Does Free Will exist? If so, where is it?
Created | Updated Jul 8, 2003
Perhaps the most important factor that underlies most of philosophy, religious doctrine and indeed everyday existence, is the belief that we, as human beings, possess freewill. That is, we possess the ability to make choices, live our lives the way we want to, and can be held responsible for the decisions we make. But is this true to the absolute? Do human beings really possess freewill? This article will focus upon the nature of freewill, and the possible existence of a deterministic self, exploring some philosophical/psychological critique, and also current scientific theory.
To begin, it is firstly necessary to analyse the constituents of the self. Since the earliest beginnings of psychology, one of the most important arguments was the nature/nurture debate. Are human beings a product of their environments, or are they a product of intricate biology? Upon the discovery and exploration of the human genome, the popular contemporary stance is that humans are influenced by both their biology and their environment. This sounds simple enough, but by how much of the self is influenced by these two variables?
If a person is a product of a certain percentage of biology (i.e. neuronal structure) and a certain percentage of the environment (upbringing), is there any room for actual freewill? This is to say that, if a person is a product of these two variables, then is that all they are? Where does freewill fit in? If a person is a 'slave' to their biology, or perhaps was raised in a certain environment, can they be held responsible for the actions they undertake? Can they really be held responsible for their actions when they are just automatons enslaved to their particular 'ratio percentage' of the amalgamation of the two essential variables?
Most people would argue that human beings possess freewill, and that this is what sets us apart from the animal world. But where is this freewill? For example, if a person 'chooses' to eat a cheese sandwich today instead of a tuna sandwich, is this a demonstration of freewill, or is it a demonstration of an innate or environmental course of events? Does this persons biology or upbringing actually determine which sandwich they will choose to eat?
It could be argued that a persons freewill is not determined by their biology or environmental upbringing. But how can this be so? It may be argued that the person chose to eat that particular sandwich because they have a preference for cheese. But where does this preference originate? Unless some 'mysterious' third variable is introduced to the equation, this 'preference' for a cheese sandwich must originate from either the way the person was raised, or by their genetic make-up, or (more likely) a collaboration of the two variables.
Within this model, there is no room for freewill, or rather responsibility. If a person is a collaboration of events and biology, then it seems logically unfair to punish someone for anything they do. If the idea of freewill is negated due to the existence of environmental and biological determinism, then no human can be held morally responsible for any action. Indeed, most human beings have this concept of 'freedom', the supposed ability to choose a course of action, or make certain decisions. A person may argue that they choose to wear the clothes they wear. But is this true? Is it more likely that they have been socially conditioned to wear those types of clothes? Or perhaps they were born with an innate fondness of those particular colours? Is this person actually choosing what to wear, or simply demonstrating an environmental/biological algorithm? Does this person have any real choice, or is he/she simply obeying the deterministic nature of his/her biological/environmental upbringing?
For a person to 'just decide' on an action, suggests that somehow, the person has made a choice based on no prior event. This suggests that somehow the person has initiated an 'effect' so-to-speak, without a 'cause'; they have somehow made a decision based on absolutely nothing, or rather, not based on their genetic neural structure or environmental upbringing.
This idea of 'effect without a cause' rallies against every scientific principle known (perhaps with the exception of quantum physics, to be discussed later). The notion that somehow, a human being can make a 'freewill decision', not influenced by any other factor, is an effect without a cause. But is it possible to have an effect without a cause?
This is a fundamental question. If one were to suggest that (as regular physics implies) there cannot be an effect without cause, then the classic definition of freewill simply crumbles. This is because in order for freewill to exist, humans would have to make decisions based on nothing; or rather they would have to make a decision that is not in anyway dependent on previous experience, as this influences the decision. So, if one were to take the scientific approach, one could say that freewill does not exist, because every decision (effect) would have to be based upon other factors (cause; nature/nurture). But what about human ability to analyse?
