h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

It depends what your point is.
Saying that 'Sherlock Holmes' has some real physical presence as marks on paper, images on celluloid of Basil Rathbone, MP3 files of Clive Merrison, or electrical activation patterns in someone's brain doesn't seem controversial.
Claiming Sherlock Holmes actually exists or existed as a real physical being is another matter.
However, as a basis for thinking about things, physical existence as a being isn't necessarily at all important.

Which I think was pretty much what P-c was saying.

When we categorise things we do so for a purpose, and the same things may be categorised differently for different purposes. There is no difficulty in using the mindworld/bodyworld distinction for certain purposes, while agreeing that the "mindworld" is a process that goes on in the bodyworld. I would say, though, that the distinction is an attribution of ours.

A computer can run a simulation that has no counterpart in the physical world, but what it does when it's controlling an actual automated factory (for example), may also be regarded as a "simulation" - a model. But a human must have some means of distinguishing between the two different cases.

Noggin

The odd thing is, that certain religions seem to be areas of thought where the actual real existence of particular alleged beings is considered by many people as being of such importance that speculating about their non-existence, or asserting that maybe another being actually exists as more than an idea, could cause people to be killed.

To those kinds of believers, the idea of the thoughts or sayings of the divine being as a basis for philosophical thought in the 'Mindworld' seems to be relatively unimportant - the actual existence of a being to reward or punish certain actions seems to be considered as possibly the only real reason why some behaviours should be performed and some shunned - actions being Right or Wrong in themselves isn't really enough.

This is why I find the term 'MindWorld' useful. In the MindWorld, Sherlock Holmes is 'real'; in the BodyWorld (the physical universe), this is not the case. And yet we humans have a use for Mr Holmes, and sometimes treat him as if he were 'real'. I suspect the only important point is that we are able to distinguish between something/someone MindWorld-real and BodyWorld-real. If we can't, we're in trouble!

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

What's the point of a phrase 'real in the mindworld' which effectively applies to anything and everything which is thought about?
Can you describe anything which *isn't* real in the mindworld?

Surely if something doesn't even exist in the mindworld, it's at the very least, 'not-currently-being-thought-about'. Any attempt to comment on its reality makes it real by definition.

In fact, wouldn't it be easier to ditch the body/mindworld concept and just use 'real' to distinguish between ideas and imagination on the one hand, and physical objects on the other. Isn't that what most people actually do?

Yes: Mount Everest. I use the term 'BodyWorld' to refer to the physical universe in all its glory, but specifically excluding any minds, souls or spirits (and similar 'beings', supernatural or otherwise) and their output. All of the latter is covered by the term 'MindWorld'.

Of course these are convenience terms, nothing more. However, I find it convenient to be able to say that you are a BodyWorld entity (although you have a mind, and therefore also exist in the MindWorld), whereas Sherlock Holmes is exclusively a MindWorld entity. I think it's more meaningful to say that Sherlock Holmes is 'real in the MindWorld' than to simply say that he's 'real', which would imply existence in the BodyWorld to many people.

Please remember that, although we can usefully distinguish between the MindWorld and BodyWorld, they are NOT independent.

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

Perhaps, but this would not allow me to describe Sherlock Holmes as 'real', and he *is* real to many humans, although he has/had no existence in the physical universe. Lara Croft is real too. I see a need and a use for a term to describe things that are real in this sense. 'Imaginary' just isn't good enough, I'm afraid.

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

>>"Perhaps, but this would not allow me to describe Sherlock Holmes as 'real', and he *is* real to many humans,..."

So there are two different kinds of 'real' in the mindworld - 'real' as in a concept simply being thought about, and 'real' as in some higher level of 'real' which still isn't *really* real in the real world?

How would "Sherlock Holmes is real in your MindWorld" be taken as any different from "Sherlock Holmes is real inside your head", which equates to "Sherlock Holmes isn't *really* real in the Real World"?

>>"Yes: Mount Everest. I use the term 'BodyWorld' to refer to the physical universe in all its glory, but specifically excluding any minds, souls or spirits (and similar 'beings', supernatural or otherwise) and their output. All of the latter is covered by the term 'MindWorld'."

Surely, anything known about in the real world also exists in the 'MindWorld' as a collection of associated ideas, possibly not all correct?

Yes, you're right of course. I over-stated my case. Even though Mount Everest is an exclusively BodyWorld entity, it must also be the case that any aspect of the BodyWorld of which we are aware must be represented somehow in the MindWorld.

