h2g2 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: Earth Edition

Basically I agree with your comments on my points 1 and 2, but would like to add that if we can't distinguish between unpredictable-in-principle and random, and we can show that u-i-p events must happen, but that genuine randomness can never be demonstrated, then the term random becomes meaningless, although this is an epistemological constraint, not an ontological one.

I'm less sure about the random creation and destruction of rules, though. If it happened often enough the results would be indistinguishable from non-rule governed behaviour. And how would you detect such changes in the rules? Again, the point is epistemological.

Noggin

I admit the bit about random creation/destruction of rules is a bit of a get-out.

What I was thinking about was the random creation of particles (or even elephants, scale doesn;t really matter when discussing such things) and I thought that you can't have a creation without rules. What you create must be defined in some way. So you need a rule governing the creation. As such then, the creation (or destruction) of something can't itself be random, it must abey certain rules. So therefore it must be the rules governing that creation/destruction whose appearance is random.

However, this all feels like a fudge to me. Why stop at the physical, why shouldn;t rule creation require rules?

The reason I'm off down this path is to try and define the scope of the random to affect the causal. I.e. the creation of the event may be random but from its creation on it is causal. So what we get is a causal space coping with an unexpected, unpredicted event occurence, but the reaction of causal space is a predictable reaction *given that* such an event occured in the first place.

In fact, I'm not even sure that random is a useful term at all. I tend to think of universal space (incorporating both causal and non-causal) as large multidimensional fields of overlapping and interacting probabilities. S'only way I can picture it. And I ain't sure that that is really random, since probabilities obey rules.

BTW, I'm not going down the epistemological route because I concur that subjectively it is not possible to tell whether anything is random or simply very complicated. That's a restriction of our real world perception. But it doesn't (and I feel shouldn't) stop us proposing what could be behind it. You never know, there might be some telltale sign discovered (although I doubt it).

I do seem to have taken over in here and produced reams and reams with you two adding a few comments - do hope you don;t mind but I've found I enjoy thinking about this stuff. It's sortof the most complicated puzzle you can try and figure out, only with no certain expectation of ever being able to manage to do so.

There's a difference between 'unpredictable in principle' and random in that u-i-p is caused and random isn't. To demonstrate which category our apparently random event falls into requires identification of the cause. For example radioactive decay appears random - no known cause precedes the decay of any individual atom but the average decay rate, defined as the half-life, is exquisitely regular. I can't say if this is u-i-p or random but until a plausible cause is found it has to be presumed random.

F

Write all you want, Icky. Seeing how other people approach the problem is fascinating in itself.

<>

Hold that thought. It's important.

<<...I concur that subjectively it is not possible to tell whether anything is random or simply very complicated.>>

My point is that it is *objectively* not possible. Any telltale sign (it wouldn't be a proof) would take the sort of form that Fathom mentioned - a predictable regularity to unpredictableness.

Yes, call these events random if you like; they are, after all, random to us. But there is no no way of knowing what they are in themselves. Peel off a layer of the onion and there will still be another layer beneath.

Noggin

I haven't forgotten about this, it's just I tend to need a clear hour or two to think things through before responding!

But two things which I'd appreciate a bit of further explanation on:

1) Fathom, you say "I can't say if this is u-i-p or random but until a plausible cause is found it has to be presumed random."
I would have agreed with you a month or so ago, but given that the concept of randomness is starting to seem a bit tarnished, since we can't actually tell if anything is or not, should we not presume that it is 'cause unknown' since saying it is random is really telling us anything?

2) Noggin, you say "My point is that it is *objectively* not possible" - intrigued by why it would be objectively impossible. My understanding of objective is that it is to see what is really there without filters, distortions and artefacts, to see everything would thus include being able to see all the causes all the way down the link.
Is it that, in order to be comprehensible (to be 'seen') then that something must obey rules. Thus, since randomness does not obey any rules (except when it does, for no reason at all) it is not comprehensible and thus cannot be 'seen'?

I'm wavering on the edge of a void here, is it then your understanding that randomness is incomprehensible by any intellect of any size or shape or degree? It may well be the surroundings of causal space, but we can in no manner interact with it nor comprehend it thus it is irrelevant as it can have no explanatory power in and of itself? Only the products thereof can?

It's objectively not possible in the sense that the limitation to our knowledge is not just a limitation on *current* knowledge, but a limitation of what *can* be known. We *cannot* know the exact position and exact momentum of a particle at the same time (Heisenberg); a predicting machine *cannot* predict its own future internal states (Church-Tuhring).

So there will always be events that are u-i-p, even in a fully deterministic universe. And of course random events will also be u-i-p. What we can't do is to distinguish between the two possible types of u-i-p events.

Noggin

Ah, I see. Is it then, do you think, worthwhile having discussions about possible random/causal basis for everything?

Just a brief reply, mainly to bump it my list before it gets lost.

