is it a measurement. C'mon, Jowot, don't be daft!"

I took your analogy of map and territory to be about our models of reality and reality itself. I don't see how asserting the length of something fits that analogy any worse than asserting the relative spatial arrangment of English cities.

"If you did, why would you have presented a measurement as a 'map'?"

Oh ha ha. That's unworthy of you. Try to be more constructive. If you want to question this, address yourself to the discussion of gravity.

I think I was reckless to conclude that a measurement is not a map. I still don't think it *is*, but it is clearly associated with territories and maps. I'm trying to untangle them as I write this.

J:

The measurement, and/or the act of making a measurement, is neither map nor territory. Thus to confuse map and territory is NOT to confuse "1.2m" with "stick". I said that using the term "accurate" in this context "helps to confuse the map and the territory, IMO."

Having said that, I can't see this point going anywhere (useful), can you? If we continue, we must surely try to determine the relationship (if any) between the map, the territory and (making) a measurement....

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

One fault in the map/territory analogy is that it is not clear that we have any access to the territory, as opposed to access to other maps, drawn at other scales and using different symbols (eg visual icons as opposed to verbal signs).

Perhaps slightly offtopic for this particular thread, but not for the general theme, I was clearing some drawer space this morning, and came across this, which I must have written a few years ago.

The thing-in-itself is not a thing-in-itself-for-itself; it is a thing-in-itself for *us*. It is a grammatical term in Kant's theory of perception.
If consciousness is all there is (solipsism) there cannot be anything going on that I don't *explicitly* know about; appearances constitute (necessarily) the whole of the phenomenal world; the recalcitrance of the objects of that world is not *evidence* of the existence of the noumenal world, the world of things-in-themselves; it is what we *mean* by their existence (Weinberg); and their existence is not an empirical fact or inference (empirical facts are facts *about* them) but a *certainty* (Wittgenstein).

One might almost say that the bare existence of the map(s), together with certain features of its projection, is our only given.

Noggin

And do we?



And from the objective/Aristotelian/binary-logic/classical-science perspective, surely this is so? That's the main reason why I reject this perspective. It's not wrong, it's just not useful. And, lest we forget, by objective/etc standards, nothing can be confirmed to be real/certain/etc. Not useful.

In contrast, the 'uncertain approach' accords with our experience of the real world. There probably is a real world, and it probably acts as we think it will. Most of the time. If we avoid paradox-inducing perspectives, all is fine.

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

Just thought it might be interesting to throw in this quote from Wittgenstein's "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics", it seems somewhat relevant:

… suppose I were to say “When someone measures the table with a yardstick he is making an experiment which tells him the results of measuring this table with all other yardsticks”? It is after all beyond doubt that a measurement with one yardstick can be used to predict the results of measurement with others. And, further, that if it could not – our whole system of measuring would collapse.

No yardstick, it might be said, would be correct, if in general they did not agree. – But when I say that, I do not mean that then they would all be false.

…

Calculation would lose its point, if confusion supervened… And yet it seems to be nonsense to say – that a proposition of arithmetic asserts that there will not be confusion. – Is the solution simply that the arithmetical proposition would not be false but useless, if confusion supervened?

Just as the proposition that this room is 16 foot long would not become false, if rulers and measuring fell into confusion. Its sense, not its truth, is founded on the regular working of measurements.

"

And do we? "

Of course not. Why are you winking?

You're quite right to be sceptical. But scepticism doesn't mean a lot if you deny reality - there isn't enough to be sceptical of!

The analogy of a map is only useful if it is a map *of* something

I've already suggested reasons for thinking that consciousness/maps are not *all* that there is - ie that solipsism is not only not useful, but not true. Even so, knowledge is always knowledge of how the world appears to us; (the world is not *like* anything; it is only *like* something to be a consciousness *in* the world.)

Noggin

J:

Point taken! I don't deny reality; I deny the *certainty* of its existence, or of any specific aspect of it. My experience of life indicates to me that there is a world out there, which behaves as if it is what I perceive it to be. That's not certainty, but it's quite sufficient for what you might call a 'working relationship'.

Noggin:

A map isn't an analogy, as I understand it. It's a map! It's value is related to how much it resembles whatever it maps, in such a way as to allow it to be used for 'navigation' in the real world. So long as *that* resemblance is present, no other similarity is necessary.

Noggin:

Don't you mean *probably* isn't true? The whole point of solipsism is that you can't *prove* it's not true, because certainty and objectivity are inaccessible to us humans. Much would be different if we could truly say "solipsism is not true".

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

Map as an analogy for the models in our minds, rather than a map as an analogy in itself. As if you didn't know.



Au contraire. Nothing would change at all. That's why its untruth is a certainty.

Noggin

Hi All

My worth for the record.

1. Are you not all getting away from the original point? From what I can gather Pattern Chaser was trying to suggest that objective value judgements could be made about subjective belief systems, which notoriously resist objective analysis. A die-hard follower of a particular faith will remain unswerving in their belief in the face of negative evidence, however compelling, suggesting that to follow a different faith/belief system will result in 'better' results. Missionaries would choose to argue that point and present proof of their success in the face of heathens/infidels/savages belief systems!

2. Discussions about the map and the territory are essentially philosophical and lead to the Explanatory Gap where Mind meets Biochemistry! (IMO of course) (And where we have been before!)

I'll sink back into my quagmire of Quantum foam, uncertainty and entanglement.

turvy

I think if you delete the word "objective" you're close to the truth! The value judgements I was suggesting are not, nor could they be, objective. They're being made by humans, after all. Nevertheless, such judgements might/could be of use....

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

The *making* of such judgements is probably inevitable - a part of what it is to be human. Understanding the criteria by which one makes such judgements, which isn't, is the advance that needs to be made.

Noggin

I quite like the characterisation that P-c was looking for criteria by which to make objective judgements about beliefs.

Now I am quite happy conisidering objectivity to be a useful standard even if it is theoretically unattainable. But there is a danger that this will lead to a fairly pointless debate about the meaning of objectivity.

Using criteria to evaluate beliefs gives us hope at least of "inter-subjectivity" if not objectivity. (I.e. that the arguments, evidence must be available to everyone). Notably, it is inter-subjectivity (not objectivity) that is a characteristic of scientific rules of evidence. Usually stated as "experiments must be repeatable". So I approve.


Of course what we hadn't done was agree with P-c's suggested criteria. (I value emprical testability over utility.) The problem is that we are all smart enough to work out how our preferred beliefs will fare under any suggested criteria, so a debate about beliefs becomes a debate about criteria.

So, I don't think this debate can get anywhere. However, there is a related questions which could get somewhere, and I think would be interesting:

Do (some/any) religious beliefs actually have pragmatic value? Obviously compared to some sort of nihilistic despair, most of them do, but I suggest that this nihilistic despair is an invention of religious apologists to frighten people into staying in the fold.

Depends how widely you want to cast the net of pragmatism

Religious belief is often the cement that binds communities together with shared goals and cultural practices, and this seems to be a good thing (on balance) for the individuals involved. A lot of religions encourage prolific breeding too, which is to the short term advantage of the genes involved, though this is one that has probably outlived its useful life.

Noggin

Me too!



Inasmuch as such beliefs might be seen as a sort of map - a system that helps us to make our life decisions in an optimal fashion - then they surely have (pragmatic) value if they work better than (say) deciding randomly?

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"