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Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Psiomniac Posted Sep 3, 2015
Hi Bx4,
>>That is because I don't see the complication you claim. In 'Facts and Propositions'(p.4) Ramsey makes that there is a distinction between the restricted English of his redundancy theory and that of 'ordinary' English when he says:
'... the propositional function p is true is simply the same as p, as e.g. its value 'Caesar was murdered is true' is the same as 'Caesar was murdered...We have in English to add 'is true' to give the sentence a verb, forgetting that ' p ' already contains a (variable) verb.'. <<
I agree Ramsey is clear, but his examples are simple and so no ambiguity arises. With 'S's belief that p is warranted is true' the reader might wonder whether we are talking about 'true belief', especially given the domain of discourse has the concept JTB*. You and I understand that the 'is true' applies to the whole clause, but beware the 'curse of knowledge'!**
>>So it is by no means clear to me why a professional philosopher like Merricks would feel the need to add 'is true' merely to give p an unnecessary verb. So it seems plausible that he might have a reason other than merely stylistic ones.<<
For readability! I see no reason why Merricks would not make his formulation clear to a general reader given the meaning is not compromised. Your alternative explanation, that he has another reason, might carry more weight if you could articulate a reason that makes sense semantically. However, you haven't yet responded to my criticism of the semantics, or my illustrative example of the square definition.
>>Well not quite since you have dropped 'is true' from the occurrence of p in the first two propositions so for absolute clarity surely iii) should be :
iv) It is true that S knows that p is true, therefore, if and only if it is true that S's belief that p is true is warranted and p is true'.
The 'redundant affirmations' in iii) and iv) seem to serve the purpose removing any ambiguity as to the truth values of //all// three propositions.<<
Good point, yes. I had put in 'is true' modifiers at the top level of the biconditional form r <-> q.p giving r is true <-> (q is true).(p is true) but since r and q also have an embedded variable, then on the nested level, for consistency, your formulation 1v) is correct.
This seems to make my point further though, for readability it makes sense to remove all the redundant modifiers, apart from the one that remains, as we can see that to remove it from 'p is true' /compromises/ readability.
* Justified true belief.
** Whereby it is difficult for those who know something to imagine what it is like not to know it.
ttfn
Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Bx4 Posted Sep 12, 2015
Hi psi
>>You and I understand that the 'is true' applies to the whole clause, but beware the 'curse of knowledge'!<<
Surely, given that Merricks is writing for an audience of 'professional' philosophers in a specialised academic journal, 'Philosophy and Phenomenological Research' then why would that audience be less understanding than either of us?
>>For readability! I see no reason why Merricks would not make his formulation clear to a general reader given the meaning is not compromised.<<
Again I question whether a journal, produced by the International Phenomenological Society, with a circulation of 1800, and whose articles are described as ' The articles it publishes are highly technical and analytical rather than expository' is intended for the 'general reader'.
http://sophia.smith.edu/~jmoulton/guidebook/jend.htm#A16
>>Your alternative explanation, that he has another reason, might carry more weight if you could articulate a reason that makes sense semantically. However, you haven't yet responded to my criticism of the semantics, or my illustrative example of the square definition.<<
Given that you seem wedded to Ramseyan redundancy theory. as articulated by Blackburn, any alternative explanation pass you by since you cannot accept any view that accepts that any arbitrary proposition (or propositional variable) in standard propositional calculus can be either true or false. In this non-Ramseyan view of Merricks to say p does not preclude p from being false which would create problems for his definition.
As to your 'illustrative example' on the definition of a square you say:
' we can see that it makes no sense to hold as invariantly true the condition that the internal angles are right angles. That would be to ignore the existance of the rhombus!'
A rhombus is 'A Rhombus is a flat shape with 4 equal straight sides. Opposite sides are parallel, and opposite (internal) angles are equal'. So all squares are rhombi but not
all rhombi are squares since it is the property of having four internal right angles that discriminate between squares and other rhombi. Consequently it is invariant truth of
this property the makes the definition of a square distinct from the definition of a rhombus.
I am also puzzled as to how you reconcile your adherence to Ramseyan redundancy theory with your statement above since surely that given the theory's claim that to say the
statement
(a) "'All its (four) internal angles are right angles' is true"
is equivalent to the statement
(b)'All its (four) internal angles are right angles'
However, declaring the phrase 'is true' redundant does change the truth value of either proposistion which remains necessarily true, for as Ramsey ('Facts and Propositions'
p.4) says:
' 'It is true that Csesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Csesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered.'
Therefore, the truth of ''All its (four) internal angles are right angles' is invariant so the existence of non-square rhombi are irrelevant.
>>This seems to make my point further though, for readability it makes sense to remove all the redundant modifiers, apart from the one that remains, as we can see that to remove it from 'p is true' /compromises/ readability.<<
I'm still not persaded by your point that if one accepts, arguendo, Ramseyan redundancy theory, then surely 'p is true' is alao redundant and afaik neither Ramsey or Blackburn makes this argument.
