h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

Hi Bx4,

>>I think you have misunderstood my argument somewhat. <<
Possibly. It sounds like it seems self evident to you that warrant entails truth*. Since any argument that seeks to establish what a self evident truth will seem circular, that's why you detect the pp aroma here. I think I see what you mean, prima facie it looks bonkers to treat seriously the notion that you could have a warranted false belief. That's philosophy for you though, maybe I am more sympathetic or more conditioned to accept fiddly arguments for the bleedin' obvious

*If, for the sake of argument you set aside your difficulties with the notions involved, ie truth, warrant and knowledge.

>>Moreover, your claim that the above is 'definition' of 'warrant' also is problematic:<<
Yes I agree, it is debatable whether this sort of stipulation: X is whatever it is that fulfills condition Y is satisfactory as a definition of X for the usual purposes of explaining precisely what X is. The counter is that this is not the only purpose of a definition. In Merrick's argument the definition of warrant is like the specification of a place holder or variable. He actually states that his argument seeks to establish that warrant entails truth /independently/ of which precise definition of warrant is used. So vagueness on detail is a strength not a weakness, akin to using an algebraic variable rather than specific numbers.

>>Only presumably if the statement involves some obvious redefinition of one or more of its terms which it doesn't seem to.<<
It might not seem so to you. But working out whether a theory is useful, whether its predictions are any good seems suspiciously absent of any consideration of how we might know that all of a sudden. Apparently this is just a purely practical matter. Rorty is Humpty and I claim my £5.

>>This seems to be somewhat of a change of stance since you argued (post 33) that

'Our assessment of the epistemic grounds for the MES is not incompatible with an instrumentalist stance in my view'

which suggests your original position was that the instrumentalist stance did not lead to the elimination of epistemic grounds.<<
No this is not a change in my stance. It seems to me that epistemological concerns are compatible with /an/ instrumentalist stance, I'd go as far as to say many such stances, just so long as they are sufficiently distant from the radical pragmatist/Rorty end of the spectrum that you seem to occupy.

>>Clearly you are wedded to the notion that a theory must have epistemic aspect presumably involving some notions of truth (whatever that means), knowledge (whatever that means) and possibly reality (whatever) that means.<<
I think that's your baggage rather than mine.

>>Perhaps the essential difference between our stances is that whereas I extend Ockham's Razor to the concept of a scientific theory so that epistemological and ontological concepts are unnecessary you take stance that these concepts are, in some sense necessary.<<
I don't know that they are necessary but I think they can be useful

ttfn

hi psi

\\'Possibly. It sounds like it seems self evident to you that warrant entails truth'\\

Not really I am suggesting that the sentence:

(a)'Warrant is “that, whatever precisely it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief.”'

Embodies a circular set of necessary conceptual logical entailments:

true belief + warrant -> knowledge ->truth ->true belief

\\'That's philosophy for you though, maybe I am more sympathetic or more conditioned to accept fiddly arguments for the bleedin' obvious'\\

Indeed, though as Frank Ramsey said:

'Philosophy must be of some use and we must take it seriously; it must make clear our thoughts and so our actions. Or else it is a disposition we have to [hold in] check, and an inquiry to see that this is so; i.e. the chief proposition of philosophy is that philosophy is nonsense. And again we must then take seriously that it is nonsense, and not pretend, as Wittgenstein does, that it is important nonsense!'
(Anthology of Frank Ramsey's Notes'; J.M. Keynes)

\\'*If, for the sake of argument you set aside your difficulties with the notions involved, ie truth, warrant and knowledge.//

I think if one sets the difficulties aside then argument about the merits or otherwise of Merricks thesis are fatally compromised:

'Essentially a philosophy is a system of definitions ...that.. philosophy should clarify and distinguish notions previously vague and confused, and clearly this is meant to fix [as in concrete] our future meaning only.'(ibid)

\\'He actually states that his argument seeks to establish that warrant entails truth /independently/ of which precise definition of warrant is used. So vagueness on detail is a strength not a weakness, akin to using an algebraic variable rather than specific numbers.'\\

There is I think a fundamental difference between a number of /precise/ definitions of warrant and an absence of /an/y precise definition.

