Arnhem
Created | Updated Jan 28, 2002
General Montgomery, in August 1944, proposed an Allied Offensive, not quite seen before in World War 2. The Objective, to sieze the Ruhr, the heartland of Germany industrial power, depriving Germany of more than half her industry. To do this, Montgomery would organise a powerful thrust through Holland and over the Rhine. However this plan would require many divisons and virtually all of the Logistic support available to the allies in Europe. Not surprisingly, General Eisenhower (Allied Commander Europe) turned Montgomery down.
However Eisenhower did agree to a modified plan, one which would rely on 21st Army Group thrusting to and beyond the Rhine, supported largely by its own resources. Montgomery had many problems though in his plan to cross the Rhine. 3 of these were rivers, the River Mass, the Maas-Waal Canal and the Rhine itself. 3 Bridges, at Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem had to be seized and held for this plan to work.
Also there was only one, narrow road on the route, which would prove nightmarish when it came to logistics. The 3 Bridges would have to be held and held intact for at least 48 hours if the armoured thrust wasnt to be bogged down, and the Germans reinforced.
The task of holding the three bridges fell on the shoulders of 1st Airborne Corps, consisting of the American 82nd (All American) and 101st (Screaming Eagles) and the British 1st Airborne Divisons. Dropping simultaneously, the Americans would open a corridor from Eindhoven to Nijmegen (82nd and 101st respectively) the the Britsh 1st would seize Arnhem.
Airborne operations, still to this day, are one of the most dangerous missons to the armed forces. They rely on surprise to seize their objectives. Being lightly armed, they must have completed their objectives and have been reinforced before the enemy can bring superior forces and firepower to bear.
The Seeds of Failure;
3 things were to hamper the 1st Airborne Divison efforts to sieze Arnhem.
1: There was insufficent airlift, to drop the entire divison on day. Therefore on the first day of the operation, only the 1st Parachute Brigade, 1st Air-Landing Brigade and the Divisonal HQ could be dropped. The 4th Parachute Brigade and the 1st Polish Brigade would be dropped on the second and third day of the operation respectively. Therefore only half the divison would gain the element of surprise and even then, the majority of 1st Air Landing Brigade was tasked with protecting the drop zones for the subsequent drops.
2: The terrain south of Arnhem bridge, were waterlogged. Not to mention the eight foot ditches which spanned them. This made glider landings and Para drops dangerous. Major General Urquhart selected the drop zones to be in the west, a further eight miles away from the Brigde.
3: Thirdly and most damning of all, was that Military intelligence was misleading. It was not known to the 1st Airborne Divison that the 9th and 10th Panzer (Armoured) Divisons were stationed to the east of Arnhem. This infomation did actually reach Allied Inteligence via the Dutch resistance, but for reasons unknown, was discounted.
The First Day;
The first day, there was little falk and the vast majority of Parachute and glider troops reach thier Drop Zones. However of the 38 Gliders which didnt arrive, were the armoured Jeeps of the Reconnaissance Squadron. Not only this, but the weather worsened and delayed future troop and supply drops and stop air support.
However, providing that the 2nd Army could keep on scheudle, Operation MArket Garden could still succeed.
Setting off on foot, 1st Brigade closed on the brigde. 2 PARA (2nd Parachute Battalion) under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost, moved to Heelsum. 3 PARA moved on the Heelsum-Arnhem road to approach the Bridge from the north.
In Heelsum, 2 PARA ambushed some German vehicles and took 20 germans prisoners. They arrived too late to stop the destruction of the Railway bridge, but met and then overcame resistance in Doorwerthsche wood.
By 2030 to 2100 hours, 2 PARA reached the still intact road brigde. quickly securing the northerned end, Frost then ordered a platoon (commanded by Lt. J.H. Graybrun VC) across the bridge. The Germans however were established there, with an armoured car and heavy weapons firing along the Bridge. Grayburn was hit almost instantly, but pressed on until ordered to retire.
That night, with the Bridge far from secure, Frost could only fortify his position and try to gather in his missing me. By morning his force grew to 300-400 men.
Meanwhile, 3 PARA had run into enemy, supported by armoured cars at a road junction west of Oosterbeek. With thier anti tank weapon PIAT (Projector Infantry Anti Tank), the armoured cars were destroyed, but the Infantry held them up. "C" Company, was ordered to find another route to the bridge, but were split up, with platoons fighting individual actions until they meet at the railway station in Arnhem. After another skirmish, a severely mauled company joined 2 PARA at the Bridge.