A more interesting example might be the world-model which science has provided us with. This is an exclusively MindWorld entity, but it is 'real' [and *very* useful] to many people. It is so real that sometimes we get confused between it and the BodyWorld itself. [Maps and territories; "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" and all that. ]

The point of the term 'MindWorld' is that there are many things which feature prominently in the lives of human beings that exist exclusively in the MindWorld. [Sherlock Holmes; the scientific world-model; England as World Cup winners... ] To describe such things as 'imaginary' is dismissive, and not indicative of their significance to us humans and our lives. [IMO, of course.]

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

>..could you define an electron, in a way that will clearly illustrate the difference between it and (say) the way we define God?<

Dammit, Jim! I'm a philosopher, not a physicist!

Do you mean is there a distinct difference in the method of defining that for which we have substantive evidence and that for which we have essentially none?

The word, 'defined', implies limitation, does it not? Observable, (apparent), entities such as electrons, are defined by what they can, and cannot do. The typical, (non-anthropomorphic), god-concept normally includes such secondary characteristics as 'omnipotent', 'all-knowing', etc., which are vague attempts to describe something limitless, and which is therefore incapable of definition. That is why such god-concepts are not really concepts at all; are invalid postulates, and are void of meaning.

Could you define a 'real', (Bodyworld), person, in a way that will clearly illustrate the difference between the way we define such a person and the way we define a 'fictional', (Mindworld), person?

I kind of think that most people are smart enough to be perfectly aware how significant science or the idea of England winning the world cup are in their lives, or those of others.
I also think that people are smart enough to recognise that 'science' is a way of thinking about the world, and isn't some physical entity which can be bought by the pound or tripped over if someone leaves it lying around at the top of the stairs.

>>"To describe such things as 'imaginary' is dismissive, and not indicative of their significance to us humans and our lives."

I still don't see how "It's real in your MindWorld/our MindWorlds" is really less dismissive than "It's imaginary", at least, not to someone who understands what 'MindWorld' actually means and thinks about what is being said.

Effectively, we are beings who spend a great deal of time talking about things lacking a physical real-world presence, so just because something isn't 'real' in a conventional sense doesn't mean it's automatically dismissed or considered inferior, or is in any way in need of some 'MindWorld' label in order to be granted appropriate status.
In addition, we have any number of specific terms to talk about such 'imaginary' things which may be less likely to offend the easily sensitive.
"Holmes is a wonderful 'fictional character'"
"Science is a useful 'thought system and codification of knowledge'"
"England winning the World cup would be great/not great" (depending on one's nationality, etc.

In practice, of course, since outside the area of deities and other supernatural entities there's a pretty good general consensus on which things are 'real' in the way most people would understand 'real', statements like "It's not *real*, you know", or "It's only imaginary" is often likely to be said only when someone seems to be taking things a bit too seriously.

In the case of things like science, of history, or economics, it doesn't seem particularly useful to use the words 'real' or 'unreal'. People know what they *are*, and what they are about, even if it's not necessarily easy to describe.
Effectively, they seem to exist almost at some meta-level - a field like history could be entirely about known facts about past reality, yet arguably not have any physical existence *as history*, even though all its components are made of 'reality'.

Not easily, no. That's my point. As Ed says, Holmes, God and Ed's Mum each have their own set of dedicated neurones; what's the difference? In other words, being unable to define something clearly doesn't stop us from thinking about it, whether it be God, an electron or Ed's Mum. Thus your argument invalidates just about all the reasoning we indulge in....

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

I agree. I just find 'MindWorld' convenient and useful. You clearly don't. That's OK.

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

Hey, if you want your own word to prevent you accidentally dissing some non-'Bodyworld' things by lumping all the disparate things a mind can hold into one catch-all category which is effectively the same as 'imaginary' or 'all in the mind', be my guest.

However, apart from the alleged insulting nature of 'imaginary' (which does rather ignore the raft of specific ways we have to describe particular kinds of ideas, concepts, thought systems, etc), I'm still not sure what the point is, except maybe to be able to define some things as 'real' when many people would consider that an overstatement, and when in honesty it still only means
"real, *to you*, *to me*, *to us*, or *to them*".

If other people *are* going to be dismissive of things because they aren't 'really real', describing them as real in the MindWorld doesn't seem likely to change anyone's attitude to them for more than an instant, in the same way as 'differently normal' would have a pretty short half-life outside the uncritical confines of a 'PC' arena.