//'It might not seem so to you.'//

Well if you consider that the definition

'instrumentalism; n. In the philosophy of science, the view that concepts and theories are merely useful /instruments/ whose worth is measured not by whether the /concepts/ and /theories/ are true or false (or correctly depict reality), but how effective they are in explaining and predicting '(Wiktionary)[Emphases in the original]


involves an Humpty_Dumptish redefinition of any of its constituent terms then you might demonstrate rarher thn merely assert this.

//'No this is not a change in my stance. It seems to me that epistemological concerns are compatible with /an/ instrumentalist stance..//

Which instrumentalist stance(s) how are they compatible?

// I'd go as far as to say many such stances, just so long as they are sufficiently distant from the radical pragmatist/Rorty end of the spectrum that you seem to occupy.'//

I am still not clear what these supposed stances are and why you think my use of the fairly standard definition of instrumentalism above makes me a 'radical pragmatist', Rortyish or otherwise.

//'I think that's your baggage rather than mine.'//

Necessarily my ontological parsimony entails that I have less philosopical baggage than you do.

//'I don't know that they are necessary but I think they can be useful**'//


but you have not shown, in so far as scientific theories are concerned, why or how..

bs

placeholder

Hi Bx4,

>>Embodies a circular set of necessary conceptual logical entailments:

true belief + warrant -> knowledge ->truth ->true belief <<
I don't see what this has to do with Merrick's argument. If what you are doing is rejecting his case because you reject the concepts of knowledge and truth that is one kind of discussion we could have. Another is to assess his argument in its own terms.

>>I think if one sets the difficulties aside then argument about the merits or otherwise of Merricks thesis are fatally compromised:<<
Not really, all I'm doing is trying to draw a distinction between the types of discussion I mention above.

>>There is I think a fundamental difference between a number of /precise/ definitions of warrant and an absence of /an/y precise definition.<<
An algebraic variable can do its job without having a finite set of precise numerical values assigned to it. Here, the stipulation of the function of 'warrant' is given, and that suffices for Merrick's purpose. However, he isn't really making a case in a context in which there are no definitions of warrant, they are well known and he alludes to them in the paper.

>>involves an Humpty_Dumptish redefinition of any of its constituent terms then you might demonstrate rarher thn merely assert this.<<
I'm not saying the definition given does that, what I said is that the arguments used to support stances on the Rorty end of the continuum redefine the task of finding out whether a theory is useful as a pragmatic concern rather than an epistemic one.

>>Which instrumentalist stance(s) how are they compatible?<<
If we take :'instrumentalism; n. In the philosophy of science, the view that concepts and theories are merely useful /instruments/ whose worth is measured not by whether the /concepts/ and /theories/ are true or false (or correctly depict reality), but how effective they are in explaining and predicting ' then the question of how we assess the utility is epistemic.

>>I am still not clear what these supposed stances are and why you think my use of the fairly standard definition of instrumentalism above makes me a 'radical pragmatist', Rortyish or otherwise.<<
My case is not that your use of the definition makes it so. My case takes as a premise that it is so. If I'm mistaken and your Rorty fanboy status doesn't go that far, sorry.

>>Necessarily my ontological parsimony entails that I have less philosopical baggage than you do.<<
You don't have less, you've just lost it at Frankfurt airport and are trying to put a brave face on

>>but you have not shown, in so far as scientific theories are concerned, why or how..<<
Fair point. I withdraw the claim.
ttfn

hi psi apologies for delay in replying. Tather busy at the moment will reply as soon as I can.

bs

Hi Bx4,

Ok, no rush.

ttfn

hi psi

Finally began drafting a reply. Hopefully will finish by weekend.
bs

hi psi

//I don't see what this has to do with Merrick's argument.//

In my view it renders his argument redundant since Plantings 'definition' of 'knowledge' adopted by Merricks in his opening paragraph has as a logical consequence my statement:

true belief + warrant -> knowledge ->truth ->true belief

which is simply another way of saying 'warrant entails truth' hence in my view Merrick has already included the /conclusion/ of his argument is contained in his/Plantinga's initial premise (definition) hence the argment is circular. Another way of looking at this by way of axiom T of epistemic logic.