I think you have made a fundamental error in adopting Ramseyan redundancy theory to argue( #231):
' here I disagree. It seems clear to me that Merricks has added the 'is true' for readability, but Ramsay's Ladder applies and thus the correct formulation in the manner of the above proposition is:
KSp<=BSpW.p
So I'm afraid the next sections of your post, excluding row 4 of the truth table as they do, rest on the error of assigning T to the propositional variable p, making it invariant for the definition. p would thus be a constant, which makes no sense.'
Since to reiterate what Ramsey says in 'Facts and Propositions':
"'It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered."
then Ramseyan redundancy theory then non-redundant forms of:
(i) 'It is true that (S knows that p}'
and
(ii) 'It is true that (S’s belief that p is warranted and p is true)'
are:
(ia)'S knows that p'
and
(iia) S’s belief that p is warranted and p is true)
So the two sides e definition are necessarily true.
Whereas if the non-redundant forms of:
(iii) 'It is false (that S knows that p}'
and
(iv) 'It is false that (S’s belief that p is warranted and p is true)'
are:
(iiia) 'S does not know that p'
and
(iva) 'Not (S belief that p is not warranted and p is true)'
So the two sides of the definition are necessarily false.
Now the non-redundant forms (ia) and (iia), with truth values of true appear in Merricks definition whereas the non-redundant (iiia) and (iva), with truth values of false do not. Hence Ramsey's redundancy theory would seem to support rather than contradict my argument that row 4 of the truth table need not be considered.
>>Whereby it is difficult for those who know something to imagine what it is like not to know it.<<
How does one know that one knows something?
bs
Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Psiomniac Posted Nov 15, 2015
Hi Bx4,
Sorry for the delay in replying, I have been very time poor of late.
I hope to be able to reply soon.
ttfn
Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Bx4 Posted Jan 19, 2016
hi psi
No problem. h2g2 had some sort o system wide implosion and I have been unable to logon since November. after much toing and froing he 'gurus' finally re-established my access so I am online again
bs
Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Psiomniac Posted Jan 24, 2016
Hi Bx4,
Welcome back! I'll see whether I can write a reply soon.
ttfn
Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Psiomniac Posted Feb 14, 2016
Hi Bx4,
>>Surely, given that Merricks is writing for an audience of 'professional' philosophers in a specialised academic journal, 'Philosophy and Phenomenological Research' then why would that audience be less understanding than either of us? <<
Fair point, but on the other hand we disagree on the interpretation.
>>Again I question whether a journal, produced by the International Phenomenological Society, with a circulation of 1800, and whose articles are described as ' The articles it publishes are highly technical and analytical rather than expository' is intended for the 'general reader'. <<
You are right, of course. However, I still think it likely that he was writing for readability in this case. Just because the audience is erudite doesn't mean they deserve sentences that are harder to read than they need be.
>>Given that you seem wedded to Ramseyan redundancy theory. as articulated by Blackburn, any alternative explanation pass you by since you cannot accept any view that accepts that any arbitrary proposition (or propositional variable) in standard propositional calculus can be either true or false. In this non-Ramseyan view of Merricks to say p does not preclude p from being false which would create problems for his definition. <<
Ramseyan redudancy theory does not preclude any propositional variable from being either true or false. But you have again confused asserting p (which is to say that p is true) with p /being/ true...which it needn't be. However, in the definition, these variables can be false as I assigned them, without any trouble ensuing for the definition itself. I have already explained why at length. Meanwhile, you still have not supplied a semantically meaningful alternative explanation.
>>A rhombus is 'A Rhombus is a flat shape with 4 equal straight sides. Opposite sides are parallel, and opposite (internal) angles are equal'. So all squares are rhombi but not all rhombi are squares since it is the property of having four internal right angles that discriminate between squares and other rhombi. Consequently it is invariant truth of this property the makes the definition of a square distinct from the definition of a rhombus. <<
You are right that it is this property which demarcates squares as a subset of rhombi. However, you are quite wrong to assume that therefore the truth has to be invariant /in the definition/! That's not how definitions work. Why isn't the equal sides condition invariant as well? Or instead?
>>I am also puzzled as to how you reconcile your adherence to Ramseyan redundancy theory with your statement above since surely that given the theory's claim that to say the
statement
(a) "'All its (four) internal angles are right angles' is true"
is equivalent to the statement
(b)'All its (four) internal angles are right angles'
However, declaring the phrase 'is true' redundant does change the truth value of either proposistion which remains necessarily true, for as Ramsey ('Facts and Propositions'
p.4) says:
' 'It is true that Csesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Csesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered.'
Therefore, the truth of ''All its (four) internal angles are right angles' is invariant so the existence of non-square rhombi are irrelevant. <<
That's a non sequitur. The propositions in question are not necessarily true, the definition functions so as to allow the 'all its (four) internal angles are right angles' condition to be false. In this case, the proposition 'is a square' will be false. But the definition will still be true.