In reality, and thinking particularly of religions and other supernatural stuff, it seems people are most likely to be dismissive of things precisely because it *is* claimed by others that they are really real, yet there seems to be no evidence for them. The more extreme someone's claims for the existence of some or other being in actual reality, the more likely *other* people are to consider that the existence of the said being must be of fundamental importance to the claimer, if notvthe whole belief syetm, and that the apparent non-existence of the being is therefore significantly damaging.

>>

Not easily, no. That's my point. As Ed says, Holmes, God and Ed's Mum each have their own set of dedicated neurones; what's the difference? In other words, being unable to define something clearly doesn't stop us from thinking about it, whether it be God, an electron or Ed's Mum. Thus your argument invalidates just about all the reasoning we indulge in.... <<


Oh, I think there is a great deal of difference.
And unless I have misstated something, I doubt any argument I have presented thus far would have such a profound impact.

Well, perhaps there is another way of approaching this.

First, let me say that I do appreciate your Mindworld/Bodyworld perspective/method/description.
I think it not unreasonable to suggest most humans function automatically in the 'real' world in this way, without conscious consideration.
When an individual finds it difficult to distinguish between the two, because of drugs, insanity, trauma etc., the results are usually counter-productive at best, lethal at worst.
However, despite the pragmatic value of the abstracting mind-function, I think it is also a two-edged sword, because the artificial dichotomy of mind/body, subject/object, self/other etc., intrudes into areas, such as metaphysics and philosophy, where it obscures, rather than illuminates.

~~~~~~~~

Let us, for the sake of the discussion, make some propositions:

1. Ed's Mum exists
2. Sherlock Holmes exists
3. God exists

Now let us determine the differences, if any, which affect those propositions.
That is to say, we are not concerned with the actual existence or non-existence of the entities, but rather with the inherent qualities, or characteristics inherent in the propositions themselves.

In other words, how are the propositions themselves meaningful?
At this point, we are not concerned about the validity of the actual propositions, but about the meaningfulness of the concepts used to phrase the claims. Does that make sense?

In the first example, we could potentially begin by examining the evidence supporting Ed's existence. Ed may co-operate, by punching me in the nose. I could then state with some degree of certainty, not to mention discomfort, that Ed does, indeed, exist. Since Ed is presumably a human being, we can assume he originated like most other humans.
We could engage in our exploration in this manner, only because the concept, that of a living 'real' person, is valid and meaningful.

In the second example, we could investigate historical evidence, and eventually arrive at the conclusion that, yes, Sherlock Holmes does not exist as a living human being, but does in fact exist as a fictional person.
Once again, the concept itself, in this case, that of a fictional character, is inherently valid.

In the third example, we are presented with a completely different, and seemingly insurmountable problem. Whereas in the first two examples we are provided with valid concepts, in this one we are not.
While 'Ed's Mum' and 'Sherlock Holmes' are both 'conceptualize-able', (human and fictional character respectively), 'God,' remains quite ambiguous.
There is nothing remotely approaching the kind of physical evidence we could use in the first example, therefore 'God' is not a 'real,' living person.
We are prevented from applying the concept used in the second example, that of a fictional character, because it is typically claimed that 'God' is a 'real' person.
And so forth..

Of course, this argument is justified only until someone comes up with a meaningful 'god-concept', or defines God as a fictional character.

It's quite simple.

Wheras a picture of Basil Rathbone and P-C's mum both fire certain sets of neurones, there are other sets which are only fired by one and not t'other. If one were to go on to investigate the reality behind the pictures, you would find neurones firing which related to what people were able to tell you about the life of Basil Rathbone, but you couldn't *quite* trigger neurones relating to a convincing backstory of Holmes.


(This argument has a minor flaw, admittedly:
"Sherlock Holmes" - 9,350,000 Google hits
"Basil Rathbone" - 616,000 Google hits
"P-C's mum" - Zero Google hits.

Thus P-C's mum - and therefore P-C himself - collapse back into the Mindworld with a puff of logic.)

It's a fair cop, guv. I am an imposter.

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

<>

Good thing too, otherwise as far as we are concerned Basil Rathbone and P-c's mum would be the same person.

The problem is, that as long as we stick to firing neurones, we have no way of getting beyond the mindworld (in fact, we can't even get to firing neurones unless we go beyond these in some respects).

There are certain things that humans do, such as accept that there exists an external world, which we perceive through our senses, that are simply givens, in the first instance. A world picture can only be analysed, not shown to be "correct" by some external standard, because what counts as verification is itself part of the world picture.

Noggin