One could argue, perhaps, that human beings have the unique ability to analyse events, and internalise an event process, without having to actually execute this process physically. This benefit of being able to execute scenarios in the mind without having to engage in the scenario in the physical sense could be used as an argument for freewill. Because humans can 'foresee' what a certain course of action would entail, this aids in decision making. But couldn't it also be argued that the interpretation and decision obtained from these internalised events would also be interpreted through the nature/nurture 'filter', as it were?
An argument that occasionally arises from stressing such points of environmental and innate determinism, is the case of monozygotic twins. An informed person may argue that monozygotic twins are genetically identical and are raised in the same environment, yet can be hugely diverse from one another, which refutes the idea of determinism. Or does it? It is here that the principles of chaos theory need to be introduced.
Chaos theory deals with what are know as Complex Systems. These systems are extremely varied, but share many common factors. One thing that these systems all have in common is that they all exhibit a huge amount of complexity, which at times gives rise to apparent random activity. Perhaps the most important shared facet of Chaotic Systems is what is known as 'sensitive dependence upon initial conditions'. In a classical Newtonian approach to physics, a small error in the initial measurement of a certain object, or movement, will result in a small error in the obtained results. That is to say that the initial degree of error has not changed considerably along the course of measurement. An example of this is perhaps the Newtonian physics of a ball bouncing. If one measured the bounce of the ball, but had an inaccuracy of 2mm in the measurement obtained at the beginning of the experiment, the final results would still be accurate within this 2mm degree of error. Alternatively, in Chaotic Systems such as the weather, economics, ripples in water etc. any infinitesimally small discrepancy in the initial condition results in a huge difference later on. The classic example of this is that it is theorised that in a certain sequence of chaotic events, it is possible that a butterfly flapping its wings in one country can inadvertently cause a hurricane in another country on the other side of the planet. This is because of the 'sensitive dependence on initial conditions'.
So to apply chaos theory to the monozygotic twins mentioned above, any infinitesimally small event that happens differently to one twin than the other can result in a huge difference later on. For example, if one day the twins are in the park with their father, and one of the twins gets stung by a bee, this slight event could cause massive repercussions. It is possible that one twin could develop a phobia for wasps, or insects in general. It is also possible that the 'un-stung twin' perhaps develops a phobia later due to the observation of the other twins pain. The outcome of such a simple event can alter the course of events thereafter massively. So the analogy of the twins to demonstrate freewill as such is flawed. Indeed, the introduction of Chaotic Systems into the notion of the self perhaps explains the diversity of humans; how they are all in someway different to each other.
So it would seem that in order for freewill to exist, a third variable is needed that transcends the other two variables. A variable is needed that can somehow interject between the cause and effect relationships mentioned above. But do humans possess this 'mystery' third variable?
Perhaps it could be suggested that consciousness is the third variable. Human beings are the only living entities (as far as it is known) that demonstrate a 'concept of self', a notion of 'I'. Many philosophers have seized upon the concept of 'I' in order to refute determinism.
Sartre was a renowned existentialist who believed that every 'enlightened' human being was free. He believed that our own perception is 'concrete' and cannot be deterministic. He suggests that this is the case due to the self being 'created in the world'. But what does this mean? Is Sartre suggesting that the personality is formed from worldly concepts? Indeed he argued that our own interpretation is what matters to the 'I', and that this interpretation is based on language and upon conceptualisation. But surely, if language is also a social tool so-to-speak, isn't this likely to alter a persons perceptions of events? And if it does, does it mean the person is no longer 'free'? Sartre decried the idea of the determined self in the Calvinistic sense, but conceded the point that perhaps there is a form of 'weak' determinism. But is there such a thing as weak determinism? This will be discussed later.
Nietzsche believed in a form of determinism, so-to-speak, that was culturally bound. He believed that the self is moderated by society and religious morals etc. but he also suggested that this form of determinism (though he didn't use the term determinism) is transcendable. He believed that the 'enlightened self' or the 'Uber-Mensche' could overcome the confines of societal determinism and be free. He did concede however that most humans could not do this, as the concept of true freedom frightens most people (so he believed). Nietzsche also had a complete disregard for most scientific principle. He was hugely sceptical of any scientific theory, holding the Nihilistic opinion that all theories should be demolished, questioned, and at best deemed inadequate.