BcP&P ('mere true belief') {Premise 1}

BcP&P&W -> KcP (Plantiga/ Merrick warrant) {Premise 2}

KcP->P (axiom T) {premise 3}


BcP&P&W -> KcP -> P {premise 4}

hence

BcP&P&W ->P

from which the circularity is obvious.

//If what you are doing is rejecting his case because you reject the concepts of knowledge and truth that is one kind of discussion we could have.//

We could but perhaps you could begin by defining the concepts since both seem to encompass a number of mutually contradictory meanings.

//Another is to assess his argument in its own terms.//

My alternative is to take the Ramseyan approach.


//Not really, all I'm doing is trying to draw a distinction between the types of discussion I mention .//

Your original 'If, for the sake of argument you set aside your difficulties with the notions involved, ie truth, warrant and knowledge.' highlights my problem because the difficulties I have are rooted in the lack of /particular /attached to the terms.

//An algebraic variable can do its job without having a finite set of precise numerical values assigned to it. Here, the stipulation of the function of 'warrant' is given, and that suffices for Merrick's purpose.//
I'm not sure you analogy works

'A Variable is a symbol for a number we don't know yet. It is usually a letter like x or y.'
http://www.mathsisfun.com/algebra/definitions.html

So if a variable appears in an equation like

X+2=6

then it is satisfied by /the/ precise value 4. This appears to be substantively different from:

b+w=k

where b is the constant'mere true belief', w is 'warrant and k is constant knowledge. Since without assigning values (meanings) to the constants, b and k then the determination of the value (meaning) of w cannot be made and hence a false analogy.

//However, he isn't really making a case in a context in which there are no definitions of warrant, they are well known and he alludes to them in the paper.//

Indeed but in note (3) he also says:

'These philosophers, of course, might not use the word ‘warrant’ for that which makes true belief knowledge, and some are not explicit about (or perhaps are unaware of) the fact that their account of warrant entails truth'.

In fact not all seem to use 'warrant' at all.

//I'm not saying the definition given does that, what I said is that the arguments used to support stances on the Rorty end of the continuum redefine the task of finding out whether a theory is useful as a pragmatic concern rather than an epistemic one.//


I'm not clear why you link my instrumentalist stance to Rorty. Since I had already given this:


'//Instrumentalism// is the methodological view in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science that concepts and theories are merely //useful instruments//, and their //worth// is measured not by whether the concepts and theories are //true// or //false// (Instrumentalism denies that theories are //truth-evaluable//), or whether they //correctly depict reality//, but by how effective they are in //explaining// and/or //predicting// phenomena.'
(adapted slightly from the entry in 'The Basics of Philosophy' website)

as the definition of instrumentalism that most closely corresponds to my view. It is more closely relate to Duhem's instrumentalism in The Aim and structure of Physical Theory':

'A physical theory is not an explanation; it is a system of mathematical propositions whose aim is to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a whole group of experimental laws (Duhem 1954, 19).'

Though I favour the former as it is not restricted to physics.


However neither seem to require an acceptance of 'Rorty's radical pragmatism' (whatever you mean by that) so this seems someting of a red herring. Perhaps you should simply provide the justification for your belief 'that epistemological concerns are compatible with /an/ instrumentalist stance'

//If we take :'instrumentalism; n. In the philosophy of science, the view that concepts and theories are merely useful /instruments/ whose worth is measured not by whether the /concepts/ and /theories/ are true or false (or correctly depict reality), but how effective they are in explaining and predicting ' then the question of how we assess the utility is epistemic.//

'epistemic: adj. relating to knowledge or to the degree of its validation.' (OCED)

Perhaps you would explain what the precise nature of the 'knowledge' would be that you would use to evaluate the utility of a theory (say the MES) from an instrumentalist stance.

//My case is not that your use of the definition makes it so. My case takes as a premise that it is so. If I'm mistaken and your Rorty fanboy status doesn't go that far, sorry.//

I was an instrumentalist 20 years before I was a Rorty fanboy. Tricky that.