>>I'm still not persaded by your point that if one accepts, arguendo, Ramseyan redundancy theory, then surely 'p is true' is alao redundant and afaik neither Ramsey or Blackburn makes this argument. <<
My point is that yes, the 'is true' in Merricks' definition is redundant. (Blackburn /does/ make this argument). My claim is that it is there for clarity and readability.
>>
I think you have made a fundamental error in adopting Ramseyan redundancy theory to argue( #231):
' here I disagree. It seems clear to me that Merricks has added the 'is true' for readability, but Ramsay's Ladder applies and thus the correct formulation in the manner of the above proposition is:
KSp<=BSpW.p
So I'm afraid the next sections of your post, excluding row 4 of the truth table as they do, rest on the error of assigning T to the propositional variable p, making it invariant for the definition. p would thus be a constant, which makes no sense.'
Since to reiterate what Ramsey says in 'Facts and Propositions':
"'It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered."
then Ramseyan redundancy theory then non-redundant forms of:
(i) 'It is true that (S knows that p}'
and
(ii) 'It is true that (S’s belief that p is warranted and p is true)'
are:
(ia)'S knows that p'
and
(iia) S’s belief that p is warranted and p is true)
So the two sides e definition are necessarily true.
Whereas if the non-redundant forms of:
(iii) 'It is false (that S knows that p}'
and
(iv) 'It is false that (S’s belief that p is warranted and p is true)'
are:
(iiia) 'S does not know that p'
and
(iva) 'Not (S belief that p is not warranted and p is true)'
So the two sides of the definition are necessarily false.
Now the non-redundant forms (ia) and (iia), with truth values of true appear in Merricks definition whereas the non-redundant (iiia) and (iva), with truth values of false do not. Hence Ramsey's redundancy theory would seem to support rather than contradict my argument that row 4 of the truth table need not be considered. <<
Firstly, I think "(iia) S’s belief that p is warranted and p is true)" is not the non-redundant form, the correct form would be: (iia) S’s belief that p is warranted and p
In any case, the versions where each side are false are perfectly possible from the definition, if the variables are assigned truth values accordingly. We don't need a separate definition to /say so/!
Hence your counter here, fails.
>>How does one know that one knows something?<<
Quite, despite the relevant modal axiom, one often doesn't.
ttfn
Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Bx4 Posted Jun 7, 2016
hi psi
A brief post. Sorry for delayed reply my h2g2 access imploded again but the 'gurus' seem to have me sorted out now.
I want to spend a couple of days reading your last few posts before I reply as I have rather forgotten the thrust of our conversation.
bs
Bx4
Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Psiomniac Posted Aug 1, 2016
Hi Bx4,
Yes it's been a while!
ttfn
Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Psiomniac Posted Mar 18, 2017
Still very quiet in here...
Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Chris Morris Posted Mar 18, 2017
If you're looking for philosophical conversation you may be interested in the "Built to Last..." thread
Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Psiomniac Posted Mar 28, 2017
Hi Chris, Do you mean this thread? https://h2g2.com/entry/A87885409/conversation/view/F22150482/T8317603/page/last
Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Psiomniac Posted Mar 28, 2017
Ah no, I think this one: https://h2g2.com/entry/A87884680/conversation/view/F22150378/T8317487/page/last/#P0
Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Psiomniac Posted Mar 28, 2017
I've read some of that now, very interesting and I think your points are well made there. I think it is very difficult to know how to respond sometimes, especially when people are clearly intelligent but have actually just constructed a byzantine structure which at its heart is one big argument from adverse consequences. You do a very good job though.
Meanwhile, I don't know whether you've seen this, I have some issues with it (in the actual paper too) but you might find it interesting:
https://medicalxpress.com/news/2017-03-dialogue-boost-critical.html
Hamilton, S., & Hamilton, T. J. (2015). Pedagogical tools to explore Cartesian mind-body dualism in the classroom: philosophical arguments and neuroscience illusions. Frontiers in Psychology, 6.
Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
Chris Morris Posted Mar 28, 2017
Thanks, Psi, the article is exactly what I've been looking for. Glad you enjoyed the conversation. Serious debate is all too rare here now.
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Methodology and ontology..Beyond the 'end of days'
- 241: Psiomniac (Sep 3, 2015)
- 242: Bx4 (Sep 12, 2015)
- 243: Psiomniac (Nov 15, 2015)
- 244: Bx4 (Jan 19, 2016)
- 245: Psiomniac (Jan 24, 2016)
- 246: Psiomniac (Feb 14, 2016)
- 247: Bx4 (Jun 7, 2016)
- 248: Psiomniac (Aug 1, 2016)
- 249: Psiomniac (Mar 18, 2017)
- 250: Chris Morris (Mar 18, 2017)
- 251: Psiomniac (Mar 28, 2017)
- 252: Psiomniac (Mar 28, 2017)
- 253: Psiomniac (Mar 28, 2017)
- 254: Chris Morris (Mar 28, 2017)
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