The Rest of 3 PARA fought from the Crossroads to the railway station, but were halted by enemy artillery. Through out the day they battled underneath pressure from mortars, slef propelled guns and infantry.
However Eisenhower did agree to a modified plan, one which would rely on 21st Army Group thrusting to and beyond the Rhine, supported largely by its own resources. Montgomery had many problems though in his plan to cross the Rhine. 3 of these were rivers, the River Mass, the Maas-Waal Canal and the Rhine itself. 3 Bridges, at Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem had to be seized and held for this plan to work.
Also there was only one, narrow road on the route, which would prove nightmarish when it came to logistics. The 3 Bridges would have to be held and held intact for at least 48 hours if the armoured thrust wasnt to be bogged down, and the Germans reinforced.
The task of holding the three bridges fell on the shoulders of 1st Airborne Corps, consisting of the American 82nd (All American) and 101st (Screaming Eagles) and the British 1st Airborne Divisons. Dropping simultaneously, the Americans would open a corridor from Eindhoven to Nijmegen (82nd and 101st respectively) the the Britsh 1st would seize Arnhem.
Airborne operations, still to this day, are one of the most dangerous missons to the armed forces. They rely on surprise to seize their objectives. Being lightly armed, they must have completed their objectives and have been reinforced before the enemy can bring superior forces and firepower to bear.
The Seeds of Failure;
3 things were to hamper the 1st Airborne Divison efforts to sieze Arnhem.
1: There was insufficent airlift, to drop the entire divison on day. Therefore on the first day of the operation, only the 1st Parachute Brigade, 1st Air-Landing Brigade and the Divisonal HQ could be dropped. The 4th Parachute Brigade and the 1st Polish Brigade would be dropped on the second and third day of the operation respectively. Therefore only half the divison would gain the element of surprise and even then, the majority of 1st Air Landing Brigade was tasked with protecting the drop zones for the subsequent drops.
2: The terrain south of Arnhem bridge, were waterlogged. Not to mention the eight foot ditches which spanned them. This made glider landings and Para drops dangerous. Major General Urquhart selected the drop zones to be in the west, a further eight miles away from the Brigde.
3: Thirdly and most damning of all, was that Military intelligence was misleading. It was not known to the 1st Airborne Divison that the 9th and 10th Panzer (Armoured) Divisons were stationed to the east of Arnhem. This infomation did actually reach Allied Inteligence via the Dutch resistance, but for reasons unknown, was discounted.
The First Day;
The first day, there was little falk and the vast majority of Parachute and glider troops reach thier Drop Zones. However of the 38 Gliders which didnt arrive, were the armoured Jeeps of the Reconnaissance Squadron. Not only this, but the weather worsened and delayed future troop and supply drops and stop air support.
However, providing that the 2nd Army could keep on scheudle, Operation MArket Garden could still succeed.
Setting off on foot, 1st Brigade closed on the brigde. 2 PARA (2nd Parachute Battalion) under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost, moved to Heelsum. 3 PARA moved on the Heelsum-Arnhem road to approach the Bridge from the north.
In Heelsum, 2 PARA ambushed some German vehicles and took 20 germans prisoners. They arrived too late to stop the destruction of the Railway bridge, but met and then overcame resistance in Doorwerthsche wood.
By 2030 to 2100 hours, 2 PARA reached the still intact road brigde. quickly securing the northerned end, Frost then ordered a platoon (commanded by Lt. J.H. Graybrun VC) across the bridge. The Germans however were established there, with an armoured car and heavy weapons firing along the Bridge. Grayburn was hit almost instantly, but pressed on until ordered to retire.
That night, with the Bridge far from secure, Frost could only fortify his position and try to gather in his missing me. By morning his force grew to 300-400 men.
Meanwhile, 3 PARA had run into enemy, supported by armoured cars at a road junction west of Oosterbeek. With thier anti tank weapon PIAT (Projector Infantry Anti Tank), the armoured cars were destroyed, but the Infantry held them up. "C" Company, was ordered to find another route to the bridge, but were split up, with platoons fighting individual actions until they meet at the railway station in Arnhem. After another skirmish, a severely mauled company joined 2 PARA at the Bridge.
The Rest of 3 PARA fought from the Crossroads to the railway station, but were halted by enemy artillery. Through out the day they battled underneath pressure from mortars, slef propelled guns and infantry.