//You don't have less, you've just lost it at Frankfurt airport and are trying to put a brave face on.//

Philosophical nonsense neither I nor my baggage has passed through Frankfurt airport

bs

placeholder

Hi Bx4,

>>In my view it renders his argument redundant since Plantings 'definition' of 'knowledge' adopted by Merricks in his opening paragraph has as a logical consequence my statement:

true belief + warrant -> knowledge ->truth ->true belief

which is simply another way of saying 'warrant entails truth' hence in my view Merrick has already included the /conclusion/ of his argument is contained in his/Plantinga's initial premise (definition) hence the argment is circular. Another way of looking at this by way of axiom T of epistemic logic.<<
I don't think that's quite right. All you seem to have done is make your own circle. If you start with 'true belief' as a premise and derive 'truth' then of course that's circular. Merricks' argument starts with this characterization of warrant:

"S knows that p, therefore, if and only if S’s belief that p is warranted and p is true."

Merricks argues that warrant entails truth. So you'd have to show that 'p is warranted -> p is true' is circular to make your case.

>>BcP&P ('mere true belief') {Premise 1}

BcP&P&W -> KcP (Plantiga/ Merrick warrant) {Premise 2}

KcP->P (axiom T) {premise 3}


BcP&P&W -> KcP -> P {premise 4}

hence

BcP&P&W ->P

from which the circularity is obvious.<<
But the link to Merricks' argument is not, since what you need to show is that W ->P is circular.

>>So if a variable appears in an equation like

X+2=6

then it is satisfied by /the/ precise value 4. This appears to be substantively different from:

b+w=k

where b is the constant'mere true belief', w is 'warrant and k is constant knowledge. Since without assigning values (meanings) to the constants, b and k then the determination of the value (meaning) of w cannot be made and hence a false analogy.<<
In x + y = 1 where x, y are real numbers then we have a restriction or stipulation for x and y but an infinite solution set for each and no precise value. So I don't think the analogy is false if interpreted correctly.

>>I was an instrumentalist 20 years before I was a Rorty fanboy. Tricky that.<<
The tricky aspect is that it is difficult to see how you are much of a fan really. What is Rortian that you accept?

ttfn

hi psi

Somewhat busy in world at moment. Will post at weekend.

bs

hi psi


<>

It shows his argument is redundant and circular because the conclusion 'Knowledge entails truth' is implicit in the axiomatic

definition of knowledge:

'if c knows that P is true then P is true': KcP->P

'All you seem to have done is make your own circle. If you start with 'true belief' as a premise and derive 'truth' then of

course that's circular.'

I disagree the circularity is implicit in the Plantinga/Merrick 'definition' of warrant(w) the supposed distintion between

'knowledge' and 'mere true belief'. Since

(a) 'Mere true belief' implicitly contains the tautology BcP&P->P

and we have the epistemic axiom:

(b)KcP->P

from which it follows from the Plantinga/Merrick definion that

(c)KcP=BcP&P&w->P



So the Plantiga/Merrick 'definition' of knowledge contains the circularity. Moreover, since it follows from (c) that BcP&P&w

cannot be true if w is (law of conjunction) then it follows that the assumption that 'w is true' is implicit in the premise.

<>

Surely this is merely a piece of philosophical legerdemain in which my (c) is recast to omit a critical element of the

Plantinga/Merrick 'definition' of knowledge which omits the notion of 'mere true belief'( and hence is inconsistent with the P/M 'definition'. If one omits the legerdemain then [i] would surely be:


[ii] "S knows that p, therefore if and only if S's belief that p is true if P is true and p is warranted.

So Merrick's does not argue 'that warrant entails truth' he presupposes it. However, it is unclear when compared with:

[iii} "S knows that p, therefore if and only if S's belief that p is true if P is true"

what the introduction of warrant does, save that of /arbitrarily/ including it a part of a conjucion such warrant entails

truth else were it not the axiom KSp->p could not be stated.

<<...the link to Merricks' argument is not, since what you need to show is that W ->P is circular.>>

I disagree all I have to show is that the premise that is the Plantinga/Merrick 'definition' of knowledge implicitly contains

the conclusion 'knowledge entals truth' an, hence, that Merrick's argument is circular.

<>

The problem with the analogy is that the 'infinite solution set' contains a solution (for the constant 1) where y = 0 such that x=1 and thus it follows that analogically, where b is 'mere true belief' and w is 'warrant' and k is a constant that there is one solution where w is the null set such that b+w = b = k. So for your analogy to hold you would have to show that the set w cannot be the null set.