However, on the other side of the scale, are Freud and Foucault. Both Freud and Foucault were determinists. Freud believed that the personality is determined by sub-conscious sexual desires. He believed that every human being is determined by how they negotiate different psychosexual stages of development, and the result of this 'negotiating' forms the personality.
Foucault believed that there is no such thing as the self or rather there is no self except 'through reference'. By this, Foucault is suggesting that humans are determined by everything that is present in society, from history to politics; and that this is what human beings are, simple accumulations of reference points.
Perhaps another argument that can be introduced here is Karl Popper's refute of scientific inductionism. Popper believed that any amount of finite observations can not logically be generalised to every condition that hasn't been observed, that is to say that just because the Sun rose today, and has every other day since records began, it does not logically follow that the sun has to rise tomorrow. This is because a finite number of observations cannot possibly account for every possible observation over an infinite amount of observations. This argument is presented as, just because every other scientific principle (except quantum physics) relies on cause and effect relationships, perhaps the mind doesn't.
So, if consciousness is this 'third variable', is there any evidence of cause without effect, or an interjection between the two variables? Perhaps there is.
One uniquely human facet is that of creation. It is possible for any human to create something that has never been on the planet before, something that has never even been conceptualised before; whether it be an invention, a word, or even a piece of art, humans have the ability to create. However, the sceptic might suggest that humans don't actually ever invent something, they just improve something. Or perhaps they just have the intelligence to invent tools for a certain purpose, and perhaps art and language fall under this purpose too. Certainly, in an evolutionary perspective, it is likely that language developed in order so we could 'hunt' in packs more efficiently; so we could co-ordinate the other pack members in order to obtain food. So although we have language, and it seems we can create, is this cause without effect?
The answer is probably not. It seems that most creation occurs in a linear manner. For instance, there is no conceivable way that a human, just 150 years ago, could build a space station. This is because a certain amount of linear progress is needed first. First the aluminium for the craft needs to be mined, then jet engines created out of other known technology etc. It seems that creation is actually based on some prior knowledge, and therefore a cause. Perhaps it could even be suggested that human creation in itself is also evolutionary.
So again we come to the problem of needing an example of effect without cause in order to prove the existence of freewill. In all the arguments above, there has been no solid evidence that an effect can occur without a cause; the very notion rallies against every physics law known (again, except quantum physics).
The classical approach to negotiate this obstacle of course, is that of religion or the soul. This approach uses the presence of the 'soul' or 'God-given freewill' to overcome the problem of effect with no cause. With this classic approach, the problem is solved by having freewill 'given' to us by an omniscient being and therefore, our freewill doesn't have to adhere to scientific concepts. However, to the more sceptical of us, or perhaps the atheist, this approach seems 'woolly'.
However, the classic argument does highlight the problem of the need for the third variable, and that this variable needs to be 'special'. Special in this sense means that it must be an almost 'magical' variable, as it needs to interject between cause and effect, a concept that is unknown in popular science.
There are, however, theories within physics that seem to allow for the possibility of effect without cause. In quantum physics, it is suggested that elementary particles, such as electrons, possess a property known as 'wave-particle duality'. The electron is commonly considered a particle but it displays many of the properties of a wave. One of its wave-like behaviours is that it appears to 'spread' from its source much as a sound/light wave would. This is known as the particles 'wave-function'. The wave-function is described as encompassing all of the sets of possible behaviours of the individual particle. In a process termed 'wave-function collapse', it is theorised that these sets of behaviours are reduced to a single set of actual behaviours upon observation. This is a heavily contested area of science, but it seems to suggest that human observation actually alters the behaviour of matter, at a sub-atomic level. This theory is presented as it suggests a possible effect without cause; prior to observation the particle can be in one of many positions, but at the point of observation, the particle arbitrarily collapses to a single position.