Yes it is worthwhile, but probablywith some shift of emphasis towards what we can make sense of, rather than what we can prove to be true.

Noggin

Bookmark.

Still thinking about this.

F

me too. I'd been reading A32511197 by felonious monk about string theory and its value, and the value of untestable hypotheses in general. Things like evolutionary psychology, even the soft personal side of psychology.

I'm currently thinking that there is value in an untestable hypothesis if it provides explanations for observations in a coherent framework which is a) not excluded by some other testable (and tested) hypothesis and b) is not unnecessarily more complicated than other hypothesis which explain the same things.

Basically I've been trying to discern a difference between, for example, the machievallian hypothesis (http://www.thegreatdebate.org.uk/MGCCHNotes.html) and divine theories of intelligence.

I prefer the EP theory but is that just bias on my part against religious thinking or is there a rational process I can apply which supports my thinking. I think there is, but would be interested to hear your comments on it.

oh, and if that is too off-topic, is there anyone current in the field of philosophy writing about the subjects above who you'd recommend reading up on?

Also, I came across a website for an american jewish woman who described herself as an analytical rationalist. Employed by one of the universities there as a philosopher I think, has written a couple of books but can't for the life of me remember her name. Bit of a long shot, but any ideas?

This is heavy stuff for this time of night.

EP would make sense if we knew what conditions humans lived under 100,000 years ago and what selection pressures were present. Right now we don't even know what caused us to walk upright. I think there's mileage in this but they may be hard fought miles.

I'm not up on philosophers as such. I suspect Noggin's your man in that department.

F

Have either of you come across Roger Penrose's arguments against conciousness being computable? He's using Godel's incompleteness theorem as the core of his argument.

I found some references to it on this CiF thread:
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/guy_dammann/2008/04/after_life.html#comment-1263560

there's a summary at that link (dunno how accurate it is) and there's a link to a talk he did on it
http://online.kitp.ucsb.edu/online/plecture/penrose/

I'll have to wait till i get home to listen it but thought I'd drop it here for your consideration, I'm a bit wary of it at the moment, but Penrose does know his stuff so shall have to see what he has to say!

If consciousness isn't computable how does a brain manage it? If the brain isn't computing then what exactly is it doing? If on the other hand the brain is computing then what else is producing the consciousness?

The suggestion that - given that consciousness is a real phenomenon - it isn't computable harks back to some kind of dualism.

Why, in fact, is consciousness afforded some kind of magical status anyway? Surely as soon as any being or computing device is able to recognise that it is an individual, distinct from other parts of its environment, some form of consciousness must instantly arise?

F

ah, but then you get the question of scale.
At one level you could say that a simple touch pad, such as on an alarm clock, has an innate sense of self and not self as it detects an interaction with it from the outside world. However, I am certainly not implying that alarm clocks are conscious!
But one can imagine an increasing number of detectors and the computing power to connect them and process them and react, predict, interpret the outside world.
Is there some magic level at which the number and complexity of inputs/processes gives rise to what we call consciousness?
Many people have long been wary of seeing consciousness in animals, but elephants and dolphins have been shown to be self aware, and I think one other, which is consciousness is it not? But certainly not like ours. Is there a scale of consciousness? Or rather a field of consciousness where there is not simple higher or lower but different as well.

Sure, why not?

Is there some law of nature that says consciousness either is or isn't with no possibility of scale?

F

I have to admit I concur. Especially as I don't think that consciousness is necessarily a thing in it's own right, but rather a label we apply to a somewhat nebulous set of traits, behaviours and reactions.

So, if consciousness is a field, a fuzzy-edged set of varying descriptions of consciousness, does the definition of the consciousness depend on the organism that gives rise to it, in large amount?

I mean, yes, nurture will have an effect, but not sure how much since nurture tends to affect personality rather than consciousness.

Is 'human consciousness' a trait which can be used to describe what it is like to be a human? (yeah I know, shades of whatisfaces 'what is it like to be a bat').

Most, I think, would agree that an ant is not as conscious as a human is. Which could indicate that there is a scale from more to less conscious.

Is it then, and this could be a tad contentious, possible to be a living, breathing, reacting (to external world) human and not have consciousness? I include reacting to exclude things like being asleep, KOd, coma etc.

That's an interesting point. While we might agree that there are varying degrees of consciousness - presumably related to 'intelligence' whatever that may mean - across species, can we say that a range exists within humans? Are there people who, for whatever reason, have a lower or higher level of consciousness than me?

Your "living, breathing, reacting (to external world) human" without consciousness sounds to me very much like a zombie. Perhaps such a thing is possible and perhaps there are people with specific types of brain damage who exhibit this effect.

I'm off to see what I can find on this subject.

F

do come back with anything you find!

I've opened a regular can of worms here. It may take some time to sift the wheat from the chaff; there's an awful lot of pseudoscience in this field.

F