<>

This seems something of a red herring since as I pointed out my adoption of an instrumentalist stance preceded a any reading of Rorty with the exception of his introduction the 'Linguistic Turn' by around ten years. I came across the instumentalism in Popper's 'Conjectures and Refutations' though I thought, as with many of his supposed refutations that those against instrumentalism wre unpersuasive.

Your position seems somewhat inconsistent as (#61) you characterise me as occupying ' the radical pragmatist/Rorty end of the spectrum' but I now appear to be not 'much of a fan really'


bs

hi psi

Somewhat oddly some of the text of yours that I quote has been replace by <> though they were OK in the preview.. Another odd 'hootoo effect'.

I hope from the content of my replies the texttto which I am replying can be inferred. If not let me know and I will attempt a work-round and re-post.

bs

hi psi
mea culpa. The problem arose because I reversed he orer of te double 'greater than' 'lesser than' symbols surrounding your text. Te consequence being that the hootoo preprocessor trats these as indicang the text within them should be treated as a smiley.

Ihave taken the opportunity to correct a few typos and solecisms


//I don't see what this has to do with Merrick's argument.//

It shows his argument is redundant and circular because the conclusion 'Knowledge entails truth' is implicit in the axiomatic definition of knowledge:

'if c knows that P is true then P is true': KcP->P

//All you seem to have done is make your own circle. If you start with 'true belief' as a premise and derive 'truth' then of course that's circular.'//

I disagree: the circularity is implicit in the Plantinga/Merrick 'definition' of warrant(w) the supposed distinction between 'knowledge' and 'mere true belief'. Since

(a) 'Mere true belief' implicitly contains the tautology BcP&P->P

and we have the epistemic axiom:

(b)KcP->P

from which it follows from the Plantinga/Merrick definion that

(c)KcP=BcP&P&w->P



So the Plantiga/Merrick 'definition' of knowledge contains the circularity. Moreover, since it follows from (c) that BcP&P&w cannot be true if w is false (law of conjunction) then it follows that the assumption that 'w is true' is implicit in the premise.

//Merricks' argument starts with this characterization of warrant:

"S knows that p, therefore, if and only if S’s belief that p is warranted and p is true."[i]

Merricks argues that warrant entails truth...//

Surely this is merely a piece of philosophical legerdemain in which my (c) is recast to omit a critical element of the Plantinga/Merrick 'definition' of knowledge since the /qualified/ notion of 'true belief'is replaced by the unqualified notion of 'belief. If one omits the legerdemain then [i] would surely be:


[ii] "S knows that p, therefore if and only if S's belief that p is true and if P is true and p is warranted.

So Merrick's does not argue 'that warrant entails truth' he presupposes it. However, it is unclear when compared with:

[iii} "S knows that p, therefore if and only if S's belief that p is true if P is true"

what the introduction of warrant does, save that of /arbitrarily/ including it as part of a conjunction such warrant entails truth else if it did not the axiom KSp->p could not be stated.

//...the link to Merricks' argument is not, since what you need to show is that W ->P is circular.//>>

I disagree all I have to show is that the premise that is the Plantinga/Merrick 'definition' of knowledge implicitly contains the conclusion 'knowledge entals truth' and, hence, that Merrick's argument is circular.

//x + y = 1 where x, y are real numbers then we have a restriction or stipulation for x and y but an infinite solution set for each and no precise value. So I don't think the analogy is false if interpreted correctly. //

The problem with the analogy is that the 'infinite solution set' contains a solution (for the constant 1) where y = 0 such that x=1 and thus it follows that, analogically, where b is 'mere true belief' and w is 'warrant' and k is a constant that there is one solution where w is the null set such that b+w = b = k. So for your analogy to hold you would have to show that the set of values of w cannot have the null set as a subset.

//The tricky aspect is that it is difficult to see how you are much of a fan really. What is Rortian that you accept?//

This seems something of a red herring since as I pointed out my adoption of an instrumentalist stance preceded any reading of Rorty with the exception of his introduction the 'Linguistic Turn' by around ten years. I came across the instrumentalism in Popper's 'Conjectures and Refutations' though I thought, as with many of his supposed refutations, that those against instrumentalism were unpersuasive.