So, it would appear that in some contested areas of science, perhaps there are effects without causes. If this discovery is taken one step further, it could then be suggested that if humans can alter the behaviour of sub-atomic particles through 'wave-function collapse', is it possible that they can interject between cause and effect in their own minds, using consciousness? If this were to be the case, the idea of personality determinism is refuted.
So what is the self? A conclusion.
To summarise the above theory, it has been demonstrated that the existence of freewill essentially needs a third variable. This variable must either be God-given (such as the soul), or it must be a variable that can interject between cause and effect relationships. This variable needs to interject; otherwise it can be argued that the self a deterministic entity governed by neuronal structures and environment. If this is the case, then it seems logically unfair to punish humans for their activities (if they are socially unacceptable), but does it?
If society does punish people for anti-social behaviour, then this has the effect of altering the society in which we live, which again determines us to be different people.
Another point is 'does determinism stop us from having a self'? The answer to this would have to be 'no'. Because every normal human being possesses consciousness, this is where the self resides. It may be likely that we are products of a deterministic system, but does this actually matter? The answer is again 'no'. At first, the idea that determinism is the worst possible thing is understandable, but that is when one looks at determinism in a classical Calvinistic way, i.e. everything is already written. But, as mentioned in the theory section, humans live in a Chaotic System. This means that every single event has massive repercussions (Nietzsche also agreed with this), so the future is not already 'written' so to speak, or in anyway 'determinable', but is essentially deterministic.
Also, it could be argued that although humans cannot influence themselves, they can influence others. This is because the human takes on the 'environmental'influence, and alters the other individual. It could be argued that this is in itself is a sense of freewill.
So freewill, in a classical definition cannot exist unless some third 'magical' variable that interjects between cause and effect is introduced, or the cause and effect relationship is not essential. Maybe the presence of consciousness in itself is this third variable, as Nietzsche and Sartre suggested, or maybe cause and effect are not unbreakably linked as quantum theory is suggesting. If either of these instances are true, then freewill, or the ability to make decisions that are independent of any other variable could be possible.
But is freewill essential for the existence of the self? Human beings have at worst the illusion that they possess free will, so even at this level, whether or not we do actually possess freewill is arbitrary.
So to conclude, it is possible to have freewill as long as the cause and effect relationship is broken. It is essential that this is broken, otherwise humans are purely an amalgamation of the two variables: biology and environment. Whether or not this is possible, and whether or not consciousness can perform this task, is debateable. However, whether or not human behaviour is deterministic doesn’t essentially matter. This is because it is a chaotic system that can never be determinable, because of its incomprehensible complexity, and therefore, it is almost the same as having freewill.
But where does this leave psychology?
The idea that if freewill doesn't exist, then psychology has no purpose seems ridiculous. As suggested earlier, if the 'self' is determined, then surely, these determining forces must have some underlying pattern (such as 'Strange Attractors' in chaos theory). So perhaps the validity of psychology is enhanced if determinism is logically true, as it leaves the psychologist the task to find these underlying 'mathematical' patterns in human behaviour.
So the self in this writer's opinion is not about being determined or deterministic, but the fact that it doesn't essentially matter; as Sartre suggested, we still have our own unique consciousness, which is ever present, and we are in all intent and purpose 'free'. The effect that this 'weak' determinism has over the idea of the self is arbitrary, because we still possess the illusion of free will, and chaos theory almost promotes this idea. Sartre was right in suggesting that although there perhaps is 'cosmic determinism', the actual global effect of this on the psyche is rudimentary, and changes absolutely nothing in our internal perspective.
Bibliography
Strawson, P. F. (1973) Freedom and Resentment and other articles. Methuen, (pp 1-125).
Sartre, J.P. (1963) Being and non-being-an article on phenomenalogical ontology. Global Press, London.
Fillingham, L. A. (1993) Foucault for Beginners. Airlift Publishers, London.
Schacht, R. (1983) Nietzsche. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Rabinow, P. (1984) The Foucault Reader. Penguin, London.
