A History of the Ontological Argument by reference to J. S. Whale
Created | Updated May 27, 2004
The ontological argument - always being shown out politely at the front door, but always quietly coming in again at the back.
WHALE, J.S. Christian Doctrine, p.25
An outline of the argument's history
This statement claims that the ontological argument is forever being civilly dismissed, but continues to return to restate its claims. Possibly the first example of this can be seen with St Anselm’s version of the argument, which was in its own time challenged by the monk Gaunilo of Marmoutiers. He argued ‘On behalf of the fool1’ and by use of the analogy of the ‘perfect island’ highlighted a major flaw in Anselm’s argument. Gaunilo explained that the perfect island is greater than any other island, and can be conceived in the psyche. Whilst this island would be greater in both the psyche and reality rather than just the psyche, and whilst this was logically possible, this did not mean the island existed. Anselm countered by special pleading, stating that God’s necessary nature made his existence a separate case. Everything else was contingent (may exist at some point in time but not others) so his argument could not be applied to them. We can see then that right from its conception in 1078; the ontological argument has been dismissed, but has come back. In his Summa Theologica of 1264, however, Aquinas made a virulent critique of a version of the ontological argument, derived from Anselm’s case. The argument then disappears until 1637, when Descartes resurrects it in his Meditations. For the next 367 years, the argument is continually advocated, by such eminent philosophers as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and contested, by equally eminent philosophers such as Hume and Kant. This would therefore seem to support the accuracy of Whale’s statement that the ontological argument is always being dismissed, but continually resurfacing.Oppy's Taxonomy
One reason for the frequency of the ontological argument’s appearance is that it can exist in many forms. Graham Oppy2 defined a taxonomy of the ontological argument, identifying seven main versions of the argument, which have been cited by various philosophers. The first type is the definitional argument, which is basically the argument as stated by Descartes, which was also proposed by Leibniz3 in 1709, whilst the second category is the conceptual/hyperintensional argument, as presented by Anselm. The third class, the modal ontological argument is derived from Anselm’s Third Proslogion4, and was proposed in the mid-twentieth century by Hartshorne5, Malcolm6, and Plantinga7. It states that as God is not a contingent being, either it is impossible for him to exist, or he is a necessary being. If he is necessary, then it is necessary for him to exist, ergo God exists.Alexius Meinong defined8 and gave his name to the fourth strand, the Meinongian argument, more recently restated by Gödel9. Through complex mathematics it claims that a schema (e.g. “The F G is F”) expresses a truth. Therefore the existent [F] perfect being [G] is existent [F] expresses truth, so there is a perfect being who is existent, and this is God. The word ‘God’ itself is seen by Rescher10 as only having a definition if God exists. As there is a definition, then God exists, and this comprises the fifth version of the argument.
The sixth, mereological, argument can be seen in de Spinoza’s
Ethics11. This argues that since I exist, things exist. If a group of things exist, then they must have a merological sum, which exists. God therefore exists as he is the sum of all things. The seventh and last category is the famous ‘Hegelian assertion12’ that God must exist – this being the entire argument.
We can see then that the ontological argument has continually resurfaced, in all its forms, throughout history, quietly coming in again at the back. It is, however, also continually being shown out of the front door, as various philosophers have disparaged it. Gaunilo and Aquinas have already been mentioned, whilst it would also be apt to make reference to Johan de Kater13 and Pierre Gassendi who were contemporaries of Descartes, and whose criticisms of his thoughts coupled with his replies have proven instrumental in clarifying the Cartesian argument. Objections have also been levelled against the nature of ontological arguments as a whole, by Hume14 and Kant15 in the eighteenth century, Frege16 in the nineteenth, and Lewis17 in the twentieth. Therefore, it can be said that Whale’s comment is fully accurate; the argument is always being politely dismissed, but continuously returns.
Politeness of the Dismissal
There is, however, one pedantic point against Whale’s statement. Some of the more prominent dismissals of the ontological argument could hardly be described as ‘polite’. Aquinas’ criticism of the argument was so vitriolic, as to prevent it recurring for over 370 years, whilst Hume’s typically cynical attack derides all a priori arguments as not being any good. Kant is also exceptionally critical, in his famous statement that the Cartesian argument is flawed, since existence is not a predicate, whilst stating that even if it is, the fact that a creature of infinite perfections would have to exist in order to exist, does not prove it exists (it would be impossible to dismiss one of the angles of a triangle, but not the triangle itself). Similarly, Frege claimed that existence is in fact a second order predicate, so all ontological arguments (which by their nature see existence as a first order predicate) are worthless. Lewis went even further, claiming that all ontological arguments are either invalid or raise more questions then they answer. He extended this to claim that most ontological arguments can be interpreted in two different ways, one of which falls into the purview of each of his two criticisms. He therefore states that no ontological argument can be taken seriously.In conclusion then, we can say, from a study of the history of the ontological argument, that Whale was almost completely correct in his statement. For 926 years, the ontological argument has been continually dismissed, often in a less than polite fashion (my one point of issue with Whale’s statement) but continually resurfaces, in a myriad of different forms.
1To whom Anselm addressed the argument.2Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 19953LEIBNIZ, G.W. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding (1709)4The reply to Gaunilo’s critique.5HARTSHORNE, C. Man’s Vision of God (1941)6MALCOLM, N. Anselm’s Ontological Argument (1960)7PLANTINGA, A. The Nature of Necessity (1974)8MEINONG, A. Over Possibility and Probability (1915)9GÖDEL, K. Collected Works Volume III (Published Posthumously 1995)10RESCHER, N. The Ontological Proof Revisited (1959)11de SPINOZA, B. Ethics (1680)12HEGEL, G.W.F. Lectures of 1831 (1831)13Better known as ‘Caterus’.14HUME, D. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part IX (1776)15KANT, I. Critique of Pure Reason (1787)16FREGE, G. Foundations of Arithmetic (1884)17LEWIS, D. Anselm and Actuality (1970)