Your position seems somewhat inconsistent as (#61) you characterise me as occupying 'the radical pragmatist/Rorty end of the spectrum' but I now appear to be not 'much of a fan really'


bs

Hi Bx4,

Will reply soon.

ttfn

Hi Bx4,

>>It shows his argument is redundant and circular because the conclusion 'Knowledge entails truth' is implicit in the axiomatic definition of knowledge:

'if c knows that P is true then P is true': KcP->P<<
But Merricks' conclusion isn't 'Knowledge entails truth' it is 'Warrant entails truth'. Hence my saying that I don't know what your self-made circle has to do with his argument.

>>I disagree: the circularity is implicit in the Plantinga/Merrick 'definition' of warrant(w) the supposed distinction between 'knowledge' and 'mere true belief'. Since

(a) 'Mere true belief' implicitly contains the tautology BcP&P->P

and we have the epistemic axiom:

(b)KcP->P

from which it follows from the Plantinga/Merrick definion that

(c)KcP=BcP&P&w->P



So the Plantiga/Merrick 'definition' of knowledge contains the circularity. Moreover, since it follows from (c) that BcP&P&w cannot be true if w is false (law of conjunction) then it follows that the assumption that 'w is true' is implicit in the premise.<<
The circularity you mention is not relevant to the actual argument. BcP&P->P is not how his argument goes even if one can derive it from the definitions used. Moreover, even though the Law of Conjunction means that BcP&P&w cannot be true if w is false, you have yet to show from this that w->P.

>>Surely this is merely a piece of philosophical legerdemain in which my (c) is recast to omit a critical element of the Plantinga/Merrick 'definition' of knowledge since the /qualified/ notion of 'true belief'is replaced by the unqualified notion of 'belief. If one omits the legerdemain then [i] would surely be:

[ii] "S knows that p, therefore if and only if S's belief that p is true and if P is true and p is warranted.<<
No. 'True belief' is shorthand for BcP&P. Your [ii] contains a clause 'S's belief that p is true' which is problematic. It either reduces via Ramsey's Ladder to BsP or it is a kind of meta statement that it is true that S believes P, which makes no sense in this context.

>>So Merrick's does not argue 'that warrant entails truth' he presupposes it.<<
You have not shown this.

>>what the introduction of warrant does, save that of /arbitrarily/ including it as part of a conjunction such warrant entails truth else if it did not the axiom KSp->p could not be stated.<<
I'm not sure what this means. Surely, we agree KsP->P<->BsP&P&w->P but this is circular only because the substitution BsP&P for KsP relies on axiom KSp->p? I do not see how it follows that w->P so perhaps you could clarify. Warrant entails truth is not the same as BsP&P&w->P.

>>I disagree all I have to show is that the premise that is the Plantinga/Merrick 'definition' of knowledge implicitly contains the conclusion 'knowledge entals truth' and, hence, that Merrick's argument is circular.<<
No, your 'hence' and the assertion of circularity only has validity if you can show that (KcP->P)->(w->P).

That's the logic part. I'll deal with the analogy part anon.

ttfn.

Hi Bx4,

>>The problem with the analogy is that the 'infinite solution set' contains a solution (for the constant 1) where y = 0 such that x=1 and thus it follows that, analogically, where b is 'mere true belief' and w is 'warrant' and k is a constant that there is one solution where w is the null set such that b+w = b = k. So for your analogy to hold you would have to show that the set of values of w cannot have the null set as a subset. <<
I don't think the analogy is like that. All that is needed for the analogy to work is that the solution set depends in some way on the other elements. Besides, w being the null set isn't the correct level of description. Rather, the solution set for w might contain a null element meaning that w does not exist. I don't see a problem there.

>>This seems something of a red herring since as I pointed out my adoption of an instrumentalist stance preceded any reading of Rorty with the exception of his introduction the 'Linguistic Turn' by around ten years. I came across the instrumentalism in Popper's 'Conjectures and Refutations' though I thought, as with many of his supposed refutations, that those against instrumentalism were unpersuasive. <<
It was possible from my perspective that you independently came to a Rortian position. This would ot make yours a Bx4ian position though.

>>Your position seems somewhat inconsistent as (#61) you characterise me as occupying 'the radical pragmatist/Rorty end of the spectrum' but I now appear to be not 'much of a fan really' <<
You often accuse me of inconsistency when all that has happened is that I've changed my mind in response to evidence or argument. In this case my position was based on previous dialogues, but in this dialogue you said those positions I had thought you'd got from Rorty were not in fact due to your reading of him. So given I'd thought you were a Rorty fan, but the obvious Rorty things weren't due to him, I asked what of Rorty you do accept, since the obvious candidates like radical pragmatism or his version of instrumentalism were not on the list.

ttfn

hi psi

busy at work and dragooned into redecorating when not. Will reply at weekend

bs

Hi Bx4,

I look forward to it.

ttfn

hi psi

Sorry I miswrote.


Leaving aside the additional complexity the tautological nature of 'mere (?) true belief (T), for the moment, the petitio principii implicit in the Plantinga/Merricks premise see fairly obvious to me. Given the epistemic axion:

(i) Knowledge entails truth : KcP>P

and the Plantinga/Merricks definition of warrant (T):

(ii) K==T&W (where == ( stands for 'is equivalent to')

whence:

(iii) KcP == T&WcP

hence

(iv)T&WcP->P

is axiomatically true because (1) is axiomatically true. Since by the laws of logic, if the conjunction T&W is true then each of the individual propositions T and W are necessarily true. Hence:

(v) W(P)->P (P is warranted entails that P is true)

So Merricks conclusion 'Warrant entails truth' is part of premise (ii).

>> I do not see how it follows that w->P so perhaps you could clarify. Warrant entails truth >>

See above.

>>No, your 'hence' and the assertion of circularity only has validity if you can show that (KcP->P)->(w->P). >>

See above - though I have preferred the notation (KcP->P)->(W(P)->P) as more consistent with:

S knows that p, therefore, if and only if S’s belief that p is warranted and p is true'

>>I don't think the analogy is like that. All that is needed for the analogy to work is that the solution set depends in some
way on the other elements.<<

I am rather unclear what you mean here - perhaps you would reduce the level of abstraction by giving a //concrete// example
of how such a mathematical analogue maps to a target involving truth, true belief, warrant and knowledge.

>> Besides, w being the null set isn't the correct level of description. Rather, the solution set for w might contain a null element meaning that w does not exist. I don't see a problem there.<<

Afaik, the notion of a 'null element' does not appear in set theory. However:

'The empty [null] set is not the same thing as nothing; it is a set with nothing inside it, and a set is something. This often causes difficulty among those who first encounter it. It may be helpful to think of a set as a package containing its elements; an empty package may be empty, but the package itself certainly exists.'

http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?NullSet

Merricks makes states his argument is independent of any specific definition of warrant which would seem to presuppose a set
W, {definitions of warrant}, so given that:

'The following are some mathematical truths about the empty set (denoted here as {}):

The empty set is NOT 0.

For any set A, the empty set is a subset of A;'

(ibid)

So it would seem to follow that the null set is that subset of W that does not contain a definition of 'warrant' which was
how I was using it.

>>It was possible from my perspective that you independently came to a Rortian position. This would ot make yours a Bx4ian
position though. <<

Only if I or Rorty authored the definition I gave earlier of the instrumentalist stance in the philosophy of science.

>>You often accuse me of inconsistency when all that has happened is that I've changed my mind in response to evidence or
argument. In this case my position was based on previous dialogues, but in this dialogue you said those positions I had thought you'd got from Rorty were not in fact due to your reading of him.<<

I am unclear how my adoption of a instrumentalist view of scientific theories (on which as far as I a aware Rorty never expressed an opinion) would lead you to revise what you consider to be my views on Rorty.

>>So given I'd thought you were a Rorty fan, but the obvious Rorty things weren't due to him, I asked what of Rorty you do
accept, since the obvious candidates like radical pragmatism or his version of instrumentalism were not on the list.<<

As far as I'm aware Rorty did not have a 'version of instrumentalism' that related to the interpretation of scientific theories (nor perhaps anything else). Perhaps you would cite some comments by him that explicates it.

Of relevance to this discussion candidates would be his commitment to linguistic priority and his anti-representationalism.

Btw, I am unfamiliar with the notion of 'radical pragmatism' and how it differs from the non radical variety so an explanation would be appreciated.
bs